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In a letter to Jean-Baptiste Leroy in 1789, Benjamin Franklin observed that “...in this world
nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes!” Individuals and businesses, however,
certainly employ skilful ways to evade taxes until they are caught, if they ever are. Inevitably,
the evolution of taxation systems and their accompanying legal frameworks result in adjustments
to evasion/avoidance patterns and mechanisms, which are of interest to economists, social psy-
chologists, and public administrations alike.
The objective of this thesis is to study the effects of the widespread shift towards indirect
taxation in the European Union (EU) on firms’ tax compliance behaviour. This shift is generally
characterised by rising consumption taxes, in particular the value-added tax (VAT) and falling
corporate tax rates (CIT). While the policy of radical lowering of the corporate tax burden will
likely lead to more honest profit disclosure, my research suggests that firms’ evasion practices
can migrate to other tax bases, such as social security, where plentiful savings from evasion
schemes can be realised. When payroll taxes are significantly above the CIT rates, incentives
emerge for companies to under-report wages, since under-stating labour costs is cheaper than
paying full contributions. Chapter 1 of this dissertation, titled “The Effect of Low Corporate
Tax Rate on Payroll Tax Evasion,” explores the phenomenon of wage under-reporting in the
context of Bulgaria, which has one of the lowest CIT rates in the EU and yet, due to negative
demographic trends and low revenue collection capacity, maintains high payroll contributions.
An interesting trend observed in Central and Eastern Europe, and to a smaller degree in
the ‘Old’ Member States, is that despite dramatic cuts in rates, corporate tax receipts exhibit
an upward tendency. The extent to which firms anticipate tax cuts and shift taxable income
to years with lower CIT rates becomes an important empirical question in view of its relevance
to the deadweight loss of the CIT. Whether accomplished through accounting manipulation or
a reduction of outright evasion, intertemporal income shifting can be one possible explanation
for the stability of CIT revenue. Evidence of income shifting as well as discussion of tax incen-
tives and the timing of CIT cuts is presented in Chapter 2, “Intertemporal Income Shifting in
Expectation of Lower Corporate Tax Rates: The Tax Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe,”
using firm-level panel data for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
Slovakia.
In addition to the greater reliance on indirect taxation, another equally important shift is the
global move towards a cashless economy and its implications for tax enforcement. Chapter 3,
“The Impact of Cash and Card Transactions on VAT Collection Efficiency,” investigates whether
the visibility of card payments contributes to better tax compliance in the case of VAT. While
no evidence is found that card transactions improve VAT performance in a country-level panel
of 26 EU countries, cash payments are shown to be negatively correlated with the VAT-to-
consumption ratio.
Considerable revenue dependence on indirect taxation coupled with a rising level of VAT
fraud necessitate a reform in VAT’s design, and in particular, its method of collection, as pro-
xi
posed recently by the European Commission. The last chapter of the thesis, entitled “Real-time
Collection of the Value-added Tax: Some Business and Legal Implications,” analyses the fea-
sibility of a real-time split-payment mechanism (VAT withholding) for electronic transactions,
which would eliminate the system of fractionated payments, but would also preclude VAT from
passing through private bank accounts. Any technological reform in that direction, however,
raises important issues on data privacy and protection, which can be positioned within the
broader debate on property rights in an economy steadfastly advancing towards payment digiti-
sation. An even more crucial question is whether tax systems should evolve towards involuntary




V dopise Jean-Baptistu Leroyovi v roce 1789, Benjamin Franklin, poznamenal, že "...v tomto
světě není nic, co by bylo jisté, kromě smrti a daní!" Nicméně občané a podniky přicházejí se
šikovnými způsoby, jak se vyhnout placení daní až do té doby, dokud nejsou chyceni, pokud
tedy vůbec někdy chyceni jsou. Vývoj daňových systémů a jejich doprovodných právních rámců
nevyhnutelně vede k úpravám způsobů vyhýbání se daním a mechanismů, které jsou zajímavé
pro ekonomy, sociální psychology, i pro veřejnou správu.
Cílem této práce je studium účinků přesunu směrem k nepřímému zdanění, obecně rozšířeného
v Evropské unii (EU), na dodržování daňových předpisů firmami. Tento posun se obecně vyz-
načuje rostoucími spotřebními daněmi, zejména pak daně z přidané hodnoty (DPH), a poklesem
daně z příjmu právnických osob (DPPO). Přestože politika radikálního snížení korporátní daňové
zátěže pravděpodobně povede k pravdivějšímu reportování zisků, můj výzkum naznačuje, že se
firemní praktiky na vyhýbání se daním přesunou do jiných daňových kategorií, jako je například
daň ze sociálního zabezpečení, kde je možné generovat velké úspory pomocí daňových úniků.
Pokud jsou daně z mezd výrazně vyšší než korporátní daně, vzniká motivace pro firmy, aby
přiznávali uměle nízké mzdy, jelikož podhodnocení nákladů práce je levnější než placení plných
příspěvků. Kapitola 1 této dizertační práce s názvem "Vliv nízké korporátní daňové sazby na
úniky na dani ze mzdy", zkoumá fenomén podhodnocování mezd v Bulharsku, které má jednu z
nejnižších sazeb DPPO v EU, a přesto, díky negativnímu demografickému vývoji a nízké kapacitě
vybírat daně, udržuje vysoké srážky z mezd.
Zajímavý trend, který je možné pozorovat ve střední a východní Evropě a v menším měřítku i
ve "starých" členských státech EU, je, že i přes dramatické snižování sazeb, příjmy z korporátních
daní vykazují vzestupnou tendenci. Do jaké míry firmy předvídají snižování daňových sazeb a
pak přesouvají zdanitelný příjem do let s nižší DPPO se stává důležitou empirickou otázkou vzh-
ledem k jejímu významu pro ztrátu mrtvé váhy z korporátní daně. At’ již je ho dosaženo pomocí
účetních manipulací nebo přímo snížením daňových úniků, intertemporální přesouvání příjmů
může být jedním z možných vysvětlení pro stabilitu příjmů z DPPO. Data ohledně intertem-
porálního přesouvání příjmů spolu s diskuzí o daňových pobídkách a načasování snižování DPPO
jsou uvedena v kapitole 2 s názvem "Intertemporální přesouvání příjmů v důsledku očekáváných
nižších korporátních daňových sazeb: Daňové reformy ve střední a východní Evropě". Kapi-
tola používá panelová data na úrovni firem z Bulharska, České republiky, Mad’arska, Polska,
Rumunska a Slovenska.
Další neméně důležitý posun, kromě většího spoléhání se na nepřímé daně, je globální posun
směrem k bezhotovostní ekonomice a jeho důsledky pro vymáhání daní. Kapitola 3 s názvem
"Dopad peněžních a karetních transakcí na ǔčinnost výběru DPH," zkoumá, zda viditelnost
plateb kartou přispívá k lepšímu plnění daňových povinností v případě DPH. Zatímco se nepo-
dařilo prokázat, že by karetní transakce zvyšovaly výběr DPH na panelu s 26 zemi EU, platby
v hotovosti mají prokazatelně negativní korelaci s poměrem DPH a spotřeby.
Značná závislost příjmů na nepřímých daních spolu s rostoucí četností podvodů na DPH si
xiii
vyžaduje reformu v designu DPH, a zejména pak způsobu jejího výběru, tak jak nedávno navrhla
Evropská komise. Poslední kapitola této dizertační práce s názvem "Výběr daně z přidané hod-
noty v reálném čase: Některé obchodní a právní důsledky,"analyzuje proveditelnost mechanismu
split-plateb v reálném čase (zadržování DPH) pro elektronické platby, což by eliminovalo sys-
tém dělených plateb, ale také znemožnilo, aby DPH procházelo soukromými bankovními účty.
Každá technologická reforma v tomto směru však vyvolává důležité otázky týkající se ochrany
soukromých údajů, které mohou být analyzovány v kontextu širší debaty o vlastnických právech
v ekonomice vytrvale postupující směrem k platební digitalizaci. Ještě důležitější otázkou je, zda
by se daňové systémy měly vyvíjet směrem k nedobrovolnému plnění, vzhledem k nebývalému
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The Effect of Low Corporate Tax Rate on
Payroll Tax Evasion
It is a commonly held view that the widespread policy of cutting the corporate income tax has a positive
effect on taxable income through decreasing firms’ incentive to hide profits. A neglected side of this
policy, however, is its potential to trigger more evasion in other tax bases, such as the social security
base, especially if the corporate income tax rate is low compared to the payroll rate. I develop a model
in which employers and employees cooperate in declaring lower wages to the tax authorities in order to
evade payroll contributions. Since wages and payroll taxes are a deductible expense for firms, a lower
reported wage translates into higher corporate profits on paper and hence, shifting of tax liability out of
social security into the corporate tax base. Using firm-level panel data for Bulgaria, where the problem of
contribution evasion is prevalent, the estimates indicate that a 1% increase in the net-of-tax-share of the
corporate tax rate reduces reported wages in the economy by .21%, but leads to higher taxable incomes.
An identical increase in the payroll net-of-tax-share results in a .28% rise in wages. The separate tax
bases respond strongly to changes in the corporate tax rate, with the overall impact on the combined
tax base of wages and taxable incomes being negative.
Keywords: Corporate tax, Payroll tax, Evasion, Wage under-reporting, Bulgaria
JEL Classification: H25; H26; H55; J3
1.1 Introduction
The evasion of social security contributions has been a long-standing problem in the countries of
Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Crude estimates for some Latin Ameri-
can countries in the early 1990s indicate that 50% to 60% of the contribution liability remained
uncollected, with Brazil heading the list, while between 20% and 30% of total contribution in-
come in CEE was evaded in the mid-1990s, as estimated by the International Labour Office
(Gillion et al., 2000).
I wish to thank Libor Dušek, Peter Katuščák, Viktor Steiner, Peter Egger, Clemens Fuest, Jan Kmenta and
the seminar participants at Potsdam University, Ruhr University of Bochum, CESifo Venice Summer Institute
and the University of Copenhagen for useful comments. Any remaining errors are mine.
1
In 2002, for example, according to a number of surveys, approximately 34% of all employed
in Bulgaria under-stated their true wages and 25% worked without an official labour contract
(CSD, 2004). Based on a survey in Hungary, Tonin (2011) documents that 56% of the interviewed
households claimed that employers declare the minimum wage and pay the rest in cash in the
form of “envelope wages.” In Estonia undeclared labour income amounted to 8-9% of GDP in
2001 (Kriz et al., 2007). Although pervasive in CEE and Latin America, payroll tax evasion is
by no means limited to these regions. In fact, as Gillion et al. (2000) point out, this type of
evasion poses a challenge even in the OECD countries, albeit on a smaller scale.
In China, where the problem is substantial, Zhu and Nyland (2004) find that barely 18% of
private firms met their mandated obligations fully in 2000. In a 2001 study of 2,200 randomly
audited companies in Shanghai, 71% were found to pay less than the prescribed social secu-
rity contributions, with big firms tending to evade more contributions relative to smaller firms
(Nyland et al., 2006).
Not only does payroll tax evasion undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the social secu-
rity system, but it also distorts labour markets by creating unfair competition and necessitating
higher tax rates to generate required revenue. Unlike tax evasion that affects the general func-
tioning of government, contribution evasion directly impacts current pensioners’ benefits and
compliant contributors under the defined benefit (DB) scheme. It reduces aggregate savings and
output and may result in the introduction of a minimum pension paid from general revenue in
defined contribution (DC) systems with low personal savings (Manchester, 1999; Gillion et al.,
2000). When achieved through the under-reporting of wage earnings, contribution evasion tends
to flatten the benefits structure, erodes the personal income tax (PIT) base and, depending on
strategy, spreads out to other tax bases as well.
There are various ways for an employer to evade the payment of contributions. The principal
strategies include failing to register an employee or registering him as a contractor/temporary
worker, not remitting contributions to the authorities, underpaying withheld contributions, or
under-reporting wage payments (McGillivray, 2001; Bailey and Turner, 2001). Theoretically,
the issue of wage under-reporting has been tackled by Gideon Yaniv in a series of papers in the
context of PIT (Yaniv 1988, 1992). Yaniv (1988) studies the advantages of withholding versus
self-declaration for personal income taxation. In particular, he explores the possibilities of tax
evasion in a withholding system, in which the employer remits employees’ withheld PIT taxes
to the authorities. In many countries employers are responsible for filing a tax return on behalf
of employees in the absence of other personal income but the labour income. All of the above
schemes, therefore, can be executed with or without employees’ collusion.
Studying evasion is especially difficult due to its illegality and hence, lack of consistent data.
Nevertheless, various theoretical and empirical studies, predominantly on personal income tax
evasion, have emerged, primarily after 1972, when Allingham and Sandmo (1972) positioned
evasion in a specific theoretical framework. Contribution evasion, however, remains largely
unexplored in the economic literature, even though there is a significant discussion of the rea-
sons, consequences and possible strategies for fighting payroll tax evasion (Gillion et al., 2000;
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McGillivray, 2001; Bailey and Turner, 2001; Manchester, 1999).
This chapter examines the effect of the widespread policy of cutting the corporate income tax
(CIT) rate on contribution evasion in Bulgaria accomplished through massive under-reporting of
labour income. From 1997 to 2002, the CIT rate decreased by 7 percentage point on average in
CEE (European Commission, 2011). Bulgaria was not an exception to this trend. Specifically,
the statutory CIT rate declined from 42.4% to 23.5% for big companies and from 33.4% to
23.5% for smaller businesses. Social security rates, however, exhibited only a slight downward
trend, moving from 44% in 1997 to 42.7% in 2002. Yet, the reduction in direct taxes in Bulgaria
did not translate into a narrower compliance gap, a fact largely attributed to the excessive
burden of compulsory contributions (Pashev, 2005). The decreased corporate burden made it
more advantageous to shift evasion towards the payroll tax base, where larger savings could be
realised.
The most common way of evading contributions was the under-statement of workers’ real
earnings, which triggered evasion in the PIT base too (CSD, 2004). Since firms under-stated
wages, they necessarily ended up with higher corporate profits, as labour costs are a deductible
expense. Thus, a trade-off emerged between overpaying CIT and paying full contributions.
Given that the CIT rate was significantly lower than the payroll rate, firms would rather not
report their full costs by under-stating wages, than pay their full payroll tax liability.
I develop a theoretical framework in which employers and employees cooperate in under-
reporting actual wages for tax purposes. As a consequence, employers decrease their payroll tax
payments, while employees receive higher net wages. The declaration of lower wage payments
than incurred in reality increases the firm’s taxable income (TI) and hence, profit tax liability.
The employer, therefore, can decide to decrease TI through the manipulation of sales or other
schemes in order to bring profit down to its actual level, or to overpay corporate income tax,
fully or partially. With CIT rates falling, overpaying tax on profits is not an irrational strategy
when payroll tax evasion is ongoing, as it can divert tax authorities’ attention from investigat-
ing previously reported profit and especially the wage pattern of the firm. I then derive the
relationships between the magnitude of fraud, the payroll and the CIT rates.
To find out whether there is indeed shifting of tax liability out of social security into the
corporate tax base, I use firm-level panel data for Bulgaria from 1997 to 2002. I study the effect
of the payroll and the CIT rate, and the difference between the two on reported wages and
taxable incomes by firms. The presence of income shifting would manifest as a positive effect
of the corporate tax rate on reported wages and a negative effect of the payroll rate on taxable
income. The effect of the tax wedge on wages should be negative, as an increase in the tax wedge
makes income shifting out of the payroll base more profitable and hence, drives reported wages
down. Even if only a fraction of firms decide to overpay corporate income tax as a result of their
evasion activities in the social security base, the tax wedge should have a positive influence on
reported taxable incomes in the corporate base. The two-rate CIT code until 2002, the annual
cuts in the CIT, and the fact that different categories of labour are subject to different payroll
contribution rates within and across years are exploited as sources of variation in the tax rates.
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The results show that a 1% increase in the CIT net-of-tax-share reduces wages in the economy
by .21%, but raises taxable incomes. Conversely, a 1% rise in the payroll net-of-tax-share results
in .28% higher reported wages. Despite the opposing effects of the corporate tax rate on the
separate tax bases of wages and taxable income, the impact of CIT on the combined base of
wages and taxable income is found to be negative, due to the prevailing negative response of
wages and limited change in TI.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of analysis;
Section 3 provides an overview of the Bulgarian social security system and the major reforms
over the period of interest as well as sketches the main features of the CIT law, while Sections 4
and 5 discuss the data, the empirical specification, and test the main hypotheses generated by
the model; Section 6 evaluates the impact of the tax reforms on the full tax base, and Section
7 concludes.
1.2 The Model
In the model that follows the firm under-reports its wage bill while having the consent of its
employees, and shares the benefits of evasion with them. The firm simultaneously decides
whether to overpay corporate profits, only part of the increase in profit, or none of it.
Let the true profit of the firm be πreal = Y (L∗)−wRL∗−wRL∗ts, where wR is the gross wage
paid to the employee in the absence of fraud, L∗ is the number of workers, already optimally
chosen by the firm, and ts is the payroll tax rate on the employer.1 Y (L∗) is the value of output.
Since the total wage bill depends both on the number of employees and their individual wages, I
assume that the company has optimally chosen its number of employees and manipulates wages
in order to adjust the total wage bill.
Denote te to be the payroll rate on workers and tp the personal income tax rate. A non-
evading firm pays wR(1 + ts) per employee, while a worker’s after-tax earnings are (1− tp)(1−
te)w
R. If the firm under-reports wR by an amount u, the gross wage for tax purposes becomes
wR − u. This type of evasion generates benefits from three different sources: Contributions
payable by the firm decrease by utsL∗, uteL∗ is the fall in employees’ contributions and finally,
PIT revenue goes down by tp(1− te)uL∗.
No bargaining mechanism is introduced between workers and employers for the redistribution
of the above-mentioned gains.2 Before a person is hired, he needs to sign an employment
1Allowing for an endogenous number of employees, it can be shown that due to contribution evasion, the
marginal cost of labour goes down, which makes it profitable to hire more workers. Even if the firm adjusts its
number of workers, the incentive for contribution evasion (income shifting) is still present as long as the necessary
condition for evasion, eq. (1.2.9), holds.
2Using survey data for Bulgaria, Perotti (2012) studies the factors affecting workers’ decision to have their
earnings under-reported. She finds that the subjective probability of survival to the age of 70 as well as the
perceived tax-benefit linkage influence the intertemporal trade-off between higher net income today and a higher
pension in future. Until 2000, the pension system was almost “Beveridgean," characterised by a very weak linkage
between paid contributions and obtained pension. The reason for this is that the amount of personal pension
for length of service and old age was calculated on the average monthly gross remuneration or income, on which
insurance contributions were paid for a period of three consecutive years, which the person could choose from
the last 15 years of service until January 1st, 1997 (emphasis mine). For a person retiring after January 1997,
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contract stipulating his exact gross remuneration to be wR − u, with the mutual understanding
that he will actually receive wR with u given under the table. The worker’s net wage increases
by tpu + teu(1 − tp), i.e., it is assumed that the savings realised due to evaded employee’s
contributions go back to the employee in the form of higher compensation. In other words,
if the total payroll rate is 30% divided into a 80:20 ratio between an employer and a worker,
under-reporting the wage by $1 results in a 24¢ gain for the employer and a 6¢ gain for the
worker, ignoring the PIT benefit.
As the firm cannot report its true wage bill, the profit that it declares to the authorities
is πreported = Y (L∗) − (wR − u)L∗ − (wR − u)L∗ts. The real profit as a result of contribution
evasion increases to
πreal,evasion = Y (L∗)− wRL∗ − (wR − u)L∗ts > πreal (1.2.1)
The difference πreported−πreal = (1+ ts)uL∗ constitutes an evasion-driven increase in profit that
can be taxed at the corporate tax rate tc. It is at this point that social security evasion creates
incentives for further manipulation of taxable income in the corporate income tax base.
Without contribution evasion, reported taxable income is such that the marginal benefit of
reporting one more dollar equals the marginal cost. The under-reporting of wages artificially
increases TI above its optimal level and the firm has an incentive to bring profit down. This is
not a costless procedure, however, since manipulation of invoices, or whatever other method the
firm chooses to hide the rise in profits, involves the risk of being caught. Moreover, an audit
based on suspicions that a firm under-reports wages can also uncover manipulation of profits,
whether or not triggered by contribution evasion. In any case, contribution evasion increases
the probability of audit in general, and hence the marginal cost of profit manipulation goes up,
inducing profit over-reporting.
Knowing by how much its profit rises on paper, a firm can choose to hide part of its sales or
choose another strategy in order not to pay corporate income tax in excess of its true liability.
Suppose that the firm subtracts a fraction φuL∗(1 + ts) from its taxable income. Thus, if φ = 0,
there is no attempt to bring profit down to its true level and part of the losses in social security
revenue are mitigated by more collections in the corporate tax base. If φ > 0 (φ = 1), the cost
of contribution evasion is partially (entirely) eliminated. The case when φ > 1 is not considered.
In other words, the firm is restricted to not manipulate profit for its own sake but only as a
consequence of wage under-reporting.3
As long as the firm engages in fraud in both bases, the total amount evaded is:
E = (ts + te + tp(1− te))uL∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
PIT+ total social security




besides the three years of their choice, the length of service after 1997 was also added to the period on which the
pension was calculated (Tafradjiyski et al., 2005). It is clear that, by design, the system until 2000 contained an
in-built incentive to promote insurance on a minimum wage and full insurance for only three years. The pension
reform in 2000 strengthened the tax-benefit link to a certain extent.
3If a firm reports zero taxable income, then it completely removes the cost of payroll evasion and the corporate
income tax, although it faces a higher probability of audit.
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The firm’s behaviour is constrained by the probability of detection and penalties that make
evasion costly. Let the probability of detection be p̄ = p1(φ(1 + ts)uL∗) + p2( uwR ), where p1(.)
is a function of the amount by which the firm adjusts its TI, in order to bring profit closer
to its actual level. p1(.) is the probability of being caught for cheating at the corporate tax
base, while p2(.) is the probability that the mechanism of contribution evasion is exposed. I
follow Slemrod and Gordon (2000) and assume an endogenous detection probability that is an
increasing function of evaded income in the corporate tax base, so that p′1(φ(1 + ts)uL∗) > 0.
p2(.) is a function of the ratio of the amount of wage under-reported to the total wage and is
also assumed to be increasing in the amount of wage under-reported, p′2(
u
wR
) > 0. A firm that
is paying contributions on minimum wages is more likely to attract attention than a firm paying
the average wage for the economy. If u = 0, then p1 = p2 = 0, which captures the previous
assumption that there will be no corporate income adjustment without contribution evasion.
The firm is risk neutral. Its after-tax profit if not detected is:
πnd = Y (L∗)− wRL∗ − (wR − u)tsL∗
− tc[Y (L∗)− (wR − u)L∗(1 + ts)− φuL∗(1 + ts)] (1.2.3)
For the determination of a penalty scheme, it is assumed that an audit performed for cor-
porate tax evasion uncovers wage under-statement and vice versa. An important question in
this context is whether the firm will be reimbursed for its overpayment of profit (if any), not
reimbursed, or penalised for engaging in evasion in general (Yaniv, 1988). In the first two cases
– full or partial reimbursement and no reimbursement at all – the firm faces no penalty for
manipulating profits provided that it is triggered by contribution evasion. Therefore, it pays off
to set φ = 1. If not detected, the firm will have eliminated the cost of its contribution fraud
partially or fully. If detected, it will be punished for payroll and personal income tax evasion,
but not corporate profit under-statement. Thus, even though the profit tax is overpaid, it makes
sense not to reimburse the firm, but to punish it with a fraction of the tax “evaded”. In a sense
this would be a punishment for not overpaying CIT completely because, if this were the case,
then no CIT “evasion” would have taken place. The penalty under these conditions becomes:
P = λ1(ts + te + tp(1− te))uL∗ + λ2tcφ(1 + ts)uL∗ (1.2.4)
where λ1 > 1 and λ2 < 1.4 In the event of detection, the firm’s profit changes to:
πd = Y (L∗)− wRL∗ − (wR − u)tsL∗
− tc[Y (L∗)− (wR − u)L∗(1 + ts)]− λ1(ts + te + tp(1− te))uL∗
− λ2tcφ(1 + ts)uL∗
= πnd − P (1.2.5)
4An additional assumption behind this penalty structure is that the firm bears full responsibility for evaded
employees’ contributions. This possibility is not accounted for by the law, so the fact that workers cooperate
willingly is ignored.
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An employer then chooses φ∗, and u∗ to maximise expected profit:
E[π] = (1− p̄)πnd + p̄πd. (1.2.6)
The first-order conditions for this problem are:
∂E[π]
∂φ
= tc − p′1P − (p1 + p2)λ2tc = 0 (1.2.7)
∂E[π]
∂u






where A = λ1(ts + te + tp(1− te)).




function of both the probability of detection for profit manipulation p1 as well as the probability
of detection for contribution evasion p2, and is equal to the marginal benefit, tc. The second-
order condition of (1.2.7) also imposes a restriction on p′′1(φ(1 + ts)uL∗).5
It can be seen from (1.2.8) that the marginal benefit of under-reporting wage by one dollar,
ts, equals the marginal cost of over-reporting profit at the corporate tax base plus the expected




which requires that the CIT is below the payroll rate.
Denote E[π] = f . Let fφ and fφφ be the first and second derivatives of f with respect to φ.
















where dts = dtp = dtp = dλ1 = dλ2 = dwR = 0, since I would like to consider only the
effects of a change in tc.













= fφφfuu − fφu2 > 06
5The second-order condition is −(1 + ts)uL∗(p′′1 + 2p′1λ2tc) < 0 and holds if p′′1 > 0, i.e. if p1 is convex. The
second-order condition of (1.2.8) imposes the same restriction on p2, p′′2 > 0









It can be shown that det|B| < 0, so that dudtc < 0 (see Appendix 1.1 for derivations).
This negative relationship is not unexpected. A decrease in tc stimulates contribution evasion
by decreasing both the marginal cost of reporting more profit and the expected penalty so that
d(wR−u)
dtc
> 0. Thus, cutting the CIT rate can raise taxable income in the economy through
two separate channels: First, a smaller rate translates into less corporate tax evasion; second,
a lower rate triggers more social security evasion through the under-reporting of wages with at
least some firms over-reporting corporate profits. Therefore, the policy of lowering the corporate
tax burden may backfire through more evasion in another base.
Studying the effect of a change in ts on wR − u, wR − u is decreasing in the payroll rate,
again pointing to the fact that increasing the contribution burden may cause more wage under-
reporting. This is due to the positive sign of dudts > 0 (Appendix 1.1).
The relationships between the tax rates and φ are dφdtc < 0 and
dφ
dts
> 0 and are derived with
Cramer’s rule in the same fashion as the relationship between u, tc and ts above. A decrease in
tc leads to higher φ since, all else being equal, the firm has a stronger incentive to under-report
wages, and therefore needs to manipulate profit more. A fall in ts lowers φ for precisely the
opposite reason.
Lastly, the effect of tax rates on taxable income is explored. The TI that is going to be taxed
at the corporate base is:
TI = Y (L∗)− (wR − u)L∗(1 + ts)− φuL∗(1 + ts) (1.2.12)
Proceeds to the government from fines are ignored, so the focus is only on changes in revenue


















On the one hand, a lower CIT rate decreases TI because φ goes up. On the other hand, lower
tc increases TI because u increases, so the overall effect is ambiguous. Note that there will be a
further effect – bigger incentive for honest reporting of profits unrelated to payroll tax evasion
– which is not captured by the above formulation, and which will most likely lead to dTIdtc > 0
The sign of dTIdts is also ambiguous. Decreasing ts raises taxable income because less payroll tax






















I therefore turn to the data to determine these relationships. Before that, the next section briefly
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describes the reforms in the two tax bases, which form the foundation of the empirical analysis.
1.3 Institutional Background
1.3.1 Social security system: Reform and characteristics
Until 1997 the social security system in Bulgaria was typical of any centrally planned economy:
It was a standard pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) DB plan characterised by a loose linkage between
benefits and contributions, too liberal conditions for access to the pension system, and an insur-
ance burden borne solely by employers. By 1997 it became clear that a reform could no longer
be postponed if the financial sustainability of the system was to be preserved (Shopov et. al.,
2005).
The changes led to the establishment of a three-pillar pension system known as the World
Bank scheme, with the first pillar being the obligatory PAYGO. Some of the mandatory insurance
contributions were redirected towards private occupational and eventually universal pension
funds as well, which formed the basis of the second pillar, capital-based, with individual insurance
accounts. The third pillar is a voluntary insurance system with employees paying voluntary
contributions into individual accounts. For a couple of years after its establishment the second
pillar was restricted to workers from the so-called first and second labour categories who paid
contributions to occupational funds for supplementary pension and early retirement. People
in these two categories are employed in hazardous conditions, such as miners, underground
geologists, hydrologists and others.7
Despite the second pillar’s fully funded structure, contributions are made only by employers.
Note that the empirical section of this chapter does not take into account the part of the payroll
rate that employers pay to 2nd Pillar Universal or Occupational funds, which is reported in
Table 1.1 for the sake of completeness.
Workers in the three different labour categories face different payroll rates, with the first
labour category having the highest rate due to the amount of risk involved in the category’s
professions. In 1999, for example, an employer had to pay 51.7% in payroll contributions for a
first labour category worker, 46.7% and 36.7% for second and third labour category employees,
respectively (Table 1.1). Over the years, these rates have decreased for employers as some of
the contribution burden was gradually shifted to workers.
Prior to 2000, the system did not distinguish between separate insurance risks. From 2000
onward differentiated amounts of insurance contributions for pension, sickness and maternity,
7Firms are assigned to labour categories in accordance with the Decree for the Categorisation of Labour
upon Retirement enacted at the end of 1997. The Decree stipulates the types of labour in the first, second and
third labour categories, which pay different payroll contributions as described in Table 1.1. The following type of
labour falls within the first labour category: Casting of metals, metallurgy, manufacture of petroleum products
and nuclear fuel, mining, and quarrying. The following type of labour falls within the second labour category:
Air, coastal, railway transport, construction of ships, motorways, airfields, water projects, civil engineering works,
collection and treatment of sewage, industrial dyeing (furs), manufacture of pigments, manufacture of glassware,
plastics, rubber, ceramics, cement, explosives, weapons, fertilisers, and glass fibre. The type of labour not














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2: SURVEYS’ ASSESSMENT OF THE DEGREE OF WAGE UNDER-REPORTING
2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
Managers’ perspective on the share of workers with under-declared incomes
Up to 10% 14.4 23.6 25.6 26.6 22.9 22
10% - 25% 12.6 24.6 18.7 11.7 14.2 10.1
25% - 50% 27.3 16.5 18.4 15.5 19.3 24.1
50% - 75% 15.2 8.1 7.8 6.6 3.6 4.4
Above 75% 12.3 6.8 7.5 4.8 7.3 8.3
None 18.2 20.4 21.9 34.8 32.7 30.3
Survey’s base 374 309 347 290 248 228
Employees’ answers on the true level of their remuneration, %
On the minimal social security
threshold, though the total amount
of my salary is larger 12.1 13.4 13.5 12.9 10.3
On the minimal social security
threshold, which is the real
salary I get 10.3 14.3 9.5 12.6 5.9
On the sum set in my contract,
though the total amount of my
salary is larger 6.7 8.3 15 15.5 8.4
On the sum set in my contract,
which is the real salary I get 68.3 63.4 61.8 56.2 67
Other 2.6 0.6 0.3 2.8 1.5
Survey’s base 348 314 378 395 466
Note: The survey question asked to managers was: “In your opinion, what share of the employed in your branch
work under contracts with “hidden clauses,” i.e. receive payments larger than the ones stated in the contract?”
The question to workers was: “What is the sum on which you are socially insured?” Before 2003, the policy of
minimal social security thresholds, whose goal is to mitigate the impact of the pervasive practice to report the
minimum wage as the income on which payroll taxes are paid, was not in force.
Source: (CSD, 2011).
and work injury were introduced, with the employer and the employee sharing the contributions
in a given ratio. The payroll contributions payable by employers in 1997 amounted to 42% of
gross salary for workers in the third labour category. Four years later, in 2002, this percentage
was 32.2%. The combined employer-employee contribution rate decreased by only 1.3 percentage
point for five years, from 44% in 1997 to 42.7% in 2002.
The nature of the reform in the pension system was such that within a given year the
difference between the payroll rates of the third and second labour categories remained fixed at
10 percentage point, while that between the second and first category was 5 percentage point.
Table 1.1 further shows that the payroll rates for the different labour categories changed by the
same percentage point from year t − 1 to year t. This means that the cross-sectional and time
series variation in the payroll rates in absolute levels is the same for all three labour categories.
Nevertheless, the percentage changes vary by labour category and over time, which allows the
identification of the effect of the payroll rate on reported wages and taxable income using various
econometric specifications.
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Data on the extent of payroll tax evasion before 2002 is scarce. A 2003 survey showed
that envelope wages constituted 21.1% of salaries in firms employing 2 to 10 people, 18.8% in
companies with 11-50 employees, and 6.7% in the biggest firms with more than 500 workers
(CSD, 2004). However, 2003 was also the year when minimum social security thresholds were
introduced in Bulgaria, suggesting that the practice of wage under-declaration was likely more
severe in the earlier years.
The minimum obligatory social security thresholds legally stipulate the minimum wage level
on which contributions are payable for every type of profession in a given industry. They are
higher than the minimum wage, and generally reflect the government’s perceptions of what the
true wages in the economy are (Slavova et al., 2007).
Table 1.2 summarises survey evidence on payroll tax evasion based on the views of both
managers and employees, which are generally quite divergent. For example, in 2004, 79.6% of
managers believed that workers’ earnings are under-declared, whereas only 21.7% of employees
admitted that they are insured on a lower income than their true one. Even though a greater
number of managers believe that the practice was uprooted in 2010 as compared to 2002, the
number of surveyed workers reporting payroll tax evasion decreased by only 0.1 percentage point
from 2003 to 2010.
1.3.2 Corporate income tax
Unlike the persistently high payroll tax rates, the corporate tax rate in Bulgaria has been lowered
substantially over the years (Table 1.3, Figure 1.1). For the whole period 1997-2002 firms paid
a tax on profits for the central budget and a tax on profit for municipalities – the municipality
tax. The tax base for the municipality tax was taxable income, while the tax base for the tax
on profit was the taxable income reduced by the amount of the municipality tax.
The standard CIT rate varied from 42.2% in 1997 to 23.5% in 2002, a change of 18.7 per-
centage point. Firms with taxable income below a legally stipulated threshold were subject to
a lower preferential rate, which was less volatile compared to the standard rate and declined by
about 10 percentage point. It is important to point out that the system was not progressive:
firms taxed at the standard rate did not pay the lower rate for profits up to the threshold.
Starting in 2002, a single rate was imposed irrespective of firms’ TI. Table 1.3 summarises the
standard and preferential tax rates and calculates the effective rate taking into account the local
CIT surcharge.
The fall in the CIT rates, however, was not accompanied by an extensive expansion of the
tax base to make the reform revenue-neutral. Depreciation rates and loss carry-forwards in
particular remained unchanged. Most importantly, while the definition of taxable income was
altered, its core elements were preserved. Taxable income is formed based on the transformation
of the accounting financial result. The accounting financial result is the accounting value of
the difference between revenues and expenses. Once this amount is determined, it is adjusted
upwards or downwards by certain provisions specified in the Corporate Income Tax Law for
tax purposes in order to obtain TI. Therefore, any amendment to these provisions affects the
12
Table 1.3: CORPORATE INCOME TAX FINANCING AND CHARACTERISTICS
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
CIT rate central budget
TI < Threshold (Preferential) 26 20 20 20 15
TI > Threshold (Standard) 36 30 27 25 20 15
CIT rate municipalities 6.5 10 10 10 10 10
Total CIT rate (Preferential) 33.4 28 28 28 23.5
Total CIT rate (Standard) 42.4 37 34.3 32.5 28 23.5
Depreciation rates
Buildings 4 4 4 4 4 4
Machines 20 20 20 20 20 20
Vehicles 8 8 8 8 8 8
All other assets 15 15 15 15 15 15
Loss carry-forward (years) 5 5 5 5 5 5
Note: The threshold changed from $1,000 in 1997 to $25,000 in 1998 and remained the same from 1998 onward.
In 2002 a single CIT rate was introduced irrespective of the level of taxable income.
Source: Law for Corporate Income Tax for various years.
definition of TI.
Table 1.4: CHANGES IN THE DEFINITION OF TAXABLE INCOME
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
No. of provisions in the CIT Law
Increasing the financial result 22 23 23 24 23 24
Decreasing the financial result 11 10 15 13 14 17
No. of abolished provisions
Increasing the financial result 3 0 0 1 0
Decreasing the financial result 2 0 4 0 2
No. of newly stipulated provisions
Increasing the financial result 4 0 1 0 1
Decreasing the financial result 2 5 2 1 5
Source: Law for Corporate Income Tax for various years.
Table 1.4 shows how the number of provisions varied over the period of interest. In particular
it lists how many provisions were abolished, how many new ones were introduced, and whether
they increased or decreased TI. It is clear that the main change in the definition occurred between
1997 and 1998 and since then it has mostly been modified with respect to the provisions that
reduce TI. This means that an increase in reported taxable income, given falling CIT rates, will
not be driven by expansions of the tax base.
Estimates of the Bulgarian tax authorities, SG group and the World Bank indicate that only
55% of corporate income taxes were collected in 2002 (CSD, 2004). Figure 1.1 depicts aggregate
taxable income as a percent of GDP as well as the CIT rates time series (National Revenue
Agency; Ministry of Finance). TI ranged between 13 and 16% of GDP until 2007, when the CIT
rate was cut to 10% and TI jumped to 30% of GDP, a 14 percentage point increase in one year.
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No major fluctuations are observed for social security contributions as a percent of GDP. In fact,
they begin to decline in 2005, despite a growing minimum wage and social security thresholds.






1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Figure 1.1: CIT RATES, AGGREGARE TAXABLE INCOME AND SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDS, % GDP
CIT Rate Taxable Income Social Security Funds
Source: European Commission (2011); National Revenue Agency, Ministry of Finance
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Data description
I use firm-level data for Bulgaria from the AMADEUS dataset provided by Bureau Van Dijk,
which is a European electronic publishing firm. The data is an unbalanced panel consisting of
firms’ main financial statement variables. The time frame under consideration is restricted to
1997-2002 due to the introduction of the minimum social security thresholds in 2003.
The main dependent variables of interest are the firm’s total cost of employment (staf ),
which is the yearly amount paid in salaries and contributions, and corporate taxes paid (taxa),
according to which I will assign each firm its respective tax rate and calculate TI (Table 1.5).
The explanatory variables are firm size, measured by the amount of sales (turn); the number of
employees, fixed assets and total assets, and the degree of indebtedness, captured by the amount
of current liabilities (culi). Changes in current assets, cuas, are additionally controlled for.
Only firms that file a report at the end of the year are included in the panel. Firms in
liquidation, dissolution, or bankruptcy are excluded from the analysis. Since sole traders are
subject to special taxation, which is not part of the Corporate Law, they are not considered
either. Further, partnerships, cooperatives and other unincorporated entities are excluded, thus
restricting the dataset to private and public limited liability companies (61%) and one-person
private and public limited liability companies (38%). The remaining 1% of the firms in the data
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lnWage -4.11 -3.96 -4.25 -4.20 -4.21 -4.05
(1.17) (.975) (.807) (.787) (.755) (.849)
TIt-TIt−1 -1.05 -.424 -.055 .071 .087
(7.91) (5.22) (2.20) (2.02) (2.85)
ln(1-ts) -.576 -.552 -.572 - .462 -.424 -.370
(.074) (.070) (.061) (.014) (.013) (.012)
ln(1-tc) -.444 -.273 -.157 -.148 -.121 -.135
(.203) (.179) (.173) (.169) (.139) (.133)
ln(ts-tc) -1.69 -1.96 -1.35 -1.66 -1.59 -1.89
(.749) (.866) (.593) (.779) (.627) (.716)
ln(1-ts/1-tc) -.132 -.279 -.415 -.314 -.303 -.234
(.213) (.193) (.181) (.169) (.139) (.133)
ln(Fias/Toas) -.977 -1.03 -1.30 -1.38 -1.38 -1.47
(1.04) (1.04) (1.13) (1.18) (1.16) (1.23)
ln(Turn/Toas) .283 .303 .453 .377 .341 .337
(1.15) (1.09) (1.22) (1.24) (1.18) (1.22)
ln(Culi/Toas) -1.25 -1.22 -1.03 -.971 -.986 -.944
(1.02) (1.08) (1.12) (1.11) (1.12) (1.14)
ln(Cuas/Toas) -.995 -.896 -.689 -.636 -.632 -.618
(.872) (.796) (.822) (.785) (.782) (.785)
N 3,035 3,257 20,524 25,421 30,730 15,708
Note: lnWage is the natural logarithm of reported wage per worker. The reported wage is obtained by dividing
the total annual wage bill staf (wages + contributions) by (1+ts)*empl, where ts is the payroll tax rate and empl
is the number of employees. TIt-TIt−1 is the first difference of taxable income and is in hundred thousands of
Bulgarian levs; ln(1-ts) is the natural log of the net-of-tax-share of the payroll tax rate; ln(1-tc) is the natural log
of the net-of-tax-share of the corporate tax rate; ln(ts-tc) is the natural log of the difference between the payroll
and the corporate tax rates, while ln(1-ts/1-tc) is the natural log of the ratio of the net-of-tax-shares of these two
rates; ln(Fias/Toas) is the natural log of the ratio between fixed assets (tangible fixed assets + intangible fixed
assets + other fixed assets, including financial fixed assets) and total assets; ln(Turn/Toas) is the natural log of
the ratio between sales and total assets; ln(Culi/Toas) is the natural log of the ratio between current liabilities
(loans + accounts payable + other current liabilities) and total assets; ln(Cuas/Toas) is the natural log of the
ratio between current assets (stocks + accounts receivable+other current assets) and total assets.
are branches of foreign companies and state companies.
If a firm has submitted both consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements, only
the unconsolidated one is considered. Firms with missing values for both taxes paid and cost of
employees for all years they appear in the panel are dropped. I have further dropped observations
with missing values of taxes paid, cost of employees, number of employees, total assets and fixed
assets only at the beginning and the end of each panel.
Firms need to be differentiated based on their taxable income and the type of industry they
operate in. For that purpose, TI should first be recovered from the data. I multiply the taxable
income threshold stipulated by law with the lower CIT rate for a given year and assign firms that
pay less than that amount in tax the low CIT rate, while those paying more are assigned the
standard rate. This means that firms can switch between rates based on their annual income.
Lastly, a zero corporate tax rate is assigned to those firms that have paid zero or have reported
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negative profit tax. Given the differentiation between the corporate rates, there is some cross-
sectional variation within a year and due to the continuous tax rate cuts, good overall time-series
variation.
Once companies calculate their book profit, they have to add and deduct all items specified
by law in order to obtain their taxable income. As a consequence, the data contains many firms
that have zero or negative book profit but have paid positive tax. The converse is also true –
some firms with positive profits for a given year pay no tax. Therefore, book profit cannot be
used in place of TI, nor is it a good indicator of it. For this reason, TI is obtained by dividing
the tax liability by the respective tax rate.
In view of the fact that the data does not provide information on losses carried forward,
taxable income is likely adjusted downwards or becomes zero for some firms that have sustained
losses in previous years. Another factor contributing to deviations of TI from the true tax liability
is deferred taxes. Hanlon (2003) provides a simple example of deferred taxes that arise as a result
of tax differences, which in turn are due to, for example, different methods of depreciation used
for book (straight line depreciation) and tax purposes (accelerated depreciation). Moreover,
some firms may have made pre-payments on current profits, and taxes paid in previous years
have an impact on the current liability as well.
Intertemporal shifting of income within a base and between bases through avoidance and
evasion mechanisms in anticipation of lower rates in the future can also affect the amount of
reported taxable income in the current period. It is likely, therefore, that the measure of TI
I use constitutes a rough approximation of real TI and hence there is measurement error in
the explained variable. Despite the high probability of such an error, the estimated coefficients
will not be biased, and the standard errors, while valid, will be larger due to the fact that the
population variances of the coefficients are larger (Wooldridge, 2002).
Social security rates are assigned to each firm depending on its type of industry. The payroll
tax rate, therefore, varies between industries within a year and over time. Footnote 6 lists the
industries that fall within the first and second labour category and are, as a consequence, liable
to pay higher payroll contributions. On average within a given year, the share of firms in the
first labour category is 1% of the sample, and that of the second labour category – 10% of the
sample. These numbers are somewhat higher than the aggregate data – for the period 2002-
2007, on average 0.51% and 4.60% of the working population was within the first and second
labour categories, respectively (Slavova et al., 2007). The AMADEUS database provides firms’
total cost of employment staf , which is the sum of wages and payroll taxes. Staf is divided by
1 + ts and the number of employees in order to obtain the average reported annual wage bill per
employee, wR.
1.4.2 Empirical specification
In order to test if there is shifting of income out of social security into the corporate tax base
as a result of a faster decreasing corporate tax rate than payroll rates, the following basic
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specifications are employed:
ln(wRit ) = α0 + α1ln(1− (ts)it) + α2ln(1− (tc)it) + εit (1.4.1)
D.TIit = β0 + β1D.ln(1− (ts)it) + β2D.ln(1− (tc)it) + δ, (1.4.2)
where ln(1− (ts)it) and ln(1− (tc)it) are the natural logarithms of the net-of-tax-shares of the
payroll and corporate tax rates, respectively, in firm i at time t. ln(wRit ) is the natural logarithm
of the reported wage bill, while D.TIit is the first-difference of taxable income TIit-TIit−1 in
absolute levels. Equations (1.4.1) and (1.4.2), where the two tax rates are entered separately
into the wage and taxable income equations, most closely follow the model developed in Section
1.2. The model predicts that an α1 > 0 and α2 < 0 would be indicative of shifting out of the
payroll base, while I expect that β2 > 0 in the TI equation. The level-log specification of eq.
(1.4.2) means that a 1% change in the net-of-tax shares leads to a response of 1% of the value
of the slopes β1 and β2.
It is important to bear in mind that there are a number of short-cuts taken between the
theoretical model and the empirical specification employed in this section. First, the theoretical
framework predicts the effect of tc and ts on the amount of wage under-reported, u, which is
not known. What is observable in the data is the reported wage, wR − u, so that the change
in u as a result of changing tax rates can only be inferred through the behaviour of reported
wages. Second, the assumption of a convex probability of detection that is increasing in u and
the amount of corporate income manipulation is key to the determination of the signs of dudtc
and dudts . Yet, given the data, I am unable to control for this probability in the regressions that
follow.
Note that due to the very large number of firms reporting zero TI, it would not be reasonable
to log transform taxable income. Approximately 50% of firms bunch at the corner solution of
zero TI. For example, 20% report TI=0 in 1997, and this percent grows to 60% in 2001. A
logarithmic transformation of taxable income will automatically drop observations with zero
taxable income, as log(0) is not defined. In effect such transformation would be selecting on the
dependent variable and use only those firms which have reported positive taxable income in the
estimation. By dropping the zeros, the dependent variable would no longer be taxable income,
but TI conditional on the firm realising any profit to be taxed E(ln(y)|x, y > 0).
As an alternative to eqs. (1.4.1) and (1.4.2), I consider the effect of the tax wedge ln(ts− tc)
on the two explained variables. When entered separately, ts and tc capture not only shifting, but
also real behavioural responses. Further, a positive coefficient on 1− ts may be an indication of
both shifting between tax bases and shifting of payroll taxes onto wages. The tax wedge focuses
solely on the shifting incentives between the payroll and corporate tax bases.
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ln(wRit ) = γ0 + γ1ln((ts)it − (tc)it) + ε
∗
it (1.4.3)
D.TIit = σ0 + σ1D.ln((ts)it − (tc)it) + δ
∗. (1.4.4)
The tax wedge, which Gordon and Slemrod (2000) refer to as a “tax incentive term,” is a
measure of the incentives to engage in income shifting, given the difference between the rates in
the two bases. Provided that there is shifting of income between the two bases, the reported wage
should decrease as the difference between the payroll rate and CIT increases, which translates
into γ1 having a negative sign. If the increase in TI that stems from payroll tax evasion is
completely overpaid in the corporate income tax base, then σ1 should be positive and similar in
absolute value to γ1. The model allows firms to cook the books and choose not to overpay CIT,
which is very likely to be happening in reality. Therefore, I expect that ln(ts − tc) will have a
smaller effect on TI than on wages.
1.4.3 Estimation issues
There are several estimation problems with the specifications as presented thus far. First,
ln(1− (tc)it) is endogenous in the TI equations. While the CIT rate influences the amount
of TI reported, it is TI that determines which corporate tax rate the firm is subject to. The
solution of reverse causality in similar specifications has been the introduction of an instrument
(IV), which is correlated with the endogenous variable, but exogenous to the error term (Gruber
and Rauh, 2007; Gruber and Saez, 2002). I follow the literature and construct such an IV by
keeping a firm’s TI in year t the same as in year t− 1 and using only the changes in the tax law
between the two years for identification. TI in year t is also adjusted by growth rates, which are
exogenous to the firm’s behaviour and therefore show how TI would have grown in the absence
of any interference by the company.
The growth rates are calculated in the following way: Apart from Bulgaria, I use data for
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania taken from the AMADEUS dataset for the
period 1997-2002. Firms within each NACE2 industry are separated into taxable income deciles.
TI for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania is calculated in the same way as that
for Bulgaria – by dividing taxes paid by the statutory tax rate. Statutory tax rates for the four
additional countries are taken from Ernst & Young Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides.
The growth rates of TI from year t−1 to year t for each income decile within a given NACE2
industry is calculated for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania and averaged out.
I then multiply the TI of Bulgarian firms in year t−1 by one plus the specific NACE2-TI income
decile growth rate and apply the year t tax rules to this adjusted TI. It is possible that the four
countries may have had shocks affecting their industries differently; however, they were still in
transition in the period under consideration and coming out of a similar political and to some
extent economic background as Bulgaria, albeit the Czech Republic and Hungary being stronger
and larger economies.
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The instrument for ln(1 − tc) is thus ln(1 − tp), which is the log of the predicted net-of-
tax-share. The same logic applies for ln(ts − tc), which is instrumented with ln((ts − tp) in the
incentive-term specifications.
Second, the instruments above are constructed as a function of income in the previous period
t−1. Thus, if TIit−1 is correlated with δ(δ∗), running the regression with the IVs will still produce
biased results. The two sources of endogeneity in this framework, as described by Gruber and
Saez (2002), are mean reversion and changes in the income distribution. Mean reversion occurs
when there are fluctuations in taxable income, which are transitory. For example, a firm that
is exceptionally successful in year t − 1 is likely to revert to its normal performance in year
t. External shocks, which make some firms more profitable than others for reasons unrelated
to changes in the tax rates, change the income distribution, which, if uncontrolled for, will
bias estimation. To account for the possibility of different growth rates at different points in
the income distribution, the TI equations allow for lagged taxable income as an explanatory
variable.
Further, I follow Gruber and Saez (2002) and include an even richer specification of lagged
taxable income to account for the possibility of a non-linear interaction between mean reversion
and changes in the income distribution. In particular, a 10-piece spline of lagged taxable income,
defined at the level of the entire sample, is added in the TI regressions. Nevertheless, I am still
imposing the assumption that the yearly changes in mean reversion and the taxable income
distribution are not correlated with the annual changes in tax policy.
Even with these controls, however, lagged taxable income can still be endogenous to the CIT
rate change from year t− 1 to year t in the presence of income shifting. If firms expect a lower
corporate tax rate in year t, then they have an incentive to report less TI in t− 1 and more TI
in t. Thus, falling CIT rates, or equivalently, increasing net-of-tax-shares from t − 1 to t, can
be accompanied by increasing taxable incomes due to income shifting. This, in return, can lead
to an upward bias in the estimates of the elasticity of TI w.r.t. the net-of-tax-share of the CIT
rate.
Taxable income and wages of a firm can rise or fall from year to year for many different reasons
apart from the corporate tax rate or income shifting. The firm, for example, can become more
profitable because of increased management quality, local characteristics, or overall business
strategy, and can consequently reward its employees better. Or it can change its financial
policy, relying on more debt. Broadening of the tax base that offsets cuts in the statutory tax
rate can be yet another reason.
Table 1.3 shows that while the definition of taxable income has been changing over the years,
as a whole the adjustments have narrowed the tax base, given the rising number of provisions
decreasing the financial result. The depreciation rates for the different classes of assets have not
changed and neither has the rule that firms can carry losses forward for 5 years. To control
for unobserved firm-specific time-invariant heterogeneity, the wage regressions contain firm fixed
effects, while differencing purges firm unobservable heterogeneity from the TI specifications.
The assumption behind the within estimator is that the fixed effects αi are correlated with the
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regressors xit. Accounting for firm fixed effects means that the effect of the two tax rates on
taxable income and wages is identified only by the within-firm time-series variation in the tax
rates.
Additionally, fixed assets and sales as a fraction of total assets are included in order to control
for changes in profitability not related to changes in the tax rates. I further incorporate current
liabilities divided by total assets to capture any adjustments in firms’ short-term debt policy.
Current assets are also controlled for.
Next, time fixed effects are added. In 1997 Bulgaria came out of an inflationary recession,
and there was a change in government in 1998. It is therefore important to account for these
elements in the variation, which are spuriously correlated with taxable income and wages by the
inclusion of year dummies. Furthermore, since the minimum wage in the country was increasing
on a yearly basis in the period under consideration, it affected the reported wage for these workers
who truly earned the minimum wage or whose employers under-reported their true wage to pay
contributions on minimum wages. Thus, reported wages will increase due to legal provisions not
related to the changes in the CIT or the payroll rates. This is yet another reason to include year
fixed effects χt.
By adding year dummies, the taxable income and wage response will be identified using
only the cross-sectional variation in the tax rates. In fact, this framework is equivalent to the
diff-in-diff estimator. To see this, note that first-differencing the data across time, yit − yit−1,
eliminates the time-invariant firm fixed effects, but leaves the time-fixed effects. The time-fixed
effects are dropped out if we difference again, this time across groups, i.e. transforming the data
into (yit − yit−1)− (yjt − yjt−1), which yields the difference-in-difference estimator.
Finally, industry-year fixed effects, ρjt, are included to control for changes over time in factors
common to all firms in a given industry such as regulation, industrial norms, etc.
Both regression frameworks are transformed to incorporate the changes discussed above. For
example, equations (1.4.1) and (1.4.2) become:
ln(wRit ) = αi + χt + ρjt + α1ln(1− (ts)it) + α2ln(1− (tc)it) +X ′∆ + εit (1.4.5)





′∆ + δ, (1.4.6)
where αi, χt and ρjt are firm-, year-, and industry-year fixed effects, respectively. X includes
the natural logarithm of the ratios of sales/total assets (toas), current liabilities/toas, fixed
assets/toas and current assets/toas.
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 Effect of tax rates on reported wages
The basic estimates of the wage equation are presented in Table 1.6. All regressions are estimated
with firm-fixed effects. Because I always cluster at firm level, standard errors are robust to the
disturbances being heteroscedastic and autocorrelated.
Column (1) in Table 1.6 presents a regression of the log of wage on the log of the net-of-tax-
shares of the corporate and payroll tax rates, without any other controls, apart from firm-fixed
effects. The elasticity of reported wage with respect to the net-of-tax-share of the corporate
tax rate is estimated to be -0.122, while the elasticity w.r.t. the net-of-tax-share of the payroll
rate is 1.2. The signs of the two coefficients are in line with the predictions of the model: a
negative and significant effect of the CIT rate net-of-tax-share on wages represents compelling
evidence for income shifting, as it is difficult to explain otherwise why this tax rate has an effect
on employees’ compensation as reported by employers.
Column (2) allows for year dummies, χt, and controls for firm-level factors, including the log
of fixed assets, sales, current liabilities and current assets, all as a ratio of total assets. While
still positive, the effect of the payroll rate is reduced to .016 and imprecisely estimated once
year dummies are included in the regression. This is not surprising, as identification of the
wage response in Column (2) comes solely from the cross-sectional variation in the tax rates.
Section 1.3.1 explained that due to the nature of the pension reform, the payroll rate has limited
cross-sectional variation. The coefficient of the CIT rate almost doubles to -0.238 and remains
significant.
To purge the regressions from shocks common to all firms from the same industry in a given
year, Column (3) includes industry-year fixed effects. The elasticity of wage with respect to the
net-of-tax-share of the CIT rate remains very similar to that in Column (2), but the coefficient
on the payroll rate increases to .354 and becomes significant at the 5% level.
Using a rich dummy structure of both year- and industry-year fixed effects in Column (4),
which is my preferred specification, yields nearly identical estimates to the ones obtained by
industry-year dummies only, with the coefficients of 1 − tc and 1 − ts significant at 1 and 5
percent, respectively.
To show robustness, Columns (5)-(8) repeat the analysis of Columns (1)-(4) in first-differences
(FD). The assumption behind the FD specifications is that the percentage change in the average
wage per employee is a linear function of the percentage changes in the CIT and the payroll
net-of-tax-shares. Column (5) repeats the simple specification in Column (1) in first-differences,
producing very similar results.
Generally, the FD estimation yields less negative elasticity of wages w.r.t. the net-of-tax-
share of the CIT rate as compared to the specifications in levels. One possible explanation is
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the correlation between wages and CIT from year t−1 to t only, while the fixed-effects estimator
relates deviations from average wages to deviations from average net-of tax-share of CIT for all
years. It is therefore likely that the fixed-effects estimator is more robust to delayed responsive-
ness. Conversely, the payroll rate has a greater effect on wages in the FD estimation, suggesting
a quicker adjustment of wages to changes in the contribution rates.
Column (9) checks how the FD results change when the differencing window is expanded to
t− 2, thus focusing on longer-run responses. If firms’ adjustment to changes in the tax rates is
slow, as seems to be the case with the corporate tax rate, then there is a reason to expect that
the t− 2 estimates will be higher than the first-differenced ones. A quicker reaction to changes
in rates or expectations that the rates will change in future will result in a weaker long-run
response. In Column (9) the corporate rate effect is stronger for a longer difference window. In
fact, the estimate is almost identical to that in Column (3). The coefficient on the payroll rate
becomes 0.323, which is closer to the specification in levels.
Table 1.7 repeats the regressions from Table 1.6, but instead of estimating the effect of the
tax rates separately, it considers the tax wedge. The effect of ln(ts− tc) on wages is -0.050 in the
specification with year dummies only, and -0.046 when industry-year fixed effects are included.
Similarly to Table 1.6, the first-difference estimation leads to lower estimates of the tax wedge
in magnitude, driven by the slower responsiveness of wages to changes in the CIT rate. Once
a longer difference window is taken in Column (4), the estimates in FD are approximately the
same as the estimates in levels.
Table 1.8 splits the sample into three groups based on taxable income. The first group is
composed of firms that have consistently reported TI greater than the threshold, so that they
are taxed at the standard CIT rate for all years they appear in the panel. The next group
are firms who have always been subject to the lower rate, but may have reported zero taxable
income for some of the years they are in the panel. Switchers between the high, low and zero
CIT rates are included in the third group. The coefficients in each regression are comparable
to those using the full sample in Table 1.6. Since the group with TI>T has no cross-sectional
variation in the CIT, Table 1.8 does not include year-fixed effects.
Interestingly, the effect of the tax wedge is higher for firms subject to the standard rate,
albeit insignificant, and for switchers than it is for firms who were eligible for the lower CIT
rate. Since the tax wedge is bigger for the low-CIT rate firms, one would expect them to be more
responsive to variations in the tax rates. However, it is possible that these businesses already
pay wages close to the minimum wage and find it hard, therefore, to adjust the wage downward
in response to changes in the tax wedge. An inspection of the data confirmed that the average
wage per employee in the group taxed at the standard CIT rate is at least three times as high
as that for the low-CIT rate group.
The wages reported by the switching firms seem to be most responsive to both tax rates,
given the estimated coefficients. This high responsiveness is expected due to the fluctuations
in the CIT rate that stem from variations in reported TI, confirming the hypothesis that firms
adjust reported wages as the tax wedge changes. In the case of switchers, a 1% increase in the
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Table 1.7: RESPONSE OF REPORTED WAGES TO TAX WEDGE
Levels FD FD t− 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(ts − tc) -.050*** -.046*** -.031*** -.049***
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.005)
χt Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρjt No Yes Yes Yes
Observ. 81,208 81,188 48,462 27,829
Firms 30,959 30,953 22,212 17,285
Note: The sample in each regression refers to 1997-2002. The dependent variable is either the log of reported wage
(Levels), the first-difference of the log wage (FD), or the second-difference. All columns include firm-fixed effects.
The regression additionally controls for ln(Fias/Toas), ln(Turn/Toas), ln(Culi/Toas) and ln(Cuas/Toas), which
are not reported here and are first-differenced in Column (3), and second-differenced in Column (4). Standard
errors are clustered by firm in all specifications. χt are year dummies and ρjt are industry-year dummies at the
NACE2 level. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Table 1.8: RESPONSE OF REPORTED WAGES BY TAXABLE INCOME GROUPS
TI>T TI<T or TI=0 TI<T or TI>T or TI = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(1-tc) -.269 -.109*** -.329***
(.831) (.024) (.040)
ln(1-ts) .879** .216 .457**
(.395) (.141) (.208)
ln(ts − tc) -.083 -.029*** -.066***
(.119) (.005) (.008)
Observ. 3,643 3,392 61,235 61,235 18,137 16,561
Firms 1,065 1,042 25,602 25,602 4,310 4,309
Note: The sample in each regression pertains to 1997-2002. The dependent variable is the log of reported wage. All
columns include firm fixed effects and year-industry dummies, not reported. The regression additionally controls
for ln(Fias/Toas), ln(Turn/Toas), ln(Culi/Toas) and ln(Cuas/Toas), which are also not reported. Columns (1)-
(2) refer to firms that were subject to the standard tax rate (have taxable income above the legally stipulated
threshold) for all years they appear in the panel. Columns (3)-(4) show results for firms who were subject to
the lower corporate tax rate (have TI below the threshold) or reported zero taxable income for some of the years
they appear in the panel. Columns (5)-(6) refer to firms, which switched between high and low corporate tax
rates or reported zero TI for some of the years they appear in the panel. Standard errors are clustered at firm
level in all specifications. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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CIT’s net-of tax-share reduces reported wages by 0.32%, while an equivalent increase in the
payroll’s net-of-tax-share raises wages by 0.45%.
1.5.2 Effect of tax rates on reported taxable income
If there is shifting of income out of the social security base due to payroll evasion, then to some
extent part of this income should reappear as an increased corporate taxable profit. Bear in
mind that the shifting of tax liability between tax bases, be it payroll to corporate or personal
to corporate (and vice versa) is only one of the numerous aspects of the relationship between
corporate tax rate and corporate tax base. Others include the impact of the CIT on investment
decisions, choice of corporate financing (e.g. use of debt), choice of incorporation and corporate
form, evasion and avoidance, and other behavioural responses. Table 1.9 explores what happens
in the corporate tax base and to TI as a result of changes in the tax rates. The regressions
present 2SLS estimation. All subsequent 2SLS regressions have very strong first stages with
F-statistics for the coefficients of the IVs almost always around 1000 and above.
Since taxable income is not log transformed, the results are sensitive to outliers. The first-
difference of TI is restricted in the range (-300, 300), where TI is in hundred thousands of
Bulgarian levs (BGN).8 This restriction drops 12 firms from the estimation, which have expe-
rienced great fluctuations in TI, mostly due to reporting huge TI in one year and zero TI the
next year.9
Column (1) contains no controls for lagged income, and hence does not account for mean
reversion and changes in the income distribution. The results have the opposite sign for the CIT
rate than expected. The estimates change dramatically, however, once lagged income is added
in Column (2), which demonstrates the sensitivity of the results to controlling for first-period
income. Lagged taxable income is significant with a coefficient -.281. Considering the tax change
from 1997 to 1998 for a firm in the second labour category subject to the standard CIT rate,
the coefficients in Column (2) imply that the 9 percent increase in the net-of-tax-share of the
CIT rate in 1998 increased TI by 7,800 BGN ($3,900). The payroll net-of-tax-share is positive
but is not significantly different from zero.
The estimate of the corporate net-of-tax-share increases considerably once the assumption
that changes in the TI distribution are functions in log of lagged income is weakened. I do that
by adding a 10-piece linear spline of lagged income in Column (3) with knots at the percentiles
of the data. The first five splines drop out of the estimation because of the very big number of
zeros of lagTI. The coefficient on the corporate rate goes up to 4.00 and remains significant. The
payroll effect increases as well, but is again imprecisely estimated. The spline is very negative
at the low end of the lagTI distribution, followed by several positive coefficients, increasing
8All financial variables are in hundreds of thousands. The average exchange rate for the period 1997-2002
was 0.5 $ for 1 lev. I prefer to keep the variables in the original currency in order to avoid introducing error
due to fluctuations in the exchange rate. The estimates for the CIT net-of-tax-share and the other explanatory
variables are robust to different intervals, which remove the major outliers.
9Among these twelve companies are the Bulgarian Telecommunication Company, Lukoil Burgas, and five
other major oil and energy producers, two copper extraction companies, a major shipping corporation, a chemical
concern, and a sea resort joint stock company.
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Table 1.9: RESPONSE OF REPORTED TAXABLE INCOME





ln(1-tc) -2.30*** .863* 4.00** 2.14* 2.31** 4.91** 4.57
(.375) (.468) (1.48) (1.13) (1.16) (1.60) (3.07)
ln(1-ts) 1.43** .417 1.20 .151 -.256 -.867 -1.13
(.689) (.586) (1.02) (1.15) (1.42) (1.66) (2.51)
ln(Fias/Toas) -.014 -.034* -.039* -.047** -.048** -.113** -.165*
(.023) (.020) (.021) (.020) (.020) (.037) (.092)
ln(Turn/Toas) .211*** .231*** .293*** .257*** .260*** .412*** .381***
(.037) (.032) (.044) (.038) (.038) (.054) (.090)
ln(Culi/Toas) -.012 -.061** -.078*** -.049** -.050** -.223*** -.142**
(.023) (.020) (.024) (.021) (.021) (.038) (.051)
ln(Cuas/Toas) .168*** .125** .163*** .144** .145*** .059 .191**





Spline 6 -21.58** -11.89** -12.74** 7.58** -25.15*
(7.52) (5.80) (5.95) (2.43) (14.78)
Spline 7 4.96*** 3.09** 3.28** 1.66* 4.14
(1.53) (1.20) (1.23) (.993) (3.16)
Spline 8 .089 -.327 -.297 -.237 2.66
(.558) (.501) (.503) (.573) (2.02)
Spline 9 .877 1.01** 1.01** 1.16** -2.24
(.593) (.508) (.509) (.555) (2.15)
Spline 10 -.284*** -.280*** -.280*** -.529*** -.076
(.046) (.043) (.043) (.058) (.139)
χt No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
ρjt No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observ. 51,577 51,577 51,577 51,577 51,577 30,153 51,628
Firms 22,434 22,434 22,434 22,434 22,434 17,354 22,446
Note: The sample in each regression refers to 1997-2002. The dependent variable is the first-difference of taxable
income in absolute levels; all ln(.) explanatory variables are also first-differenced. Column (6) uses a longer
differencing window and the spline is of TIt − 2. Estimates in Column (7) are based on the full sample, which
includes the 12 outliers. χt are year dummies and ρjt are industry-year dummies at the NACE2 level. In all
specifications, standard errors are clustered by firm. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and
10% (*) levels.
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Table 1.10: RESPONSE OF REPORTED TAXABLE INCOME TO TAX WEDGE
t− 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(ts − tc) .265** .316* .303* .279
(.120) (.180) (.172) (.320)
lagTI -.280***
(.054)
χt No Yes Yes Yes
ρjt No No Yes Yes
Observ. 50,295 50,295 50,295 28,666
Firms 22,564 22,564 22,564 17,425
Note: The sample in each regression pertains to 1997-2002. The dependent variable is either the first-difference
of TI in absolute levels, or the second-difference in Column (4). Columns (2)-(4) include splines of lagged TI, not
reported here. The regression additionally controls for D.ln(Fias/Toas), D.ln(Turn/Toas), D.ln(Culi/Toas) and
D.ln(Cuas/Toas), which are also not reported. Standard errors are clustered by firm in all specifications. χt are
year dummies and ρjt are industry-year dummies at the NACE2 level. Asterisks denote significance at the 1%
(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
non-linearly as income rises, suggesting mean reversion.
Estimating the regression with year-industry fixed effects instead of year dummies yields a
lower effect of ln(1 − tc) on D.TI (2.14) in Column (4). My preferred specification in Column
(5) combines year- and industry-year fixed effects leading to a very similar result to the one
obtained with industry-year dummies only: a 1% increase in D.(1− tc) translates into 0.0231%
change in D.TI, given the level-log specification. Evaluating the tax change from 1997 to 1998
again, the coefficients in (5) imply a 20,800 BGN ($10,400) increase in TI in 1998 on average as
a result of the 9% increase in CIT rate net-of-tax-share. To put this number into perspective,
note that the average TI of the firms in the sample, excluding the 12 companies described above,
is 95,600 BGN ($47,800).
The regression in Column (6) is identical to the one in Column (5), but the data is second-
differenced in order to check if TI adjusts immediately, or if its responsiveness is delayed. The
estimate of the corporate net-of-tax-share more than doubles, rising to 4.91, and so do the
coefficients of fixed assets, sales and current liabilities, suggesting that it takes time before firms
adapt to changes in the tax policy. The effect of current assets, which is always positive and
significant in the first-differenced specifications, becomes insignificant in second-differences.
Apart from Column (1), the payroll net-of-tax-share is found to have no significant effect on
the first-difference of taxable income and is not robust to the dummy variables structure, being
positive in Columns (1)-(4), and switching its sign in the remaining columns. Like the model,
the data analysis yields an ambiguous relationship between TI and ts.
Lastly, Column (7) shows results for the unrestricted sample, which includes the 12 outliers
dropped before. While the corporate net-of-tax-share remains positive and similar in magnitude
to the previous estimates, its standard error is much higher, resulting in imprecise estimation.
The 12 outliers have a significant impact on the spline coefficients as well.
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Table 1.10 focuses on the response of taxable income to the tax wedge. Without lagged
income control, the effect of the tax wedge has the wrong sign and is not reported. Once first
period income is taken into account in Column (1), the estimate of the wedge becomes .265 and
is statistically significant. Given the specification controlling for industry-year fixed effects, a
39% increase in the wedge in 1998 leads to 11,800 BGN ($5,900) increase in reported TI. Overall,
the coefficients suggest that TI is more responsive to the corporate net-of-tax-share than the
wedge, which makes sense, given that the wedge measures the incentives for income shifting out
of the payroll base.
1.6 Overall Effect on the Tax Base
The firms in the sample paid $8.81 billion in wages for the period 1997-2002, and $3.48 billion
in social security contributions. Using the coefficients of the long-run estimates in Table 1.6,
Column (9) and Table 1.9, Column (6), the changes in the net-of-tax-shares of the CIT and
payroll rates for firms in a given labour category, given year, and standard, low or zero CIT
rate, I estimate that if there were no cuts in the payroll rate for employers, reported wages
would have decreased by $922.4 million and contributions – by $314 million. Conversely, had
there been no cuts in the corporate income tax, reported wages could have risen by $575.9 million
and $225.3 million more contributions could have been collected.
Taxable income declared for 1997-2002 was $6.9 billion, of which $2.03 billion was paid in
corporate tax. This taxable income would have been $133.2 million lower if the corporate tax
rate was not cut, resulting in $41.6 million less in corporate taxes.
All in all, the increase in the net-of-tax-share of the corporate tax rate had a negative impact
on the total tax base of wages and taxable income, increasing TI by $133.2 million, but decreasing
wages by $575.9 million. The net-of-tax-share of the payroll rate increases the total tax base by
$922.4 million through its impact on wages. Its effect on TI is ambiguous both in the theoretical
derivations, and in the empirical results.
Another way to see the overall response is to estimate a regression for the total tax base, i.e.
estimate the responsiveness of the sum of wages and taxable income to the net-of-tax-shares of
the tax rates. This enables the log transformation of the dependent variable, as TI=0 is no longer
an issue. ln(1 − tc) is instrumented for in the usual way. I include the lagged ln(Wage+TI)t−2
in a log differenced 2SLS specification containing year-fixed effects and industry-year dummies.
ln(Wage+TI)t−2 is preferred to a spline of ln(Wage+TI)t−2, since the wage regressions in Table
1.6, which the manual estimates above are based on, do not include a spline.
The results of a full base regression are reported in Column (3) of Table 1.11 and support the
previous calculations in the case of the CIT rate. The coefficient on 1− ts is again insignificant.
The estimated elasticity of the CIT rate net-of-tax-share is negative and significant at 1% and
so is the t− 2 lag of ln(Wage+TI). This is due to the strong negative effect of the corporate tax
on wages and its mildly positive impact on taxable income, which leads to an overall negative
response of the total tax base to changes in 1− tc.
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D2.ln(1-tc) -.213*** 4.91** -.470***
(.024) (1.60) (.160)




Observ. 29,559 30,153 29,559
Firms 17,356 17,354 17,357
Note: The sample in each regression pertains to 1997-2002. Columns (1)-(2) repeat the estimates for the social
security tax base from Table 1.6 and for the taxable income base from Table 1.9, respectively. Column (3)
shows the results for the total tax base (wages + taxable income), estimated by log differenced 2SLS regression.
All regressions contain year- and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm level in all
specifications. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
1.7 Conclusion
In order to attract foreign direct investment and stimulate domestic business, many developing
economies have cut their corporate income tax rates. Developed countries have pursued similar
policies in an attempt to prevent major outflows of capital resulting from intensified competi-
tion. While such policy clearly generates incentives towards more honest disclosure of corporate
profits, it would be hasty to consider its effects in isolation from other tax bases within the econ-
omy. The main goal of this chapter is to point out the risk that a too-low CIT can exacerbate
payroll tax evasion if the contribution burden on employers is significant and payroll tax evasion
is prevalent.
With the collaboration of employees, such fraudulent behaviour becomes virtually unde-
tectable and as a consequence it may be more beneficial for a firm to overpay profit tax than
to pay its full contribution expense. Thus, unless the government is able to somehow balance
the corporate and social security burden, such a possibility certainly exists and should not be
neglected. On the one hand, given Europe’s rapidly ageing population and significant reliance
on defined benefit pension schemes, it is unlikely that we will witness a decrease of the social
security burden on employers. On the other hand, there is a very clear shift towards indirect
taxation and away from direct taxation, suggesting even lower CIT rates in future. It is therefore
important to carefully consider not only the advantages of a low CIT rate, but also its potential
side effects through its interaction with other tax bases.
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Appendix 1.1: Comparative statics derivations
The two sufficient conditions for a relative maximum at a critical point are that fφφ < 0 and
fφφfuu − fφu2 > 0. It follows from here that fuu < 0.
fφu = fuφ = −p′′1(1 + ts)φL∗P − p′1(Pu + (1 + ts)φL
∗λ2tc) − p′2 1wRλ2tc < 0 due to p
′′
1 > 0 and
p′′2 > 0. Similarly,
futc = −(1 + ts)− p′2 1wRλ2φu(1 + ts) < 0 and
fφts = −p′′1φuL∗P − p′1uL∗(λ1 + 2λ2tcφ) < 0.




− λ1(ts + te + tp(1− te))uL
∗
tc
)− (p1 + p2)λ2
=
λ1(ts + te + tp(1− te))uL∗
tc
> 0
futs = 1− tc − p′1φuL∗A− (p1 + p2)λ1 − p′2 1wR (λ1u+ λ2tcφu). Dividing (8) by ts, I get 1− tc =
tc
ts
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∗(1 + ts)− φ(tc − (p1 + p2)λ2tc)
= h+ p′1φλ2tcφuL
∗(1 + ts) + φ(p1 + p2)λ2tc + tc(1/ts − φ) > 0
since ts < 1 and φ ≤ 1.





= det|C|det|A| > 0,
dφ
dtc
= det|D|det|A| < 0 and
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dts































= −fφufuts + fφtsfuu > 0
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Chapter 2
Intertemporal Income Shifting in Expectation
of Lower Corporate Tax Rates: The Tax
Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe
This chapter examines if firms shift income out of years with high corporate tax rates into years when
tax cuts are anticipated. Such intertemporal shifting can be one explanation for the stability of corporate
tax revenues in Central and Eastern Europe, despite the major decline in the corporate tax rates and
overall narrowing of the tax base starting in the late 90s. Using firm-level panel data for Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia from 1999 to 2005, the estimates indicate that
the lower corporate tax rates induced a considerable increase in taxable income. Most of this increase,
however, was due to short-term shifting of income to years with lower tax rates leading to non-transitory
responses ranging from zero to .151, depending on the specification employed. Splitting the sample by
firm size shows that income shifting is an appealing tax saving strategy to small and to a lesser extent
medium-sized enterprises, but not for big firms. A further disaggregation by country reveals that the
driving country behind the results is Romania.
Keywords: Corporate tax, Income shifting, Tax reforms, Central and Eastern Europe
JEL Classification: H25; H32; D32
2.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, as part of a broader shift towards indirect taxation and due to
intensified international competition, many European Union (EU) economies decreased their
statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates. In the years between 2000 to 2009, a particularly
intense period of corporate tax reform, the old Member States lowered the CIT rate by 8.32
percentage point (pp) on average and collected 1.27pp lower revenue as a percent of GDP in 2009
compared to 2000. The countries joining the EU in and after 2004, i.e., the Baltic countries, the
I wish to thank Libor Dušek, Jan Kmenta, Viktor Steiner, Peter Egger, Jan Hanousek, Štěpán Jurajda and
the workshop participants at the 2nd Doctoral Meeting at the Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford University
for useful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.
34
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania undertook
even larger cuts of 10.12pp on average. Yet, average proceeds increased by 0.17pp.
The pattern of falling rates and rising revenues has spawned much research on whether
the tax cuts generated their own revenue, or the broad reforms simply expanded the tax base.
Devereux et al. (2004), for example, focus on the UK, concluding that while base-broadening
can, to some degree, explain the strength of the UK’s corporate tax revenues in the 1990s, the
bulk of the increase was due to the rising importance and profitability of the financial sector. A
more general analysis of the OECD countries is performed by Clausing (2007), who finds positive
statistically significant effects of the rate of profitability and the corporate share on collected
revenues.
Piotrowska and Vanborren (2008) show that the increasing rate of corporatisation is the
driving factor behind growing revenues. Their finding is corroborated by Da Rin et al. (2011),
who demonstrate that a lower CIT rate leads to a higher entry rate.
While many aspects of tax reforms and firm behaviour have been studied to evaluate their
revenue impacts, the intertemporal shifting of income by firms within a jurisdiction in expecta-
tion of lower future CIT rates has received little attention in the economic literature. This is
surprising, given that, if the presence of income shifting is not considered, the deadweight loss
of the corporate tax is likely to be overestimated owing to the fact that income shifting does
not reflect permanent changes in firms’ behaviour with real distortionary consequences but is a
short-term transfer of revenue over time (Slemrod, 1995).
I use firm-level panel data for six Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, namely
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia for the period 1999-2005,
to test if taxable income was shifted to years with lower expected CIT rates. Common for these
countries are the dynamic tax reforms starting in the early 2000s, characterised not only by
cuts in the statutory tax rates, but also by extensive changes in the tax base and investment
allowances. The announcement of the reforms was usually made in advance and, as King (1974)
points out, such announcements can have significant effects on investment behaviour and taxable
income reports, thus being a policy tool in their own right.
Deferral of income declaration or acceleration of expense recognition in years before a main
tax reduction can generate sizeable tax savings. Thus, the shifting of taxable income to years
with lower corporate tax rate would manifest as higher revenue collections. However, many
other factors can account for rising corporate tax revenues. Therefore, before testing the income
shifting hypothesis, I examine the tax reforms in CEE in greater detail in order to better com-
prehend the role adjustments in the tax base, firms’ profitability, and the size of the corporate
sector play in explaining revenue dynamics.
Instead of widening tax bases, tax reductions in CEE were generally accompanied by more
generous capital allowances and numerous tax incentives and credits, especially targeting the
manufacturing sector and new investment. Moreover, although there was an increase in firm
profitability in some countries (Poland, Slovakia), higher entry rate (the Czech Republic), and
an increased share of the corporate sector (Romania), these trends were not so pronounced as
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to entirely explain unchanging or raising tax revenue, given the major CIT cuts. This suggests
that other factors, such as curtailing of the shadow economy and income shifting, could have
had a major influence on revenue collections in CEE.
The empirical analysis begins with the construction of effective corporate income tax rates
based on the methodology of Devereux and Griffith (2003) and explores how elastic firms’ taxable
income is to changes in these tax measures. The goal is to not only estimate the current effect,
but also separate the long-run and the short-run firms’ responses in order to detect earnings
management. Specifically, in addition to contemporaneous tax terms, lagged and leading tax
rates are included, which capture adjustments in TI stemming from firms’ expectations about
future net-of-tax shares.
In the short-run taxable income is found to be very responsive to cuts in the CIT rate. In
particular, in the richest specification, a 1% increase in the log of the current net-of-tax share
increases the taxable income-total assets ratio by 0.0134. To put this number into perspective,
note that the average TI to total asset ratio for the firms used in the chapter from 1999 to 2005
is between 0.07 and 0.1. The results suggest, however, that a large part of the increase in TI
comes from the shifting of income across years to take advantage of tax rate cuts. There are
positive and significant long-term effects in most specifications, although with some particular
dummy structures, this effect becomes not significantly different from zero.
Disaggregating the data by firm size reveals that the sizeable coefficients on the lagged, lead-
ing and current tax rates are almost entirely driven by small enterprises, and become modest for
medium enterprises, while for big firms the contemporaneous effect is estimated to be negative.
This puzzling finding may be explained by the high political costs of income shifting faced by
big firms, but also with the numerous other earnings management instruments and tax incen-
tives available to them. The intertemporal shifting of income, therefore, appears to be a more
appealing tax saving strategy to smaller companies that do not possess the wide array of tax
management tools a big corporation can exploit.
A further disaggregation by country shows that Romanian firms exhibit the biggest anticipa-
tory response, followed by the Czech Republic and Poland. For Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia,
a negative effect of the current net-of-tax share is estimated.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 proceeds with a brief overview of
the literature on intertemporal income shifting; Section 3 outlines the tax reforms in CEE, while
Section 4 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Results are presented in Section 5, and
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Analyses of Income Shifting in the Literature
Different tax rates can arise within the same tax base over time. One explanation for the volatil-
ity of corporate tax revenue can therefore be the intertemporal shifting of income, provided that
tax cuts were anticipated. Goolsbee (2000) studies intertemporal shifting for high income exec-
utives through the timing of stock options in the context of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993 (OBRA). Heim (2006) estimates the elasticity of taxable income for individuals
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and like Goolsbee (2000) controls for future net-of-tax shares, but also accounts for the effect of
lagged taxes. Overall, Heim (2006) finds negative and significant long-term responses.
Revenue management by firms in expectation of lower corporate tax rates is examined by
Guenther (1994) and Scholes at al. (1992) for the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). In
particular, Guenther (1994) looks at adjustments in current accruals (CA) as an indicator of
revenue management. CA are defined as the change in the difference between a firm’s current
assets and current liabilities from year t−1 to year t. The author focuses on CA because they are
discretionary accruals, enabling managers to transfer earnings between periods by accelerating
expenses or deferring the recognition of revenue.1 Since taxable income is not observable by
researchers, Guenther (1994) demonstrates that deductibility of an accrued expense or deferral
of revenue for tax purposes is sufficient but not a necessary condition for the accrual of the
expense or the deferral of the revenue for financial statement purposes. Thus, it is likely that
deferral of taxable income translates into deferral of financial statement income.
The author estimates significantly negative current accruals for large firms for the year be-
fore the tax rate reduction, which suggests that accounting earnings were managed in response
to changes in the statutory tax rate. The same analysis is performed by Roubi and Richard-
son (1998), who find evidence of firms’ management of discretionary accruals in Canada and
Singapore, and to a lesser extent, in Malaysia.
Scholes at al. (1992) use the fact that, due to the phase-in character of tax rate decreases of
TRA86, different fiscal year-end firms faced different future corporate tax rates to estimate their
propensity to shift income between quarters. Their results show that the shifting of gross margin
and selling, general and administrative expense during quarters before the tax cuts, resulted in
$459,000 in tax savings, on average, although the shift was not uniform across income and
expense items.
The shifting of income can also be captured by studying the responsiveness of TI to tax rates.
Few studies have estimated the elasticity of TI w.r.t. the corporate income tax and generally,
without controlling for income shifting. Overall, this literature is small, primarily because the
taxable income elasticity approach for individuals does not transfer entirely to the CIT.2 Gruber
and Rauh (2007) use industry-level data on publicly traded corporations in the US and find a
modest elasticity of 0.2. For Germany, ETI is estimated by Dwenger and Steiner (2012) who
use detailed tax return data on loss carryforwards to estimate effective tax rates for individual
firms.
1If the tax rate is to be increased, firms have an incentive to accelerate revenue and defer expenses in order
to shift taxable income in the year before the tax increase.
2As Jane Gravelle points out in her critique of Gruber and Rauh (2007), adjustments in firms’ TI reflect a
complex combination of factor and product substitution elasticities, capital intensities, depreciation and other
factors, all of which are complications, which do not arise in the case of personal income taxation.
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Table 2.1: CHANGES IN STATUTORY TAX RATES AND CORPORATE REVENUE
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 4
BG 34.3 32.5 28.0 23.5 23.5 19.5 15.0 15.0 10.0 -24.3
28.0 28.0 23.5
CR % GDP 3.1 2.7 3.8 3.0 2.8 2.5 1.8 2.1 4.4 1.3
CZ 35.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 28.0 26.0 24.0 24.0 -11.0
CR % GDP 3.8 3.5 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.8 5.0 1.2
HU 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 17.6 17.5 17.5 21.3 1.7
CR % GDP 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.8 0.5
PL 34.0 30.0 28.0 28.0 27.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 -15.0
CR % GDP 2.4 2.4 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.8 0.4
RO 38.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 -22.0
CR % GDP 3.8 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.2 2.7 2.8 3.1 -0.7
SK 40.0 29.0 29.0 25.0 25.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 -21.0
CR % GDP 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 -0.1
EU-17 35.5 35.5 33.8 32.6 31 30.5 29 28.6 27.7 -7.8
CR % GDP 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.6 0.3
Note: All tax rates are in %. CR % GDP shows corporate tax revenue as a percent of the respective country’s
GDP. The last column lists the percentage point change from 1999 to 2007. Until 2001, in addition to the
standard rate, Bulgaria had a lower CIT rate for companies with TI below a legally stipulated threshold.
Source: Ernst & Young (Various Years); European Commission (Various Years).
2.3 Corporate Tax Reforms in CEE
2.3.1 Statutory tax rates
Table 2.1 shows the evolution of the statutory CIT rates for the six countries under consideration.
With the exception of Hungary, these countries maintained relatively high rates in the range
of 34% to 40% in 1999, but from 2000 onwards an overall decline is observed. Romania and
Slovakia slashed the CIT rate in stepwise reductions ending up with rates of 16% and 19% in 2007,
respectively, which is about 21pp below their level in 1999. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and
Poland engaged in more frequent, albeit smaller annual cuts, bringing the CIT rate substantially
below the EU-15 average, apart from the Czech Republic, whose rate was only about 4pp lower
than the EU-15’s in 2007.
A Romanian firm that deferred $1 of TI from 1999 to 2000, gained 20%, given the 13pp fall
in the CIT rate. Similar tax savings could be realised in Slovakia, and over the longer-term, in
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland.
Compared to other CEE countries, Hungary had a low CIT rate of 19.6% as early as 1997,
which was first reduced in 2004 to 17.6%. Thus, Hungary is one of the few EU countries
exhibiting little dynamics in its statutory CIT rate. The rates in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia
did not change after 2005, so the bulk of the reforms took place between 1999 and 2005.
Despite the considerable fall in the statutory rates, corporate tax revenues in CEE as a
proportion of GDP remained stable and even increased in some countries (Table 2.1). From 1999
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to 2007, the Czech Republic lowered its CIT rate by 11pp, yet it collected 1.2pp higher revenue
as a % of GDP in 2007 than it did in 1999. Overall, the Czech Republic exhibited buoyant and
steadily growing corporate tax collections accompanied by gradually declining statutory rate.
Revenue was more volatile in Bulgaria. An interesting trend is that revenue collections dip in the
year before a tax cut only to bounce back in the year of the tax cut. This is valid for the 2000-
2001 tax decrease and especially for the 2006-2007 5pp cut, which more than doubled revenue
in 2007. The same tendency is observed in Poland, where collections did not change from 1999
to 2000, while the 8pp tax cut from 2003 to 2004 increased revenue. Tax cuts in Romania and
Slovakia were usually followed by a slight drop in revenue, but in general, collections displayed
little fluctuation, remaining especially stable in Hungary.3
2.3.2 Tax base
In contrast to other EU countries, which broadened the tax base and closed loopholes to make
tax cuts revenue-neutral, the six CEE countries considered in this chapter narrowed their tax
bases by introducing various tax incentives and more generous capital allowances, primarily after
1999.4 Table 2.2 summarises some of the most important tax incentives, whose effect can later
be accounted for in the data.5 In general, most tax breaks applied to the manufacturing sector,
but also overall to businesses operating in areas with high unemployment.
The Czech Republic, for example grants a ten year income tax holiday for companies investing
certain funds in manufacturing as well as provides job-creation and retraining grants. Although
few firms qualified for this policy in its starting years, currently many foreign and domestic
investors take advantage of the tax breaks. Other countries chose to stimulate smaller businesses.
Romania, for instance, implemented special provisions for small and medium enterprises and
microenterprises, while Bulgaria offers 100% corporate income tax relief if a company operates
in a high unemployment region. Besides manufacturing, Hungary also supports its hoteling
industry and Slovakia has numerous incentives for foreign investors. Since 1995, Poland created
seventeen special economic zones (currently fourteen), in which companies can benefit from tax
exemptions provided they obtain a permit from the zoning authorities.Table 2.2 and Appendix
2.2 describe the tax incentives in greater detail.
With regard to capital allowances, all six countries maintained the yearly write-down al-
lowances at their 1999 level (Table 2.3). Gradually, more detailed asset categories were intro-
duced that generally benefited from higher depreciation rates, a development applying especially
to the IT and communications sector. Provisions for intangible assets were also established. In
3It is worth mentioning that the Baltic countries, although not studied in this chapter, experienced 100%
increase in revenue through modest cuts in the CIT rates. From 2000 to 2009, for example, rates in Estonia and
Lithuania fell by 5 and 4pp, respectively. Collections rose from 0.9% (2000) to 1.8% (2009) in Estonia, and from
0.7% to 1.8% in Lithuania. A similar trend is observed in Latvia.
4In all six countries, indirect taxation is gradually becoming one of the biggest sources of government revenue
and certainly of greater importance than the CIT. The shift from direct to indirect taxation is not limited to
CEE, however, and is happening, to a varying degree, across all EU countries. This shift is acknowledged and in
fact encouraged by the European Commission (2010). The increasing reliance on indirect taxes can be a possible
explanation of why corporate tax cuts were not accompanied by a tax base expansion.
5Except loss carryforward.
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Table 2.2: MAJOR TAX INCENTIVES
BG 2003 Manufacturing companies qualify for 100% reduction in CIT if located in
municipalities, where unemployment is 50% higher than the average unemployment in
the country. The tax is accounted as a reserve and should be used for the acquisition
of fixed assets. A list of qualifying municipalities is published in CIT Law annually.
Incentive was still in effect in 2005. Losses can be carried forward for 5 years.
CZ 1999 Corporate income tax relief for 10 years for firms that make an investment in a
specified manufacturing sector, with a certain portion of the investment being covered
by equity; investment in machinery must account for at least 40% of the total
investment. Incentive was still valid in 2005. Losses can be carried forward for 7
years
2004 Losses can be carried forward for 5 years.
HU 1999 Investment tax credit of 50% of the corporate income tax if product manufacturing
investment of at least HUF 1 billion is made. Credit can be claimed in each of the
five years following investment if in such years sales revenue increases by at least 5%
of the investment value. Same conditions apply for equivalent investment in the hotel
industry, but sales turnover should increase by 25% compared to the previous year
but not less than HUF 600 million. Losses can be carried forward for 5 years.
PL 1999 Since 1995 Poland has created seventeen special economic zones (SEZ). One zone was
since closed, and two were merged into the Pomeranian SEZ. Companies can apply
for permit to operate in these zones and benefit from tax exemptions and preferences.
Tax exemptions are calculated based on the amount invested and the company would
not pay income tax until the income tax exemption limit has been exhausted.
RO 2000 Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) can reduce their corporate profit tax by 20% if
their employment increases by 10% compared to previous year. A SME is a company
with no more than 249 employees and annual turnover less than e8 million. This tax
incentive was valid until 2004.
2001 Micro-enterprises (ME) are taxed at 1.5% on sales. An ME has no more than 9
employees and annual turnover less than e100,000. Incentive was valid until 2002.
Losses can be carried forward for 5 years.
SK Losses can be carried forward for 5 years.
Note: The table lists only those tax incentives, which are accounted for, given the data. In addition, until 2002,
Bulgaria offered an incentive, which reduced profit tax by 10% of the amounts contributed to establish a company
or increase the capital of a company, if the amounts are used to improve fixed tangible assets and the investment
is made in municipalities with 1.5 times higher unemployment than the average for the country. Besides a
corporate income tax holiday, firms in the Czech Republic can also apply for job-creation grants, customs-related
benefits, grants for retraining employees and property-related incentives, all of which can affect taxable income.
Hungary additionally offers tax incentives for offshore companies. Romania has special provisions in place for
firms in Disfavoured Economic Zones and Industrial Parks (usually VAT deferral) and like Poland, has created
Free-Trade Zones benefiting from 5% profit tax rate or a general profit tax exemption. Tax holidays and tax
credits as well as contributions for new jobs and training are available to firms in Slovakia, although they need
to meet a long list of requirements in order to qualify. Column (2) shows the year of implementation of the tax
incentive or the year in which an already existing policy was modified.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2003 Bulgaria increased the depreciation rates for some assets including plant and machinery,
followed by the Czech Republic in 2005. Romania allowed for an accelerated depreciation rate
at 50% in the year of purchase for technological equipment and other machinery in service after
2002.
Due to the limitations of the data, a single definition of taxable income cannot be adopted
in the empirical analysis that follows. It is therefore important to establish that the definition of
TI has not changed in such a way that TI would have grown for reasons unrelated to tax rates
or firms’ profitability. While the definition of taxable income was indeed altered in all countries,
it was mostly in the direction of increasing deductible expenses. In Bulgaria, the number of
new provisions reducing the financial result was far greater than the ones raising it. The list of
deductible expenses in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic remained virtually the same,
with the exception of a new provision introduced in 2004 in the Czech Republic, stipulating that
the purchase cost of intangible assets up to CZK60,000 can be deducted immediately (Ernst
& Young, Various Years). Romania followed a balanced approach in modifying firms’ taxable
income. For example, up to 1.5% of total salary cost could be deducted in 2005 compared to
2% in 2004, but in 2005 permanent establishments could deduct R&D, and management and
administration expenses up to 10% of taxable salaries.
Given the described policies and the falling CIT rates, the strength of corporate tax revenues
cannot be explained by expansions in the tax base. It is certainly possible, however, that
enhancement of tax administrations’ enforcement and collection abilities could have generated
additional revenue by driving more firms out of the shadow economy. According to the World
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, regulatory quality, which incorporates the effectiveness
of the tax collection system, has improved tremendously in CEE for the period 1999-2005.
Nevertheless, according to the Indicators, there are mixed signals concerning the control of
corruption, which has not exhibited marked advancement, and in the case of Poland, has actually
worsened with time.
2.3.3 Rate of incorporation and profitability
Even if the tax base became narrower, lower CIT rates could have promoted a higher rate of
incorporation and the growth of already established businesses. Further, firms may have become
more profitable due to non-tax reasons. To examine if this is the case, I study changes in the
profit rate of corporations, the share of the corporate sector in GDP and the number of firms
per capita. I follow Clausing (2007) and construct a rate of profitability measure by dividing
corporations’ aggregate net operating surplus by corporate value added. Corporate value added
scaled by GDP serves as a measure of the share of the corporate sector. Finally, the number
of firms by industry as well as population statistics are taken from OECD’s Structural Business
Statistics and Eurostat.
Figure 2.1 shows the number of enterprises per capita in the non-financial sector from 1999
to 2005. The number of firms relative to the population increased in Romania and remained
virtually unchanged in Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. There was a substantial jump in the
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Figure 2.2: RATE OF PROFITABILITY
BG CZ HU PL RO SK
entry of firms in the Czech Republic between 2001 and 2002, with the time series stabilising at
the higher level post 2002.6 In general, the Czech Republic has markedly higher businesses-to-
population ratio than the remaining five countries. In contrast, Poland experienced an overall
decline in businesses both in absolute and per capita level.
Trends in profitability are depicted in Figure 2.2. Looking in more detail at the sectoral
differences, the mining and quarrying as well as the electricity, gas, and water supply industries
expanded in all countries, although their profitability was volatile – from negative in Poland,
Slovakia and Hungary to steadily growing in the Czech Republic (Appendix 2.1: Tables 2.13
and 2.14).7 The number of firms operating in the Real Estate and Business Services sector grew
6The entry rate could have been even higher as the change of the number of firms from one year to the next
is a combination of both the birth and death rates of firms.
7For Romania, the data is only for the total number of firms.
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in all countries and its profitability remained stable.
Apart from the sectors mentioned above, the number of enterprises in Poland declined in
all other industries, yet their profitability increased considerably. Piotrowska and Vanborren
(2008) also find an increasing entry rate and corporate profit share for the Czech Republic and
Poland, respectively. Overall, only Poland and Slovakia exhibit an upward tendency in the
rate of profitability.8 Last but not least, the share of the corporate sector in GDP declined in
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia, remained the same in Poland and the Czech Republic, and
increased in Romania, as depicted in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: SHARE OF CORPORATE SECTOR IN GDP
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Figure 2.3: SHARE OF CORPORATE SECTOR IN GDP
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Data
I use firm-level panel data from the comprehensive AMADEUS dataset for European companies
compiled by Bureau van Dijk. The data consists of financial statements’ variables as reported
by firms. I consider data for the 6 CEE countries discussed above, namely Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia for the period 1999-2005. Earlier years are
not included because AMADEUS’s data coverage for CEE was limited before and even in 1999
and also because most tax reforms took place after 1999.
Sole proprietors, partnerships, societies, associations and non-profit organisations are ex-
cluded from the analysis, since some are non-corporate entities and others are subject to special
tax provisions. For each country I keep public and private limited companies, branches of foreign
corporations, as well as municipal and state companies, resulting in a dataset of 3,248,643 firm-
year observations. If a firm has submitted both consolidated and unconsolidated statements,
8Figure 2 excludes the financial sector, but the trends do not change if this sector is considered.
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only the unconsolidated statement is considered in order to avoid repetitive firm observations
(3,795 firm-year observations dropped). The sample is further restricted to include firms whose
status is active, i.e., not in bankruptcy, dissolution, or liquidation, and that file a report at the
end of the year (11,399 firm-year observations dropped).
I follow Klapper et al. (2006) and Da Rin et al. (2011) and exclude certain industries
that are unlikely to manage taxable income or are subject to stricter regulations. In particular,
financial services (NACE2 65-66; 2,551 firm-year observations), public administration, educa-
tion, and other social and personal services industries (NACE2 75, 80, 90, 91, 92, 95, 97, 99;
40,328 firm-year observations) as well as firms missing an industry classification (36,471 firm-
year observations) are removed. Overall, there remain 51 different industries based on a NACE2
classification. I additionally drop observations with spells of missing values of taxes paid, cost of
employees, profit/loss for the period and depreciation in the beginning and the end of each panel
(1,112,893 firm-year observations), all of which are variables used later on in the calculation of
effective tax rates.
All financial amounts are transformed into thousands of USD using AMADEUS’s exchange
rate from the local currency to USD at the fiscal year end of companies. By and large, the
exchange rates exhibit little volatility, which will not affect the subsequent empirical estimation
as all balance-sheet variables are scaled by total assets.
The statutory tax rates for each country are described in Table 2.1, but before proceeding
with computing taxable income, I need to identify firms that have utilised tax breaks, and
therefore face lower or zero corporate tax rates. In the data, such firms usually appear as paying
zero taxes due to tax incentives, yet it would be wrong to infer their taxable incomes to be zero.
Appendix 2.2 describes in detail what types of firms qualify for tax incentives and how
they are identified. All in all, approximately 600 major manufacturing firms from Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland qualify for some tax incentive. The number is much more
substantial for Romania, since the incentives cover SMEs and microenterprises. About 9,000
companies per year (2000-2004) in Romania fulfil the SMEs incentive criteria and more than
70,000 firms in 2001 could use the microenterprises tax rate. Earnings before interest and tax
(ebit) are used as a measure of taxable income in the case of a tax incentive, which enables the
firm to pay no tax. If the incentive reduces the tax rate, then I simply assign the lower rate to
the eligible firm.
2.4.2 Computing firm-level effective tax rates
The methodology of Devereux and Griffith (2003) is followed to compute effective average cor-
porate tax rates (EATR). An attractive feature of this effective tax rate, as pointed out by
Devereux and Griffith (2003), is that it constitutes a weighted average of the marginal effective
tax rate for marginal investments, and the statutory tax rate for very profitable investments.
One of the main reasons for using EATR in this chapter is to create variation in the tax rates,
since the formula for EATR includes a firm-specific component as will be shown below. Even
though EATR is more suited to studying the firm’s decision to invest, while income shifting,
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especially if achieved through accounting manipulation, would be better captured by the statu-
tory rate, it is worth noting that in the long-run, the decision to invest (or not) inevitably affects
taxable income. Regressions using the statutory tax rates instead of EATR are also reported
later on.
The EATR is based on the net-present value (NPV) of a hypothetical investment project,





with R∗ being the NPV of the project without tax and R – the NPV with tax. R is derived
in the following way: If Vt is the market value of a firm’s shares, then following King (1974),
the net-of-tax yield from investing Vt at the market rate of interest must equal the net-of-tax




Dt + (1− zt)(Vt+1 − Vt −Nt), (2.4.2)
where it is the market rate of interest at time t, mit is the personal tax rate on interest income,
mdt is the tax rate on dividend income, zt is the capital gains’ tax rate, ct is the rate of tax credit
on dividends, and Nt is the new equity issued.
Solving this difference equation and assuming a one unit increase in the capital stock in
period t dKt = 1, which is reduced in the next period so that dKk = 0 ∀ k 6= t, yields a change







, where θ = (1 −mdt )/(1 − ct)(1 − zt)
and ρ = (1−mit)it/(1− zt).
From the equation for the appropriation of income, one obtains Dt as Dt = Y (Kt−1)(1 −
τ st )− It +Bt− (1 + it(1− τ st ))Bt−1 + τ st φt(I +KTt−1) +Nt. Output Y in period t is a function of
the beginning of year capital stock Kt−1, τ st is the statutory corporate tax rate, It is investment,
Bt is debt, with interest payments assumed to be tax-deductible, φt is the depreciation rate
of capital, and KTt−1 is defined as tax-written-down value of capital stock at the beginning of
t (Devereux and Griffith, 2003). Deriving the change in dDt+k from the equation for Dt and
plugging into the equation for dVt, Devereux and Griffith (2003) obtain R and subsequently the
EATR for different sources of financing.
Throughout the chapter I assume that θ = 1, i.e., mdt = ct = zt = 0. Additionally, I
assume that mit = 0, which leads to the nominal discount rate of shareholders ρ = i. θ was first
defined by King (1974) as a measure of the degree of discrimination between retaining profits
and distributing profits as dividends. In other words, if paying dividends generates more tax
liability as compared to retaining earnings, then θ < 1. Therefore, assuming that θ = 1, or
equivalently not considering personal income taxes, implies that financing projects either by
retained earnings, or the issue of new shares yields the same EATR.
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[(p+ δ)(1 + π)(1− τ s)− ((1 + i)− (1− δ)(1 + π))(1−A)] + F, (2.4.3)
where the first term in brackets is the net-of-tax change in output caused by a one unit increase
in the capital stock, with p being the real financial return, δ one period cost of depreciation and
π the inflation rate, which is the same for capital and output. The second term in brackets is
the required decrease in investment to keep capital stock unchanged in period t + 1. A is the
NPV of tax allowances per unit of investment and F is the cost of raising external finance.9
Provided that the investment is financed by debt, because of deductible interest payments,
taxable income will be lower, and hence the EATR is smaller. To see this, note that if the firm
borrows 1 − φτ in period t, then R incorporates the amount of deductible interest payments
F = iτ s 1−φτ
s
1+i , which leads to a lower EATR as compared to the case when F = 0, which is
equivalent to financing by retained earnings or equity.10
Correspondingly, R∗ is simply R without the taxes, or
R∗ = −1 + 1
1 + i
[(p+ δ)(1 + π) + (1− δ)(1 + π)] = p− r
1 + r
(2.4.4)
using the relationship between the real r and nominal i interest rates (1 + r)(1 + π) = (1 + i).
The difference R∗ − R is then scaled by the NPV of the pre-tax total income stream net of
depreciation p/(1 + r) in order to obtain a measure of the EATR (See Appendix 2.3).
Similarly to Da Rin et al. (2011), I measure the nominal interest rate i with the rate
of short-term government bonds. In particular, two-year government bond rates are used for
Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia, and one-year government bond and one year treasury bill rates
for the Czech Republic and Hungary, respectively. No such rate is available for Romania, so it
is approximated with the money market interested rate, taken from Eurostat. The Harmonised
Indices of Consumer Prices from Eurostat are a measure of the inflation rate π.
The maximum depreciation rates for plant and machinery in the cases of Poland and Hun-
gary, heavy machinery for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and machines and manufacturing
equipment for Bulgaria and Romania are used as the rates at which capital expenditure is
offset against tax φ. The results presented below are robust to using other asset categories’
depreciation rates and the average of these.
The financial rate of return p is obtained by subtracting expenditures on employees (staf)
from the added value (av), and dividing this difference by the added value: (av − staf)/av,
where in AMADEUS av is defined as the sum of taxes paid (taxa), profit/loss for the period
(pl), depreciation (depre), interest paid (inte), and labour expenses (staf). Da Rin et al. (2011)
employ an identical measure but on an industry level.
A major problem is that about 90% of the AMADEUS firms have missing values for interest






, where T = 1/φ for straight-line depreciation, and
A = φτs (1+i)
(i+φ)
for declining balance. See also Da Rin et al. (2011).
10The assumption is that the firm is eligible for an immediate tax allowance of φτs, hence 1− φτs.
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paid. For this reason, p is calculated without including this variable. However, estimates are
presented for the small sample of firms who have reported interest payments, with p calculated
accordingly, with the results confirming income shifting, although the non-transitory responses
tend to be lower (close to zero) than the long-term responses estimated without inte.
All remaining variables, namely r, A, R and R∗ are calculated using the formulas described
above. The one-period cost of depreciation δ is assumed to take a value of 12.5%, taken from
Da Rin et al. (2011). A step-by-step explanation of the variables and formulas used to calculate
the EATR is provided in Appendix 2.3.
2.4.3 Taxable income
In general, the measure of firms’ taxable income, which is taxes paid divided by the statutory
tax rate, is only an approximation of the true taxable income, given the limitations of the
data. In particular, there is no information on incurred losses, which can be carried forward
for 5 consecutive years in all countries and are in effect a deferred tax, since they appear as
deductions in future periods (Hanlon, 2003). This means that a lot of firms will report zero TI
in year t, because of previous year losses, even if they are profitable at time t.
Table 2.4 provides descriptive statistics for all variables of interest. TI is between 5% and
10% of total assets, with the notable exception of 2001, when the ratio is 0.5. This high ratio
is due to the large number of Romanian microenterprises subject to 1.5% tax in 2001, which
lowers the mean of the tax rates in that year substantially, while raising the ratio of TI to Toas
considerably as microenterprises’ tax base is turnover. If the data is weighted by turnover, the
weighted mean of TIToas for 2001 is .079. The same occurs with inflation whose mean is well above
the weighted mean due to the very large number of Romanian firms relative to the remaining
sample.
Table 2.4 further shows the three corporate tax rates of interest: the statutory, and the
effective tax rates assuming the project is financed by equity (τ ee), and debt (τ ed), respectively.
τ ee closely follows the statutory tax rate and is very similar in value, while τ ed is much lower.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the distributions of τ ee and τ ed, respectively, in the range (0,1) for the
period 1999-2005. Compared to τ ee, τ ed’s distribution is more compressed, with a lower mean
and less rate variability.
Both tax rates, however, are lower than they should be, since interest payments were not
included in the calculation of the rate of return, which resulted in smaller p, and hence lower
effective tax rates. In Table 2.4, the tax rates’ means are for firms that have realised some profit,
i.e., the rates are in the range (0,1). In the subsequent estimation I use tax rates in the range
(−0.01, 1) in order to reduce the influence of very negative values of the effective tax rates.11
11Given the formulas for the effective tax rates, I obtain a number of firms which face tax rates greater than
100% and some facing negative tax rates (subsidy). The firm-year observations with tax greater than 100%
are 1,930 for τee (3,337 for τed), all of which drop out from the subsequent estimation as ln(1 − τ) becomes
negative, and therefore not defined. 75.8% (70.5%) of these are Romanian enterprises that experienced very
high inflation in the period 1999-2003. Inflation in Romania began to normalise in 2005, declining to 9%. The
firm-year observations with a negative tax rate are 25,640 (115,440 for τed); the estimation includes businesses
facing tax rates in the negative range (-0.01, 0), or 20,805 (29,014) firm-year observations, leaving out 4,835
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.093 .110 .493 .065 .053 .057 .076
(.175) (.201) (.792) (.232) (.136) (.155) (.186)
τs .328 .238 .136 .232 .251 .218 .171
(.077) (.032) (.116) (.064) (.035) (.040) (.030)
τee .342 .280 .150 .242 .245 .197 .172
(.125) (.085) (.136) (.087) (.064) (.073) (.044)
τed .147 .163 .102 .171 .191 .151 .148
(.094) (.070) (.103) (.083) (.078) (.077) (.044)
ln(Cuas/Toas) -.637 -.588 -.589 -.554 -.553 -.575 -.575
(.726) (.715) (.715) (.719) (.743) (.774) (.779)
ln(Culi/Toas) -.685 -.681 -.525 -.507 -.579 -.765 -.780
(1.02) (.1.06) (1.01) (1.06) (1.13) (1.22) (1.25)
ln(Depre/Toas) -3.41 -3.38 -3.53 -3.54 -3.57 -3.46 -3.42
(1.27) (1.26) (1.28) (1.34) (1.4) (1.4) (1.41)
ln(Fias/Toas) -1.37 -1.46 -1.48 -1.56 -1.60 -1.59 -1.58
(1.15) (1.21) (1.25) (1.31) (1.35) (1.39) (1.4)
ln(Opre/Toas) .834 .745 .688 .717 .624 .488 .414
(1.13) (1.16) (1.08) (1.10) (1.09) (1.16) (1.17)
ln(Toas) 3.36 3.35 3.59 3.65 3.86 4.20 4.14
(2.41) (2.39) (2.53) (2.55) (2.48) (2.30) (2.23)
i .485 .289 .299 .185 .141 .140 .059
(.269) (.156) (.132) (.075) (.061) (.060) (.011)
φ .147 .148 .149 .146 .150 .148 .149
(.019) (.019) (.022) (.019) (.037) (.031) (.030)
π .322 .313 .271 .170 .114 .091 .067
(.185) (.176) (.122) (.086) (.062) (.033) (.029)
p .438 .468 .463 .498 .530 .518 .514
(.262) (.269) (.271) (.276) (.290) (.281) (.279)
N 166,411 201,182 183,122 196,703 260,943 391,654 414,909
TI>0 100,039 125,625 146,546 78,059 109,583 173,950 199,553
Note: TIt
Toast
is taxable income scaled by total assets; τs is the statutory tax rate; τee is the effective tax rate
assuming new investment is financed by equity (retained earnings); τed is the effective tax rate assuming new
investment is financed by debt only. The means of the tax rates are in the range (0,1), i.e., they reflect the
mean rates for firms with positive TI. See Footnote 11 in the text. ln(Cuas/Toas) is the natural log of the ratio
between current assets (stocks + accounts receivable+other current assets) and total assets; ln(Culi/Toas) is
the natural log of the ratio between current liabilities (loans + accounts payable + other current liabilities) and
total assets; ln(Depre/Toas) is the natural log of the ratio of depreciation to total assets; ln(Fias/Toas) is the
natural log of the ratio between fixed assets (tangible fixed assets + intangible fixed assets + other fixed assets,
including financial fixed assets) and total assets; ln(Opre/Toas) is the natural log of the ratio between operating
revenue and total assets; ln(Toas) is the natural log of total assets. i is the nominal interest rate, φ is the rate of
depreciation for plant and machinery, π is inflation, and p is the rate of return. See also Appendix 2.3.
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Unlike Western European countries, where the average inflation for the period 1999-2005 was
about 3%, CEE had high rates of inflation, especially in the period 1999-2002, which normalised
to about 7%, on average, in 2005. The nominal interest rates reflect the high inflation rates and
also decrease over time.
2.4.4 Methodology
The goal is to separate the long-run and short-run responses of taxable income to changes in the
tax rates and this involves taking account of income shifting by firms in anticipation of lower
future rates. To separate the responses, the following specification is employed:
TIit
Toasit
= αi + β1[ln(1− τ eit)− ln(1− τ eit−1)] + β2ln(1− τ eit)
+ β3[ln(1− τ eit+1)− ln(1− τ eit)] + εit (2.4.5)
= αi + (β1 + β2 − β3)ln(1− τ eit)− β1ln(1− τit−1) + β3ln(1− τit+1) + εit
(86,426) firm-year observations with tax rates smaller than -1%. It is worth pointing out that more than 60%
of all firms with negative tax rates belong to a narrow category of firms, which are also the most difficult to
tax, namely: General construction and plumbing; restaurants and bars; sale, maintenance and repair of motor
vehicles; sales agents; and retail trade with food, beverages and tobacco predominant. Last but not least, the
firm-year observations facing a zero effective tax rate are 862,694 for both τee and τed, or approximately 47% of
the whole sample. Again, more than 63% of the firms with zero effective tax rates belong to NACE2: 45, 50, 51,
52, and 55, i.e., construction, wholesale and retail trade and hotels and restaurants, and to NACE2 74, which is
accounting and tax consulting services.
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which is similar to the one used by Heim (2006) and Goolsbee (2000). TIit is the taxable income
of firm i in year t scaled by total assets Toas. ln(1 − τ eit−1), ln(1 − τ eit), and ln(1 − τ eit+1)
are the natural logarithms of the lagged, the contemporaneous, and the leading net-of-EATR
shares, respectively, and αi are firm fixed effects. αi capture unobserved heterogeneity for firm
i, assuming that firms differ randomly in a way that is not completely controlled for by the
observed covariates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009a). In this specification, TIToas in period t is
affected not only by the current tax rate, but also by the difference between the current and
lagged and current and leading rates.
If τ et−1 > τ et > τ et+1, I expect firms to shift income out of year t−1 into the current year t, and




. Thus, the effect of ln(1− τ eit−1) on taxable income in the current year, TIt,
is likely to be positive (β1 > 0), and that of ln(1− τ eit+1) – negative (β3 < 0). The coefficient of
the current net-of-tax share is a combination of the current effect and two shifting coefficients,
which entails the explicit control for the lagged and leading shares, if β2 = (β1+β2−β3)−β1+β3,
the long-run effect, is to be estimated consistently.
In the linear-log specification, the coefficients measure the absolute change in TIitToasit for a
relative change in the net-of-tax shares, so that a 1% increase in ln(1 − τit+1), increases the
ratio of TI to total assets by β3/100, where the division comes from the switch from relative to
percentage change. The reason why I cannot log transform the dependent variable is that such
transformation turns observations with zero taxable income into missing values, thus creating
gaps in the individual firm-panels as log(0) is not defined.
If I log transform, the estimation will be based solely on firms that have reported positive
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taxable incomes. Therefore, the dependent variable is no longer E[ln(TI)] but E[ln(TI)|x, TI >
0]. Without the log transformation, there is a mass point of TI at zero, but not a problem with
observability of the dependent variable. In other words, the zeros in the case of firms’ taxable
income are not due to self-selection but are an actual outcome value. For this reason self-
selection models are not appropriate for the data, while if Tobit is used, random effects have
to be assumed, and even then, differencing the data to eliminate the firm-effects can lead to
complications.12
There are several problems with the specification as presented above. First, ln(1 − τ eit) is
endogenous in (2.4.5) not only due to spurious correlation stemming from the fact that common
factors, such as taxes paid taxa and the statutory tax rate τ s, determine both TIit and the
effective tax rate τ eit, but also due to reverse causality. For example, in the case of firms that
sustain losses, it is TI that determines the tax rate. Similarly, smaller firms can be taxed at
preferential rates, provided that their TI do not exceed a certain limit.
Second, even if a suitable instrumental variable (IV) for ln(1− τ eit) is available, an additional
problem arises due to the dynamic nature of the specification and the assumption that the fixed-
effects αi are correlated with the observed regressors xit, which necessitates αi’s elimination
through the transformation of the data. In particular, note that a fixed-effects, two-stage least
square estimation of (2.4.5) will lead to an inconsistent first stage. The first stage is an OLS of
the demeaned data:
ln(1− τ eit)− ln(1− τ ei ). = γ0 + γ1(IVit − IVi.) + γ2[ln(1− τ
e
it−1)− ln(1− τ ei )−1]
+ γ3[ln(1− τ eit+1)− ln(1− τ ei )+1] + εit − ε̄i., (2.4.6)








t=0 ln(1−τit), and ln(1− τ ei )+1 =
T−1i
∑t=Ti+1
t=2 ln(1−τit). This regression would lead to inconsistent parameter estimates, because
ln(1 − τ eit−1) and −T
−1
i ln(1 − τ eit) are correlated with −T
−1
i εit−1 and εit, respectively. Similar
negative correlations occur for the leading net-of-tax share, yielding an inconsistent within es-
timator (Bond, 2002). For a single lagged dependent variable, Nickell (1981) demonstrates
that the leading negative correlations outweigh the positive correlations between terms such
as −T−1i εit−1 and −T
−1
i ln(1 − τit−1), resulting in downward bias in γ2. Eq.(2.4.6), however,
contains a second endogenous variable, making it unclear if the bias formulas hold in this case.
In fact, an IV estimation in the presence of any lagged or leading terms in levels will produce
an inconsistent within-estimator (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009b). Therefore, in order to remove
αi and estimate eq.(2.4.6), and therefore eq.(2.4.5) consistently, I turn to the first-difference
estimator.
An important advantage of the first-differencing transformation is that, unlike demeaning, it
does not introduce all realisations of the disturbances (εi1, εi2, ...εiT ) into the transformed error
term. Nevertheless, adjacent time periods are still problematic. Note that in the first-differenced
12See Kalwij (2003) for more details on Tobit in first-differences with individual effects. Since taxable income
is zero when a loss is realised, it is in fact a censored variable, so that: TIit = TI∗it if TI∗it > 0 (taxable profit is
realised) and TIit = 0 if TI∗it ≤ 0 (taxable loss or the firm breaks even).
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, since ln(1 − τ eit) and −ln(1 − τ eit+1) are
correlated with −εit and εit+1, respectively, leading to a downward bias. It is uncertain how the
bias in the case of first differencing will compare to demeaning considering the second endogenous
regressor. ln(1 − τ eit−k), for k ≥ 2, however, is not correlated with the error term, which opens
up the possibility for consistent estimation using a longer difference window. Specifically a two




















+4X ′Γ + εit+2 − εit, (2.4.8)
which will result in a consistent first stage of the 2SLS, provided that two key assumptions are
met: εit are independent across firms and εit are serially uncorrelated.
λt, λjt, λct are year, industry-year (NACE2 level) and country-year dummies, respectively;
X includes the natural logarithm of the ratios of current assets, current liabilities, depreciation,
fixed assets, and operating revenue to total assets as well as the natural log of total assets.






. Using Gruber and Rauh (2007)’s methodology, such an instrument
is constructed by calculating the EATR in year t + 2 with the firm characteristics from year t.
Specifically, I keep the added value av at its year t level and inflate it by the producer price
index, but allow the macroeconomic variables, such as the statutory tax rate, depreciation rules,
etc., to change. The idea is to make the change in the net-of-tax shares between year t and t+ 2
exogenous to firm behaviour by removing that component of the change, which can be driven by











1 − τpit+2 is the predicted net-of-tax share. All subsequent 2SLS regressions have strong first
stages with F-statistics for the coefficient of the IV always above 1000.
One major disadvantage of using a two-year difference window is the possible underestimation
of the short-term response, especially if firms are able to react to tax changes swiftly from year
to year. Company size and the level of indebtedness may capture some of this flexibility in
the model, but time is certainly a factor. In contrast, it is also probable that the highest
responsiveness occurs a few years after a tax reform, in which case the specification in (2.4.8) is
appropriate.
An indisputable drawback of the two-year window, however, is the big loss of firm-year
observations. In addition, the inclusion of the lagged and leading terms require that a firm be
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present in the panel for at least 5 years, which deprives the estimation of valuable information
from firms, appearing for fewer years. Moreover, the estimates should be taken as representing
the shifting behaviour of already well-established firms rather than new entrants. It is for
these reasons that I additionally present regressions in first-differences, despite the endogeneity
discussed above, and compare the obtained results to the estimates using eq.(2.4.8).
It is worth noting that even if second-differencing removes part of the endogeneity in the
estimation, it is still an imperfect method. In particular, the lack of data on loss carryforwards,
which can be offset against future taxable income, means that past disturbances, usually over a
five year period, will be correlated with the current net-of-tax shares. In fact, firms’ behaviour
with respect to the use of taxable losses to shelter other forms of taxable income is unaccounted
for. As observed by Mintz (1988), the difference in firms’ ability to use write-offs leads to
substantial variation in the effective tax rates, unrelated to changes in tax law or the statutory
tax rates. Neither τ ee, or τ ed incorporate this variation. It is also clear that a large number of
firms may have utilised tax incentives not covered by the ones explicitly controlled for in this
chapter.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Effect of anticipated CIT rates on taxable income
The main results are presented in Table 2.5. Firm fixed effects are eliminated through second-
differencing in all specifications. The effective tax rate is calculated based on a rate of return,
which does not include interest payments for reasons described above, and the assumption that
the project is financed by equity. Column (1) shows the basic regression of the change in the
ratio of taxable income to total assets on the change in the log of the current net-of-tax share,
without other controls except a constant, which acts as a time trend and accounts for income-to-
assets growth. The contemporaneous effect is estimated to be 0.208, and given the specification,
it should suffer from omitted variable bias. If the correlations between the current and lagged
and the current and leading net-of-tax shares were positive, then this bias would be downward.
Column (2) allows for a lagged transitory component, which has a negative and statistically
significant impact on the change of taxable income. Note the dramatic increase in the current
tax effect due to mitigation of the omitted variable bias. This suggests that while the contem-
poraneous effect is close to one, part of it is due to a timing shift of income from previous years
with higher CIT rates to the current year.
The leading net-of-tax share is added in Column (3) and shows how current TI reacts to
anticipated changes in the corporate tax rate. Similarly to the lagged CIT, this term has a
negative impact on reported income, indicating that firms act on expectations of lower taxes
in the future by deferring the declaration of income, accelerating expenses, or by other means.
Both the current and lagged tax terms grow as a consequence of the inclusion of future taxes.
The current effect in Column (3) is much higher than that of Columns (1) and (2) and is








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1), the number of firms is more than cut in half in the specification including all three net-of-tax
shares, revealing a major loss of observations due to second-differencing, but also the extent to
which the panel is unbalanced. The non-transitory response, or the sum of the three coefficients,
is approximately 0.28 and significant.
The inclusion of the year fixed effects in Column (4), which is equivalent to a diff-in-diff
estimation, means that the response of taxable income is identified using solely the cross-sectional
variation of the net-of-tax shares. Once other firm-level explanatory variables and year dummies
are controlled for, both the current response and the shifting coefficients decrease, resulting in
a long-term effect that is statistically not different from zero.
In particular, Column (4) accounts for the log change in current assets (cuas), current
liabilities (culi), depreciation (depre), fixed assets (fias), and operating revenue (opre), all
scaled by total assets and the change in total assets themselves. An increase in cuas, opre,
depre, fias, and culi raises the taxable income-total assets ratio, although the coefficient of
cuas is not precisely estimated. By construction, an increase in Toas will decrease the TIToas
ratio. The positive sign of current liabilities seems counter-intuitive, but it may in fact reflect
the possibility that highly indebted firms, which are close to violating debt covenants, may be
unwilling to engage in aggressive tax planning. This is likely, given that debt covenants not only
require the maintenance of certain financial health, but also determine how the numbers proving
this financial health are calculated.
To purge the regression from country-specific shocks, Column (5) contains country-year fixed
effects. In this case the coefficients of interest are identified from the different timing and different
size of the tax cuts and magnitude of other tax reforms across countries, yielding lower shifting
coefficients in absolute value and thus, a positive and significant long-run response of .139.
Alternatively, Column (6) controls for shocks such as regulations and industry norms that
affect different sectors differently by incorporating industry-year dummies at the NACE2 level.
Similarly to the estimation with year dummies only, controlling for industry-year fixed effects
leads to a permanent response that is not significantly different from zero.
Finally, year-, country-year and industry-year fixed effects are all allowed for in Column
(7), which is my preferred specification. This extensive dummy structure generates the largest
significant non-transitory effect, .151, which nevertheless closely resembles the result in Column
(5).
Utilising the richest specification, (8) repeats the regression in (7), but this time using an
effective tax rate, which includes interest payments, i.e., the rate of return is comprised of all
elements of added value. The number of firms falls drastically to about 27,000. Although the
coefficients of all three net-of-tax shares decrease substantially using this subsample of firms,
income shifting is still present as signalled by the magnitude of the transitory components, while
the long-run effect is almost identical to the one estimated in Column (7).
The influence of current liabilities is no longer significant, while that of fixed assets becomes
negative. In view of the number of tax incentives and deductions available to new investment
in CEE, the negative effect of fias is not unexpected, especially given that 66% of the 27,000
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the respective instruments. All other balance-sheet explanatory variables from Table 2.5 are included but
not reported. Country-year dummies, λct, are also included. The relationship between the first-and second-
differencing first stage coefficients remains robust to any dummy structure or lack thereof. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level in all specifications and are shown in parentheses. Estimation is performed with ivreg2
(Baum et al., 2010). Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
firms reporting interest payments are big and medium enterprises.
To check if it is the inclusion of interest payments in the calculation of τ ee that drives the
lower coefficients in (8) or the particular subsample of firms used, Column (9) reports results
based on the same subsample, but using the baseline EATR, i.e. ones without inte. On account
of the results in (9), it can be concluded that the lower estimated coefficients are subsample-
specific.
2.5.2 First-difference estimates
Table 2.7 re-estimates some of the regressions from Table 2.5 in first-differences. To obtain
coefficients on the leading and lagged net-of-tax shares, a firm should be present in the panel for
at least four years, whereas a year of data is lost due to first-differencing. Nevertheless, about
54,000 firms that dropped out of the previous estimation as a consequence of employing a two-
year window are re-incorporated. The trade-off, as explained in Section 4.4, is the inconsistency
of the first stage estimation which spills over to the 2SLS coefficients, although, due to not
controlling for loss carryforwards, some bias is bound to remain in second-differences as well.
The interesting problem here is that due to the presence of fixed effects and lagged and lead-
ing terms of an explanatory variable that is endogenous, the first stage of the 2SLS estimation
suffers from the classic endogeneity inherent in dynamic panel data models. This endogene-
ity stems from the leading and lagged net-of-tax shares, both of which are exogenous in the
original regression but become endogenous in the first stage and hence cannot act as their own
instruments as they violate the exclusion restriction.
Even so, it is useful to compare the first-difference estimates to the results in Table 2.5,
bearing in mind that apart from Column (1), the coefficients in Table 2.7 are inconsistent. The
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Table 2.7: RESPONSE OF TAXABLE INCOME TO CURRENT, LAGGED, AND LEADING NET-OF-TAX
SHARES, FIRST-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATION






.544*** 1.33*** 1.20*** 1.22*** 1.25***






-.845*** -.618*** -.634*** -.603***






.615*** .253*** .144*** .231***




Observations 1,071,593 408,278 399,286 399,286 399,286
Firms 417,938 177,009 174,091 174,091 174,091




. τeet is the
effective tax rate, calculated under the assumption that new investment is financed by equity (retained earnings)









. All other balance-sheet explanatory variables from Table 2.5 are included in Columns (3)-(5) in
first-differences and not reported here. λt are year dummies, λct are country-year dummies, and λjt are industry-
year dummies at the NACE2 level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all specifications and are
shown in parentheses. Estimation is performed with ivreg2 (Baum et al., 2010). Asterisks denote significance at
the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
negative correlation of the leading and lagged net-of-tax shares with the error term in the first
stage will lead to downward bias in their coefficients, although it is not clear how it will affect
the coefficient of the instrument and thus the fitted value ˆIV .13 The predicted error from the
first stage, which in general should be orthogonal to the right-hand side of the second-stage
regression, contains a bias term. The direction of bias of the 2SLS coefficients will therefore
depend on the interaction between the conditional correlations and this bias term.14
Before looking at the first-difference estimates, Table 2.6 shows how the first stage changes
when estimated in first- and second-differences. The results in Table 2.6 are obtained using
country-year fixed effects, but no matter what the dummy structure is, the first-difference first
stage estimates are always below the second-difference ones, suggesting a downward bias, as
argued in the discussion of eq.(2.4.7).
In Column (1) of Table 2.7 the contemporaneous net-of-tax share is entered alone, which
means that the first stage regression is consistent. Compared to the same estimate in Table
2.5, the coefficient in first-difference, .544, is almost three times as big as in second-differences,
.208, suggesting that firms do not take as long as two years to respond to tax changes but
react promptly. It is likely, therefore, that a two year window underestimates some of this
responsiveness. Once the leading and lagged net-of-tax shares are incorporated in the subsequent
13See Section 2.4.4 and the discussion under eq.(2.4.6) and (2.4.7).
14I am thankful to Štěpán Jurajda for this comment.
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Table 2.8: RESPONSE OF TAXABLE INCOME TO CURRENT, LAGGED, AND LEADING NET-OF-TAX
SHARES, STATUTORY TAX RATE






1.55*** 1.54*** 1.53*** 1.51***






-1.73*** -1.60*** -1.66*** -1.55***






-.703*** -.910*** -.686*** -.906***




Observ. 282,212 282,212 282,212 282,212
Firms 141,400 141,400 141,400 141,400





is the effective tax rate, calculated under the assumption that new investment is financed by equity (retained
earnings) only. τst is the statutory tax rate used in the shifting terms. In all columns fixed-effects are eliminated



































, and4 ln(Toas) are differenced as described above. λt are year dummies, λct are country-
year dummies, and λjt are industry-year dummies at the NACE2 level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level in all specifications and are shown in parentheses. Estimation is performed with ivreg2 (Baum et al., 2010).
Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
columns, the current term is substantially lower than its second-difference equivalent, whereas
the shifting coefficients become less negative, and in fact, the leading term turns positive. All
in all, if firms are quicker to react across adjacent years than two years, these coefficients imply
that the contemporaneous effect is biased downwards as opposed to the leading and lagged terms
whose bias is possibly upward.
If most of the income shifting occurs through accounting manipulation by deferring revenue
and accelerating expenses, for example, then the more relevant tax rate to capture this behaviour
is the statutory tax rate. Table 2.8 shows how results change if EATR is replaced with the










, but keeping the effective
tax rate in the current term. Apart from higher contemporaneous coefficients, the leading and
lagged estimates increase significantly compared to their counterparts in Table 2.5, resulting in
negative and statistically significant long-run response.
2.5.3 Who shifts income?
This section investigates in more detail what type of firms drive the non-transitory result, and
in particular, whether the effect varies by firm size and ability to shift income. Large firms
especially may be more sensitive to nontax costs of income deferral, but may also be more
effective at shifting income as they have more sophisticated tax departments. Guenther (1994)
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Table 2.9: RESPONSE OF TAXABLE INCOME BY FIRM SIZE






















Observations 158,672 71,375 22,103
Firms 76,541 33,418 10,680




. τeet is the
effective tax rate, calculated under the assumption that new investment is financed by equity (retained earnings)





were separated according to size in the following manner: Big(T): operating revenue ≥ e10 million, total assets ≥
e20 million, number of employees ≥ 100. Medium (M) companies: operating revenue ≥ e1 million, total assets
≥ e2 million, number of workers ≥ 15. All columns include all other balance sheet explanatory variables used
in Table 2.5, as well as year, industry-year, and country-year fixed effects not reported here. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level in all specifications and are shown in parentheses. Estimation is performed with ivreg2
(Baum et al., 2010). Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
and Scholes at al. (1992) describe two types of nontax costs: (1) those associated with income
deferral such as costs caused by the acceleration of R&D projects or dissatisfied customers if
year-end shipments are delayed, and (2) political costs pertaining to meeting debt covenant
restrictions and management compensation plans. Guenther (1994) concludes that larger firms
will tend to reduce financial statement income if they defer taxable income to minimise cost in
case they are subjected to public scrutiny. Scholes at al. (1992) estimates that large public firms
are more tax opportunistic than small public companies and are more prone to shifting gross
margin and selling, general and administrative expenses in expectation of tax cuts.
In order to categorise firms into big, medium and small, I use AMADEUS’s classification,
based on total assets, operating revenue and number of employees. Firms with total assets
greater or equal to e20 million, operating revenue of at least e10 million and no less than
100 employees belong to the Top 250,000 firms. Next are the Top 1,500,000 companies. In
general, a firm should have total assets ≥ e2 million, operating revenue ≥ e1 million and at
least 15 employees to qualify as a Top 1,500,000 company. Firms not belonging to the above
two categories, are classified as small.
Table 2.9 splits the sample according to the size classification described above; 28% of firms
belong to the Top 1,500,000 dataset, and 63% are small firms. It is clear from Table 2.9 that
the big contemporaneous and transitory coefficients estimated in Table 2.5 are mostly driven
by small firms, which exhibit high anticipation to future rates. In fact, the long-term response
for small firms is twice bigger than the highest response estimated in Table 2.5. The results are







has a modest but significant impact on taxable income of medium-sized compa-
nies in the current year, and so does the lagged net-of-tax share, indicating that medium-sized
firms undertake income shifting on a small scale. The leading effect, while negative, is insignifi-
cant. After accounting for income shifting, the non-transitory effect on TI for medium firms is
much closer to the one obtained with the full sample.
When it comes to big firms, the current net-of-tax share has a negative and significant effect
on taxable income, a contradictory result to the previous estimates. While both the lagged and
leading change in tax rates have precisely estimated negative impact on TI, these effects are
rather small. Big firms, therefore, do not seem to engage in aggressive intertemporal earnings
management.
Considering bigger firms’ access to many other tax management instruments, such as debt
shifting, earnings distribution between subsidiaries, geographic income shifting, as well as invest-
ment tax incentives, it is probable that such firms find cheaper alternatives to the intertemporal
shifting of income (Tang and Jog, 2001; Smart and Hong, 2007).15 This result is robust to
splitting the sample by firms’ number of managers, which can be used as a proxy for firm size.16
Another sample split, this time by country, is performed in Table 2.10 with the results vary-
ing greatly between countries. First, Bulgaria and Slovakia have negative estimated coefficients
for the current effect, which are also statistically significant. An insignificant negative contem-
poraneous term is estimated for Hungary. Given that 75% of the total sample are Romanian
firms, the coefficients for this county are closest to the full sample ones, as expected. Last but
not least, Poland exhibits a modest current effect and small transitory coefficients, while in the
case of the Czech Republic these effects are bigger, yet still well below the full sample estimates.
In a sense, however, Table 2.10 replicates the sample splits from Table 2.9, since 47,254 out
of the 55,642 firm-year observations, or 84%, for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia are medium and big enterprises, for whom small positive and negative current net-
of-tax share coefficients are estimated, respectively. It is, therefore, hard to consider the samples
for these five countries representative, as most of the smaller firms simply do not appear in the
panel for five consecutive years and drop out of the estimation. In the other extreme is Romania,
with 74% small and 23% medium firms.
In an attempt to address this aggregation problem, which makes the interpretation of the
15Since every edition of Amadeus deletes firms which exited the market prior to the edition year, it is likely
that there is attrition bias in the data, as firms are removed if exiting the market, i.e. they do not drop out of
the panel in a random fashion. Furthermore, the firms that exit are likely to be small and medium enterprises, so
firm size can be significantly associated with attrition. It is possible that this bias affects the estimated shifting
coefficients for small versus large companies. I am grateful to Peter Egger for this comment.
16In general I would expect that a firm’s ability to shift income will increase proportionally to the number of
managers it employs. Yet, this turns out not to be the case. The sample is divided into three subgroups: firms
with zero to two managers, those with 2 up to 5 managers and firms employing more than 5 managers. The
results are robust to using other subgroups and are almost identical to those in Table 2.9, with the most responsive
firms being the ones with fewer managers, whereas companies with five or more managers have very small shifting
coefficients. One possible explanation put forth by Guenther (1994) is that if management compensation is linked
to firm performance, then executives may be reluctant to decrease taxable income to save taxes, even though
this move would be beneficial to shareholders. Alternatively, as mentioned earlier, big firms can utilise a variety
of tax instruments apart from income shifting, which are not easily procurable by smaller companies.
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Table 2.10: RESPONSE OF TAXABLE INCOME BY COUNTRY






-.249*** .467*** -.988 .169*** 1.66*** -.108***






-.020** -.295** -.236 -.043*** -.928*** -.022






-.011*** -.287*** .386 -.005 -.417** .002
(.003) (.075) (.508) (.006) (.028) (.024)
Observations 15,712 10,212 13,783 13,929 196,508 2,006
Firms 7,326 6,460 7,012 7,273 91,440 1,128




. τeet is the
effective tax rate, calculated under the assumption that new investment is financed by equity (retained earnings)





sample is split by country. All columns include all other balance sheet explanatory variables used in Table 2.5,
as well as year and industry-year effects, not reported here. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all
specifications and are shown in parentheses. Estimation is performed with ivreg2 (Baum et al., 2010). Asterisks
denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
average coefficients difficult, Table 2.11 weighs the data, using statistics for the whole popula-
tion of firms for the six countries, namely turnover by NACE 1 industry. Thus, the data was
re-weighed using wctjWj , where wctj is the turnover of industry j in country c at time t and Wjt is∑6
c=1wcjt. In this way, the Czech and Polish firms received the highest weight, while Bulgaria
and Romania, the lowest. Table 2.11 presents some preliminary results of the weighted regres-
sions. Unlike Table 2.8, where the shifting coefficients were much larger than the ones estimated
in Table 2.5, in Table 2.11 the shifting coefficients are smaller than the benchmark table results,
leading to a positive long-run response.
As a robustness check, Table 2.12 repeats the regressions from Table 2.5, using the effective
tax rate τ ed, based on the assumption that the project is entirely financed by debt. The current
effect is twice as high as the one estimated with τ ee, but falls substantially when the lagged
tax rates are added. Without controlling for any other firm-level variables, Column (3) actually
yields a negative and significant non-transitory response. Once other explanatory variables and
year dummies are accounted for in Column (4), the long-run effect is 0.258, which is higher than
the one obtained with the same specification using τ ee. The richest specification in Column (7),
however, produces a non-transitory effect of 0.031, which is not significantly different from zero.
Similarly to the regressions with τ ee, the estimates with τ ed lead to a long-run response that is
either close to zero, or small, positive and significant, depending on the dummy structure.
In general, assuming a project financed by debt results in lower estimated coefficients of the
net-of-tax shares in absolute value than a project financed by equity. This may be due to the
fact that, unlike financing with equity (retained earnings), the cost of raising external capital
through debt, F , is different from zero, which in turn yields higher net-present value R and
hence smaller τ ed. Compared to τ ee, the distribution of τ ed is thus shifted to the left, as shown
62



























Observ. 276,038 276,038 276,038
Firms 124,706 124,706 124,706
Note: The sample in each regression pertains to 1999-2005. The data was re-weighed using wctj
Wj
, where wctj is the
turnover of industry j in country c at time t and Wjt is
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τeet is the effective tax rate, calculated under the assumption that new investment is financed by equity (retained



































, and 4 ln(Toas) are differenced
as described above. λt are year dummies, λct are country-year dummies, and λjt are industry-year dummies at
the NACE2 level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all specifications and are shown in parentheses.
Estimation is performed with ivreg2 (Baum et al., 2010). Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**),
and 10% (*) levels.
in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. With more values of τ ed closer to zero, it is not surprising that a flatter
line is estimated with this tax rate than with τ ee.
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Table 2.12: RESPONSE OF TAXABLE INCOME TO CURRENT, LAGGED, AND LEADING NET-OF-TAX
SHARES, PROJECT FINANCED BY DEBT






.479*** .102* .808*** 1.07*** .665*** 1.10*** .696*** .296***






-.497*** -.787*** -.549*** -.472*** -.529*** -.459*** -.314***






-.468*** -.263*** -.199*** -.262*** -.206*** -.076**






.028 .027 .028 .027 -.006






.071*** .065*** .065*** .058*** -.001






.003 .0009 .002 .0009 -.001






.005 .011 .006 .013 -.030***






.328*** .326*** .326*** .323*** .107***
(.054) (.054) (.054) (.054) (.007)
4ln(Toas) -.102*** -.100*** -.101*** -.100*** -.027***
(.020) (.021) (.020) (.022) (.006)
Time trend -.086*** -.252*** -.407***
(.007) (.011) (.004)
λt Yes Yes Yes
λct Yes Yes Yes
λjt Yes Yes Yes
Observations 671,257 410,098 243,473 238,549 238,549 238,549 238,549 51,085
Firms 280,633 175,090 118,509 117,112 117,112 117,112 117,112 26,645





is the effective tax rate, calculated under the assumption that new investment is financed by debt only. In






























, and 4 ln(Toas) are differenced as described above. λt are year
dummies, λct are country-year dummies, and λjt are industry-year dummies at the NACE2 level. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level in all specifications and are shown in parentheses. Estimation is performed with
ivreg2 (Baum et al., 2010). Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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2.6 Conclusion
In the last two decades most CEE countries undertook radical tax cuts as part of a package of
tax reforms speeding up their transition from controlled to competitive market economies. The
considerable decline in the CIT rates contributed to a reduction in illicit economic activities,
encouraged new entrepreneurs and stimulated already existing firms to expand, thus leading to
a remarkable stability of revenue collections.
This chapter explores whether firms resort to income shifting across years in anticipation of
lower tax rates as an additional mechanism that can explain the increase of corporate revenue
in the years taxes were cut. A substantial rise in revenue in a tax cut year occurs at the expense
of previous year collections if income shifting is present. Further, if tax declines are expected in
the future, taxable income can be shifted further.
The shifting of income, however, is simply a timing response that does not distort real
economic behaviour, and, if unaccounted for, would wrongfully inflate the deadweight loss of the
CIT. Thus, the estimates of the current effect of the net-of-tax shares yield large coefficients,
implying a 0.01 increase in the difference of the taxable income-total assets ratio as a result of
a 1% increase in the two year difference between the net-of-tax rates. Given an average TIToas
ratio of 0.08, a 0.01 increase is substantial. When the possibility of income shifting is explicitly
modelled by the inclusion of leading and lagged terms, the sum of the three coefficients is in the
range between zero and .15 (.20 if τ ed estimates are considered). Nevertheless, even the positive
estimated non-transitory responses have a negligible effect on TIToas as compared to the current
response only.
The results suggest that small firms are most responsive to anticipated tax cuts, exhibiting
the largest shifting coefficients as well as the largest long-term response, followed by medium
enterprises. In contrast, the estimated current effect for big firms is negative, leading to negative
and significant permanent responses. This finding is to some extent mimicked by country sample
splits, since the subsamples for five of the CEE countries, Romania being excluded, are composed
largely of medium and Top 250,000 firms, mainly due to the requirement that a firm appears
in the panel for at least five years. For this reason, outside of the sample results, it cannot
be conclusively stated that the estimates for the Czech Republic and Poland are smaller than
for Romania because firms there are less responsive to tax changes, or that firms in Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Slovakia behave differently given the negatively estimated current effects.
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Appendix 2.1: Change in the number of enterprises and profitabil-
ity by sector
Table 2.13: CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES BY SECTOR
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BG
Mining & quarry 187 207 228 250
Electricity, gas, water supply 181 214 247 279
Hotels & restaurants 22,833 23,258 23,135 22,655
Transport, communications 24,203 24,196 22,853 22,206
Manufacturing 25,689 27,603 28,730 28,740
Construction 16,986 16,824 14,250 12,823
W/sale & retail 119,501 124,051 125,500 123,740
Real estate, business 21,379 23,728 25,465 29,622
CZ
Mining & quarry 301 241 244 317 285 427 324
Electricity, gas, water supply 668 862 707 942 883 1,066 1,083
Hotels & restaurants 38,408 41,721 42,580 47,777 48,800 50,254 50,233
Transport, communications 39,531 62,002 40,828 46,739 46,362 46,851 45,739
Manufacturing 136,206 144,099 131,582 153,788 153,131 151,252 149,581
Construction 110,813 126,040 119,764 144,038 147,790 150,474 144,177
W/sale & retail 215,456 234,686 205,514 237,088 233,560 227,419 218,839
Real estate, business 174,684 190,727 200,543 245,801 245,824 251,906 246,008
HU
Mining & quarry 418 412 457 455 456
Electricity, gas, water supply 514 515 593 630 651
Hotels & restaurants 32,121 32,966 35,320 33,568 32,815
Transport, communications 40,644 40,207 38,947 38,160 36,882
Manufacturing 75,219 73,005 69,711 68,042 64,956
Construction 63,982 65,857 69,667 71,951 71,431
W/sale & retail 173,955 170,135 169,109 161,054 156,100
Real estate, business 161,606 174,446 171,562 189,900 193,928
PL
Mining & quarry 1,058 1,272 1,373 1,505 1,123 1,176 1,243
Electricity, gas, water supply 1,791 1,929 1,839 2,086 1,758 1,931 2,078
Hotels & restaurants 58,461 57,664 51,645 55,685 57,142 56,614 57,146
Transport, communications 169,878 158,296 147,533 152,201 144,974 142,119 136,385
Manufacturing 243,347 219,313 199,993 210,200 197,397 207,197 191,561
Construction 214,264 205,047 174,843 183,372 170,295 159,958 160,227
W/sale & retail 677,616 653,712 589,115 626,219 614,700 610,977 591,137
Real estate, business 213,644 236,731 250,801 267,049 270,098 277,099 267,572
RO
See Figure 1 for trend in total enterprises
SK
Mining & quarry 69 70 68 78 81 81
Electricity, gas, water supply 120 130 166 153 182 207
Hotels & restaurants 740 1,161 792 1,141 1,260 1,424
Transport, communications 1,184 1,531 1,179 1,399 1,530 1,951
Manufacturing 5,614 6,368 5,609 6,764 6,389 6,848
Construction 2,911 3,691 2,738 3,590 3,254 3,724
W/sale & retail 12,473 15,465 11,828 14,730 13,872 16,899
Real estate, business 6,089 8,494 6,527 9,372 9,111 11,089
Source: OECD SDBS Structural Business Statistics: All Businesses (SSIS) for the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia; Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, Structural Business Statistics for Bulgaria;
Eurostat Business Demography Statistics for Romania and Hungary.
Table 2.14: CHANGE IN PROFITABILITY BY SECTOR
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BG
Mining & quarry 0.383 0.163 -0.222 -0.323 0.034 0.169 0.288
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.400 0.523 0.402 0.314 0.201 0.235 0.137
Hotels & restaurants 0.575 0.548 0.504 0.457 0.407 0.453 0.388
Transport, communications 0.347 0.554 0.450 0.465 0.476 0.480 0.431
Manufacturing 0.167 0.283 0.300 0.280 0.283 0.281 0.286
Construction 0.501 0.520 0.508 0.484 0.446 0.509 0.517
W/sale & retail 0.495 0.474 0.472 0.414 0.270 0.303 0.356
Real estate, business 0.817 0.805 0.780 0.779 0.76 0.745 0.722
CZ
Mining & quarry 0.372 0.212 0.232 0.209 0.194 0.326 0.393
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.136 -0.024 0.102 0.149 0.207 0.281 0.327
Hotels & restaurants 0.487 0.426 0.379 0.361 0.420 0.448 0.392
Transport, communications 0.273 0.256 0.288 0.325 0.336 0.303 0.270
Manufacturing 0.342 0.345 0.325 0.230 0.287 0.342 0.331
Construction 0.408 0.402 0.417 0.407 0.421 0.440 0.429
W/sale & retail 0.440 0.478 0.464 0.479 0.445 0.380 0.439
Real estate, business 0.414 0.431 0.426 0.404 0.388 0.377 0.399
HU
Mining & quarry -0.271 -0.220 -0.349 -0.104 -0.068 -0.030 0.034
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.205 0.155 0.104 0.111 0.120 0.188 0.137
Hotels & restaurants 0.361 0.278 0.246 0.280 0.200 0.182 0.160
Transport, communications 0.069 0.034 0.053 0.113 0.125 0.147 0.128
Manufacturing 0.311 0.287 0.288 0.303 0.326 0.351 0.346
Construction 0.449 0.464 0.461 0.481 0.418 0.417 0.371
W/sale & retail 0.335 0.271 0.355 0.373 0.312 0.292 0.276
Real estate, business 0.478 0.474 0.479 0.487 0.459 0.443 0.425
PL
Mining & quarry -0.187 -0.008 -0.038 -0.075 -0.045 0.201 0.225
Electricity, gas, water supply -0.266 -0.296 -0.176 -0.082 -0.005 -0.015 -0.014
Hotels & restaurants 0.424 0.419 0.396 0.457 0.458 0.441 0.457
Transport, communications 0.165 0.200 0.241 0.296 0.303 0.334 0.350
Manufacturing 0.169 0.191 0.160 0.188 0.260 0.340 0.328
Construction 0.518 0.531 0.475 0.505 0.552 0.554 0.574
W/sale & retail 0.695 0.700 0.675 0.681 0.651 0.683 0.676
Real estate, business 0.615 0.620 0.595 0.608 0.619 0.613 0.627
RO
Mining & quarry 0.304 0.357 0.161 0.184 0.209 0.191 0.143
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.505 0.449 0.275 0.471 0.510 0.496 0.442
Hotels & restaurants 0.854 0.747 0.502 0.576 0.592 0.578 0.605
Transport, communications 0.725 0.564 0.550 0.581 0.620 0.654 0.626
Manufacturing 0.517 0.489 0.439 0.479 0.477 0.505 0.478
Construction 0.574 0.541 0.422 0.477 0.574 0.569 0.582
W/sale & retail 0.664 0.529 0.505 0.507 0.574 0.588 0.592
Real estate, business 0.869 0.869 0.802 0.828 0.849 0.825 0.828
SK
Mining & quarry 0.205 0.318 0.274 0.125 0.219 0.177 0.224
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.103 -0.290 -1.03 -0.542 -0.059 0.127 0.021
Hotels & restaurants 0.451 0.442 0.425 0.385 0.416 0.445 0.462
Transport, communications 0.417 0.415 0.475 0.398 0.375 0.368 0.350
Manufacturing 0.321 0.347 0.37 0.315 0.329 0.393 0.394
Construction 0.457 0.607 0.575 0.645 0.559 0.568 0.601
W/sale & retail 0.493 0.355 0.469 0.394 0.508 0.553 0.529
Real estate, business 0.455 0.458 0.458 0.485 0.440 0.454 0.407
Profitability is measured as corporate net operating surplus divided by corporate value added. Source Eurostat.
Appendix 2.2: Identifying firms eligible for tax incentives
The Ernst & Young Worldwide corporate tax guides provide a comprehensive list of the tax
incentives introduced over the period 1999-2005. Due to the nature of the qualifying conditions
and data availability, only a subset of these incentives are accounted for, which are summarised
in Table 2.2. For convenience, I repeat the reforms and eligibility criteria below and explain how
I have identified firms in the AMADEUS dataset that are eligible or have used a tax break. The
main assumption is that if a firm met the conditions for a tax incentive, it took advantage of it.
Nevertheless, this assumption is always double checked by looking at what happens to eligible
firms’ tax payments.
Bulgaria
Production companies qualify for a 100% reduction of the corporate tax on income for five
consecutive years if the following conditions are met: a) The company and its assets are located
in municipalities with unemployment rate for the preceding year 50% higher than the average
unemployment rate for the country; b) the tax is accounted for as a reserve and (part of it) is used
for the acquisition of long-term fixed assets; c) 80% of workers reside in the above-mentioned
municipalities; d) the company does not have outstanding liabilities for tax and social insurance
contributions. The tax incentive was introduced at the beginning of 2003 and is still in force.
A list of the municipalities that satisfy the unemployment rate condition is published every
year as an annex of the Bulgarian Corporate Income Tax Law. I matched the cities in which
manufacturing companies operate to these municipalities as a first step to identifying firms
eligible for the tax incentive. I then chose only firms whose fixed assets grew compared to the
previous year. Unfortunately, I cannot account for conditions c) and d), but given that a firm
satisfies a) and b), and has reported zero (negative) tax and positive accounting profit, I assume
that it took advantage of the tax opportunity. Thus, if a firm qualifies in 2003, its effective tax
rate is zero for the remaining years it appears in the panel. Approximately 60 firms (254 firm-
year observations) meet the above conditions. Since their taxable income cannot be imputed,
earnings before interest and tax are used instead (ebit).
The Czech Republic
Investors in manufacturing can apply for corporate income tax holiday for up to 10 years
subject to conditions which change annually. For a detailed account of these requirements,
see Ernst & Young (Various Years). A list of the qualifying firms for the period 1999-2005 is
published at http://www.czechinvest.org/en/investment-incentives-for-manufacturing-industry.
As the AMADEUS dataset includes the names of the companies, it is straightforward to identify
the Czech and Czech-based foreign firms that have been granted the tax holiday. This tax
incentive is in force for the whole time period considered in the chapter.
From the Czechinvest list, 167 firms altogether appear in the AMADEUS dataset, or equiva-
lently 781 firm-year observations. Out of these, 426 firm-year observations face a zero statutory
tax rate. This is because some firms appear in the data a few years before they qualified for the
tax holiday. Similarly to Bulgarian firms, ebit is used as a measure of these firms’ TI for the
relevant years. In 1999 and 2000, only firms belonging to the Top 250,000 firms took advantage
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of the tax holiday. From 2002 onwards, smaller companies also joined in utilising the incentive.
All of them are part of Dataset M (Top 1.5 million firms). AMADEUS’s criteria for Top 250,000
and Top 1.5m firms are described under Table 2.9 and in the main text.
Over 20% of all firms granted the tax holiday specialise in the manufacture of parts and
accessories for motor vehicles and their engines (NACE4 3430) and the manufacture of electrical
equipment for engines and vehicles (NACE4 3161).
Hungary
Hungary offers an investment tax credit of 50% of the corporate tax for two sectors: man-
ufacturing and the hotel industry. To qualify for the credit, a manufacturing firm should make
an investment of HUF 1 billion ($3.33 million). The credit can be claimed in each of the next
consecutive five years if sales revenue increases by an annual average of 5% of the investment
value (Ernst & Young, Various Years). Given the conditions, I identify manufacturing firms (52
firms, 167 firm-year observations), whose fixed assets grew by at least the minimum amount
required and assigned 50% lower statutory tax rate for the subsequent years these firms show
in the panel, provided that their sales increased by at least 5% of the minimum investment
required.
With respect to hotels, the same amount of investment is necessary – HUF 1 billion. However,
in order to claim the credit in the next 5 years, sales should grow by 25% compared to previous
year sales but not less than HUF 600 million. Approximately 5-6 hotels meet the investment
requirement per year in the AMADEUS database, but none of them meets the sales growth
requirement.
Poland
Poland has fourteen special economic zones, namely Kamienna Góra, Katowice, Kostrzyn-
Słubice, Kraków, Legnica, Łódź, Mielec, Pomeranian, Słupsk, Starachowice, Suwałki, Tarnobrzeg,
Wałbrzych, and Warmia-Mazury. They are described in detail in KPMG Poland (2009). I ob-
tained a list of the investors for each zone from the zone’s respective website and matched it to
the data.
The AMADEUS dataset contains 272 companies (717 firm-year observations) with a license
to operate in one or more of the above zones. Together, these firms employ approximately 110,000
people and have $38 million of total assets, on average. Given the investment a company makes, it
qualifies for a tax exemption based on the following formula: I = R(e50 million +0.5B+0.34C),
where R is the aid intensity in a given economic zone, B is the amount of investment above e50
million (B ≤ e50million), while C is the amount of investment exceeding e100 million. Thus,
a firm investing e120 million in Slaskie voivodship is eligible for I = 40%(e50 million +0.5e50
million+0.34e20 million)=e32.7 million exemption and the firm will not pay corporate tax until
this exemption has been exhausted (KPMG Poland, 2009). I use ebit as a measure of what these
companies’ TI is, even in the years they pay some tax because information on the amount of
the credits is unavailable.
Romania
From 2000 to 2004 inclusive, Romania provided incentives for small and medium enterprises.
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SMEs CIT was reduced by 20% if their number of employees increased by 10% as compared to
the preceding year. A SME is defined as a firm that has an annual turnover of less than e8
million and employs no more than 250 employees. Another condition is that the capital of a
SME is 100% privately owned. I isolated firms meeting the employment, turnover and ownership
conditions and lowered their statutory tax rates by 20% if their number of employees grew with
the required percent. Tax incentives for SMEs were still available in 2005 but depended on
profits reinvested in equipment, and therefore, I am not able to account for them.
About 9,000 firms (42,909 firm-year observations) per year qualified for this incentive, with
turnover of $1 million and 38 employees, on average. Close to 40% of the eligible companies were
from the retail and wholesale industry. A statutory tax rate of 20% is assigned on a year-to-year
basis to the SMEs, which fulfilled the incentive criteria.
Romania also introduced temporary provisions for microenterprises from 2001 to 2002, in-
clusive. A microenterprise is a firm that has no more than 9 employees, annual turnover at most
e100,000, and 100% privately owned capital. It is taxed at a rate of 1.5% on all income and
in addition, can benefit from the same tax incentive as the one for SMEs. In the initial year,
2001, 78,442 firms qualify in the AMADEUS dataset, more than 50% of which operate in the
retail and wholesale sectors. Interestingly, most of these firms reported zero taxable incomes in
2002, thus reducing the number of companies that could use the incentive to 5,042. A typical
microenterprise in 2001 had an annual turnover of $26,000 and 3 employees.
Slovakia
For the period under consideration, Slovakia offered numerous tax incentives, such as 100%
corporate tax credit, especially for companies with a given percent of foreign ownership of paid-
up registered capital. Due to the large number of qualifying conditions, however, I am not able
to pinpoint these firms in the AMADEUS data (Ernst & Young, Various Years).
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Appendix 2.3: Description of variables used in the computation
of EATR
Table 2.15: VARIABLES DEFINITION, FORMULAS AND SOURCES
p Financial rate of return, firm-level variable, equal to [Added Value – Labour Expenses]/Added
Value. Added Value equals taxes paid taxa+profit/loss for the period pl+ depreciation depre+
interest paid inte + labour expenses staf . For reasons explained in Section 2.4.2, inte is not
included in the calculation of p. Source AMADEUS.
i Nominal interest rate, country-level variable. For Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia it equals the
two-year government bond rate, one year government bond rate for the Czech Republic, one
year treasury bill for Hungary and the money market interest rate for Romania. Source: Central
Banks of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland; European Central Bank and Eurostat.
π Inflation rate, country-level variable. Measured with the Harmonised Indices of Consumer
Prices. Source Eurostat.
r Real interest rate. r = i−π
1+π
, country-level variable. Author’s calculation.
τs Statutory corporate tax rate, country-level variable for firms with positive taxable income,
although it becomes zero for firms with losses (carryforward), zero profit, or tax incentives, so
it is also firm-specific. For a few years, τs in Bulgaria also varied based on a given threshold
of taxable income. Source Ernst & Young (Various Years) and European Commission (Various
Years).
mi Tax rate on interest income, for example interest earned on deposits in savings accounts, or
income from rental property, etc. I assume mi = 0.
md Tax rate on dividend income. I assume md = 0.
z Tax rate on capital gains, on an accrual basis. I assume z = 0.
c Rate of tax credit on dividends. The tax credit reduces the tax liability of the person receiving
the dividends in order to avoid double taxation of the dividends. I assume c = 0.
θ θ = (1−md)/(1− c)(1− z). King (1974) defines θ as the opportunity cost of retained earnings
in terms of net dividends foregone, or the amount which shareholders would gain if one unit of
retained earnings were distributed. θ is derived from the capital market equilibrium condition
eq.(2). As I assume that md = c = z = 0, then θ = 1, i.e. cash held by the company or by the
shareholders can be interchanged without incurring additional tax liability.
ρ ρ = (1−mi) ∗ i/(1− z) is the discount factor of the dividend stream. See Section 2.4.2. Given
the assumption that mi = z = 0, the discount factor is equal to the nominal interest rate i.
φ Depreciation rate of capital, country-level variable. I use the maximum depreciation rate for
plant and machinery in the case of Poland and Hungary, heavy machinery for the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, machines and manufacturing equipment for Bulgaria and Romania. See Table 2.3
for detailed account of the various asset categories and their depreciation rates. Source Ernst &
Young (Various Years).
δ One period cost of depreciation, assumed to be 12.5%. See Da Rin et al. (2011).
R∗ Net present value of the investment project without tax. R∗ = −1 + 1
1+i
[(p + δ)(1 + π) +
(1 − δ)(1 + π)] = p−r
1+r
, where the second equality comes from the fact that r = i−π
1+π
and the
assumption that md = c = z = mi = 0. Author’s calculation.
R Net present value of the project with tax. The general formula for R is R = θ
1+ρ
[(p + δ)(1 +
π)(1− τs)− ((1 +ρ)− (1− δ)(1 +π))(1−A)] +F , which simplifies to R = 1
1+i
[(p+ δ)(1 +π)(1−
τs) − ((1 + i) − (1 − δ)(1 + π))(1 − A)] + F , given that ρ = i and θ = 1. A is the NPV of tax






, based on ρ = i, for straight-
line depreciation and T = 1/φ. Although some countries allow for accelerated depreciation, the
straight-line method is always the baseline and is the method used in the chapter. F is the cost of
raising external capital. Thus F = 0 in case of retained earnings, and F = −ρ(1−θ)
1+ρ
(1−φτs) = 0
for equity as θ = 1. F = 0 for both equity and retained earnings reflects the discussion on
θ above. If capital is raised by debt, then F = θ(1−φτ
s)
1+ρ




exactly the amount of deductible interest payments, if the firm has borrowed 1− φτs. Author’s
calculation.
EATR Effective average tax rate, firm-level variable. EATRdebt = (R
∗−R)(1+r)
p






≡ τee for equity (retained earnings). Bearing in mind that
F = 0 for equity, EATRequity > EATRdebt. Author’s calculation.
Chapter 3
The Impact of Cash and Card Transactions on
VAT Collection Efficiency
Using EU country-level data, this chapter investigates if any correlation exists between transactions’
payment method and tax compliance in the context of the value-added tax. Intuitively, the visibility of
card payments by third-party institutions can serve as a deterrent to sales under-reporting and other
evasion strategies. Countries like the US and Turkey have already implemented policies directly utilising
electronic payments as a tax control instrument. Estimates based on European data do not find a statis-
tically significant effect of cards on VAT performance, but do show that cash usage has a negative impact,
a result that remains robust to a wide range of controls and specifications. It is further demonstrated
that the relationship between cards, cash and the VAT revenue ratio is best modelled via a second-order
Taylor approximation. The role of standard and reduced VAT rates, turnover thresholds and exposure
to trade is also explored.
Keywords: Value added tax, VAT revenue ratio, card payments, cash, tax evasion, European
Union
JEL Classification: H21; H25; H26; K34
3.1 Introduction
Due to technological progress and the introduction of new methods of payment, tax administra-
tions face new possibilities of improving tax enforcement, while firms devise creative opportuni-
ties for tax evasion. Nowhere is this trend more pronounced than in the case of the value-added
tax (VAT). Ainsworth (2011) points out that the supply of goods and services, the movement
of the supply and funding in the context of carousel VAT fraud are already entirely digitised.
Given the enormous estimated losses of VAT revenue, radical proposals for fraud prevention are
not infrequent. Examples range from VAT withholding, which would split the VAT amount from
the taxable amount in real time and thus eliminate both firms’ access to VAT and voluntary
compliance, to data mirroring of companies’ hard disks for tax control purposes as advanced in
I wish to thank Libor Dušek for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.
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a bill by the Danish Ministry of Taxation (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2010; Skatteministeriet J.
2010-711-0044, 2010).
A common factor among these proposals, and recent developments in tax enforcement policies
in general, is the move to discourage business/customer cash transactions in favour of electronic
payments that are more easily monitored, and hence constitute a strong incentive for compliance.
The deterrent effect of card transactions on tax evasion, however, is yet to be established in the
economic literature. Recently, Hasan et al. (2012) provided some preliminary evidence that retail
electronic transactions, and especially retail card payments, are positively correlated with GDP
per capita growth, consumption, and trade. Whether a similar effect exists between electronic
payments and tax compliance remains a largely unexplored question.
The empirical literature on VAT thus far has primarily studied the effect of standard and
reduced rates (Bogetić and Hassan, 1993, Agha and Haughton, 1996, Engel et al., 2001), and the
quality of tax administrations (de Mello, 2008) on VAT’s performance, predominantly using a
large cross-section of countries. A more recent panel data analysis performed by Aizenman and
Jinjarak (2008) focuses on levels of urbanisation, trade openness and some political variables as
determinants of VAT’s collection efficiency.
While controlling for most of the variables used in the above studies, this chapter further
investigates if there is any association between method of payment and VAT’s revenue outcomes.
Using country-level panel data for 26 EU countries in the period 2000-2010, I find that the
relationship between both cash and cards and the chosen VAT performance ratio is non-linear,
even after controlling for the number of ATMs and point of sale terminals (POS) per million
inhabitants, the VAT rate, and other explanatory variables. In particular, this relationship is
convex in the case of cash, measured as the share of ATM cash withdrawals in GDP, vis-à-vis
VAT revenue as a proportion of net consumption, and concave for card transactions (share of
total card transactions in GDP).
The empirical analysis does not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between
VAT revenue and card usage, but shows the consistently negative impact of cash, whose effect
can turn positive in countries with high preference for cash transactions. While it is possible that
there is simply no connection between cards and VAT performance, this lack of correlation can
also be attributed to the fact that electronic payments are not an explicit tax control instrument
in the EU, as is the case in the US and Turkey, for example. Despite the insignificant results for
cards, POS terminals are shown to affect the VAT-to-consumption ratio positively in almost all
regressions.
These findings are robust for both low- and high-income Member States, and hold for al-
ternative dependent variables. They are also unaffected by the inclusion of additional control
variables. Although a different specification strategy, in which the VAT rate is considered en-
dogenous and is hence instrumented for, yields higher coefficients in absolute value, the results
remain qualitatively the same. Nevertheless, since the study is limited to 26 EU members, its
findings are likely specific.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses the specific role electronic
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payments play in tax policies targeting compliance. Section 3 describes the data, the estimation
strategy, and examines the results. Concluding comments are presented in Section 4.
3.2 Role of Electronic Payments in Tax Policy and Enforcement
The retail sales of a firm can generally be split into two categories based on the method of
payment chosen by the consumer: electronic payments via credit/debit cards or mobile devices
(m-payments), and cash payments. The former have an almost 100% probability of detec-
tion if an audit is instigated, since a record of the transaction exists and can be cross-checked
through third-party reporting, while the latter are easily manipulated and evaded. In fact, for
resourceful retailers the probability that the tax authorities would uncover cash sales evasion
has decreased substantially with the invention of Zappers – add-on programs in electronic cash
registers (ECR) or point of sales systems which skim sales and simultaneously re-number and
re-calculate the records of the remaining invoices, thus creating consistent financial statements
(Ainsworth, 2010). Even if a retailer is unaware of the evasion opportunities arising from Zap-
pers, Ainsworth (2012) notes that an operation conducted by the US Department of Taxation
and Finances, in which false restaurants were opened with the goal of soliciting tenders for ECR,
showed that 70% to 80% of the sales representatives actively marketed sales deletion software.
With regard to electronic payments, the firm’s knowledge that transactions are recorded
by banks, credit card companies, mobile operators or others can serve as a major deterrent
to evasion and as a tool to diminish the tax gap.1 This was the objective of adding Section
6050W to Title 26 of the US Code in 2008 (in force from January 2011), which requires banks,
third-party settlement organisations, and other organisations with contractual obligations in
the settlement of payment cards to send annual reports to the IRS containing information on
payments made to merchants via debit/credit cards or certain electronic means. The IRS can
use this data to match merchants’ sales with the ones reported on their tax returns (Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration, 2011).
A similar policy is in place in Turkey. According to Dogan (2011), since 2008 Turkish
businesses can check their monthly credit card sales online when preparing their VAT returns.
If there is a discrepancy between the company’s records and the online statement, the firm
can ignore the discrepancy provided it can furnish an explanation; otherwise it will be subject
to an audit. Before the implementation of the system, 140,000 taxpayers did not report any
credit card sales in their VAT returns and 60,000 had deviations in more than 20% of their
transactions. One year later, fewer than 20,000 had a discrepancy rate of over 20% (Dogan,
2011). It is unclear, however, how issues of data protection and privacy, as well as compliance
costs incurred by merchants are to be addressed by the US and Turkish policies.
Effective taxation hinges crucially on the availability and processing of information. The rise
1In a randomised enforcement experiment studying evasion responses of individuals, Kleven et al. (2011)
show that in Denmark evasion is modest for personal income subject to third-party reporting, and considerable
for self-reported income. The advantages of third-party collection – withholding employees’ PIT and collecting
it from employers – versus self-declaration are, for example, explored in Dušek (2003).
76
in cashless retail sales means that complete information exists for the fraction of firms’ retail
transactions executed electronically. Thus, while businesses act as collectors of VAT for the tax
authorities, at the retail stage of VAT collection, customers increasingly become the enforcers.
Clearly, the substantial wedge between the probabilities of detection of suppressed cash and
electronic transactions can induce firms to hide more of their cash receipts to compensate for
their inability to cheat elsewhere. In a laboratory experiment conducted by Johnson et al.
(2009), for example, tax revenues declined by 15% when participants were told that part of
their income would be perfectly monitored by the tax administration but that they had the
opportunity to transfer income from the monitored to the unmonitored source at a cost. Even if
transfers were not allowed, reporting rates remained similar to the baseline case without perfect
monitoring, suggesting that taxpayers would find a way to adjust to tax policy changes in order
to maintain their preferred level of tax compliance (Johnson et al., 2009).
In general, a firm cannot switch easily between monitored and unmonitored sales as it faces
exogenously given demand for the methods of payment, which is determined by consumers’
preferences for anonymity and convenience, the amount of transaction fees, and other factors.
Nevertheless, if the firm is a monopolist it can use cash discounts as a means of price discrim-
ination, a possibility explored by Gordon (1990). Alternatively, provided that the customer
initiates bargaining for a price reduction, as modelled by Fedeli (2003), then the chosen method
of payment will depend on the customer’s intention to evade VAT.
To prevent collusion between retailers and customers, tax administrations resort to various
policies. In Italy, for example, upon leaving a restaurant, hotel, or bar, a consumer may be
required by the police to produce a fiscal receipt showing the VAT paid. Failure to do so results
in a fine (Tait, 1988). Gordon (1990), however, demonstrates that shifting part of the liability
for unpaid taxes onto consumers can increase tax evasion, since the firm has to cut its cash price
to keep cash sales demand constant.
A superior strategy is to align the incentives of the final consumer and the tax authorities,
especially in areas that are notoriously hard to tax – the businesses of plumbers, builders,
electricians, etc. Instead of establishing a reduced VAT rate for renovation and restoration
of private dwellings, Denmark allows 15,000 DKK (≈ e2000) per person per year, which is
spent on renovation, to be deducted from the personal income tax (PIT). In order to qualify
for the deduction, a household must have paid for the services via a card or a bank (cash or
check payments are not eligible) and present detailed documentation about the supplier and the
services performed.2
Although the scope of this policy is relatively limited, in a nutshell it contains several essential
elements which can be useful for broader tax purposes: 1) It demonstrates that the effect of
reduced VAT rates can be successfully achieved through the interaction of tax bases, in this
case through deductions in the PIT, while avoiding further complexity in VAT; 2) Despite the
loss of tax revenue as a result of the deductions, the tax administration can obtain a very clear
picture of the amount of VAT and income evasion in this predominantly cash-based sector. It
2Details on the conditions, requirements, and services covered are available on the website of the Danish Tax
Authorities (in Danish): http://www.skat.dk/SKAT.aspx?oId=1947018&vId=0#os
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can do so by comparing revenue before and after the introduction of the policy, taking into
account the possibility that the tax policy itself could have increased the demand for home
renovations; 3) Last, and possibly most importantly, the policy, even if of a temporary nature,
roots out the use of cash in an industry where cash payments are practically entrenched. It is
worth pointing out that while such measures can be effective in countries with high PIT rates
relative to VAT, which makes deductions worthwhile for the consumer, most Central and Eastern
European (CEE) countries, for instance, have flat PIT schemes below the standard VAT rate,
so that VAT evasion remains the more profitable option.
Overall, the final consumer’s choice of payment instrument can be a powerful enforcement
measure if card payments on the retail level become the norm, as they already are in several
EU countries. While a large part of the public will continue to adopt convenient, secure, and
innovative cashless payment methods as they become more and more widespread, tax policy
clearly has the means to considerably reinforce this trend through monetary or other incentives.
3.3 Data
To check if the method of payment matters for tax compliance, I use a small unbalanced panel
dataset for 26 EU countries, namely Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the
UK for the period 2000-2010.
The main dependent variable is the VAT Revenue Ratio (V RR), which is a measure of the
performance of countries’ VAT regimes. The V RR is the ratio of actual collected VAT revenue
to net consumption, divided by the standard VAT rate (SV AT ). Net consumption is item P3
in the National Accounts minus VAT revenue. In the literature, VAT performance ratios differ
given the economic base they assume for VAT. The Efficiency ratio, used for example by Engel
et al. (2001) and Bogetić and Hassan (1993), scales the consumption-type VAT revenue by
GDP, which would have been the tax base if VAT were a gross-product based tax, under which
firms cannot deduct expenditure on capital goods from sales when computing their value-added
(Department of the Treasury, 1984).
If the goal is to estimate the extent to which exemptions, reduced and zero rates, and
avoidance/evasion activities erode VAT revenue collection, a more appropriate indicator would be
the C-efficiency ratio, VAT RevenueFinal consumption*SVAT , whose denominator captures the potential tax base
given a single VAT rate, no exemptions, and full compliance. This was the chosen performance
variable in Ebrill et al. (2001), Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008), and de Mello (2008). The C-
efficiency ratio, however, under-states VAT’s collection capacity since the National Accounts
compute consumption inclusive of VAT, at market prices. Therefore, VAT revenue should be
subtracted from final consumption in the ratio’s denominator, resulting in an improved measure,
V RR. Chapter 4 of the 2010 edition of OECD (Various Years) discusses the V RR in detail and
proposes steps towards its further refinement.
The V RR is a combination of two efficiency ratios, the Policy efficiency ratio, which demon-
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strates the degree to which current VAT legislation deviates from a uniform tax on consumption,
and the Compliance efficiency ratio – measuring compliance (OECD, Various Years). For the
purposes of my estimation, ideally I would use the Compliance ratio. It, however, entails the
calculation of the theoretical tax revenue from actual tax law or VAT revenue under full compli-
ance, which is a daunting task, inevitably prone to error, and thus far attempted only by Reckon
LLP and by some individual countries’ tax administrations.
To better understand fluctuations in V RR, one needs to take a closer look at the specific
legislative changes affecting the actual tax base in a given country. In terms of rates coverage
and exemptions over the 2000-2009 period, very few changes with a likely minimal impact on
revenue occurred in the tax bases of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK, while in Spain there were no changes
at all as shown in Table 3.5. Out of these countries, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland
and the UK increased the standard VAT rate modestly.
The CEE countries were the major VAT reformers, mostly due to their accession to the EU.
The Czech Republic, and especially Hungary, expanded and changed VAT’s coverage consid-
erably in order to comply with the list of goods and services which can be subject to reduced
rates as listed in Annex H to the Sixth VAT Directive. Nevertheless, the new Member States
negotiated various derogations, most of which expired in 2010. Given its aggressive base expan-
sion, and despite having a 5 percentage point (pp) lower standard rate in 2006-2008 compared to
previous years, Hungary raised SV AT back to 25% in 2009. Narrowing of the VAT tax base is
observed in France, Portugal, and especially Greece. SV AT in Greece and Portugal grew by 1pp
and 3pp from 2000 to 2009 and then by further 4pp and 1pp in 2010, respectively. Registration
thresholds are generally higher in 2009-2010 in Western Europe, and especially in Ireland and
the UK, whereas in CEE they decrease, albeit from a very high level.
In Figure 3.1, the dynamics of actual VAT revenue (V RR’s numerator) as a % of GDP in
2000 and 2009 is compared to revenue from the potential tax base under a single VAT rate,
no exemptions and full compliance (V RR’s denominator), again as a % of GDP. Five countries
stand out due to large falls in VAT RevenueGDP % and simultaneous increases in the potential tax base
receipts driven by jumps in SV AT and/or stronger final consumption – Spain, Ireland, Latvia,
Greece, and Portugal. While the reduced revenue in Greece, Portugal and Ireland may be due
to the possibility that the base narrowing effect of VAT reforms outweighed the increase in
rates, the 2.03 pp drop in collected VAT to GDP in Spain in 2009 is hard to explain, given that
there were virtually no alterations in VAT’s legislation since 2000 and no major fluctuations in
consumption. Revenues stabilised at 5.5% of GDP in 2010, after Spain raised SV AT by 2 pp.
One possible factor behind the revenue decline may be the 15% decrease in the number of VAT
registered traders and the overall effect of the financial crisis. In Hungary, however, in spite of
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Data for OTC withdrawals covers only the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Spain, Finland, the UK, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Romania and Slovakia. Source: ECB.
Table 3.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 N
V RRM 10.6 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.7 11.3 11.4 11.6 11.1 10.4 10.8 286
(1.94) (1.87) (1.86) (1.86) (1.99) (1.99) (2.08) (2.02) (2.18) (2.4) (2.06)
CeffM 9.58 9.41 9.42 9.47 9.7 10.1 10.3 10.4 10.0 9.38 9.78 286
(1.57) (1.51) (1.51) (1.51) (1.61) (1.6) (1.66) (1.61) (1.76) (1.97) (1.67)
EffR 7.34 7.24 7.26 7.32 7.44 7.74 7.78 7.74 7.59 7.32 7.56 286
(1.00) (0.95) (0.95) (1.00) (1.07) (1.10) (1.19) (1.17) (1.24) (1.34) (1.12)
Cards
GDP
6.8 6.66 7.49 8.10 8.79 9.73 10.36 10.93 11.60 12.29 12.96 281
(5.91) (6.10) (5.54) (5.58) (5.76) (5.73) (5.91) (5.97) (6.18) (6.22) (6.11)
Cash
GDP
9.58 10.02 10.74 11.55 12.12 12.27 12.82 12.94 13.21 13.66 13.42 273
(5.71) (5.98) (5.44) (5.51) (5.72) (5.75) (5.99) (6.09) (6.29) (6.31) (6.19)
CIT 31.83 30.94 29.39 28.45 27.5 26.16 25.85 25.56 24.46 24.43 24.08 286
(6.8) (6.07) (6.79) (6.85) (7.64) (7.93) (7.49) (7.95) (7.15) (6.94) (7.07)
GovExp 43.85 43.88 44.36 44.54 43.99 43.8 43.38 43.03 44.55 48.74 48.45 286
(6.2) (6.06) (6.31) (6.95) (6.71) (6.63) (6.33) (5.73) (5.24) (5.19) (6.70)
Deficit -.942 -1.6 -2.4 -2.5 -1.96 -1.49 -.926 -.4 -2.21 -6.56 -6.53 286
(4.09) (3.30) (2.96) (2.88) (2.71) (3.02) (3.27) (2.84) (3.32) (3.90) (5.89)
ATM
POPM
483 503 532 568 601 625 657 711 738 750 736 285
(296) (308) (311) (317) (328) (330) (335) (345) (342) (338) (333)
POS
POPM
8,907 10,229 11,030 11,451 12,196 12,697 13,731 15,187 16,474 17,181 17,661 280
(5,549) (6,959) (7,663) (7,393) (7,848) (7,569) (7,880) (8,104) (8,766) (9,006) (9,351)
Open 109 108 104 102 107 109 117 119 120 105 116 286
(54.6) (52.5) (49.1) (46.7) (50.6) (51.7) (55.9) (57.4) (56.3) (52.2) (56.3)
Urban 70.59 70.7 70.8 70.9 71.05 71.17 71.33 71.49 71.64 71.8 71.9 286
(12.45) (12.44) (12.44) (12.45) (12.45) (12.46) (12.46) (2.46) (12.47) (12.47) (12.48)
Unempl 8.84 8.77 8.76 8.69 8.79 8.30 7.42 6.49 6.39 9.07 10.48 285
(4.66) (5.13) (4.68) (3.94) (3.69) (3.18) (2.49) (1.97) (1.88) (3.68) (4.41)
Corrupt 6.23 6.23 6.25 6.32 6.4 6.46 6.52 6.56 6.47 6.34 6.3 282
(2.18) (2.09) (2.15) (2.16) (2.09) (2.04) (1.93) (1.79) (1.74) (1.83) (1.91)
ThreshGDP 417 334 343 238 241 236 247 190 186 213 201 249
(669) (517) (585) (394) (355) (355) (345) (235) (224) (216) (230)
SV AT 19.57 19.61 19.73 19.65 19.61 19.73 19.54 19.65 19.61 19.96 20.65 286
(2.92) (2.89) (2.87) (2.78) (2.60) (2.59) (2.36) (2.25) (2.24) (2.56) (2.44)
Range 10.53 10.47 10.95 10.66 10.82 10.9 10.70 11.86 11.66 11.45 12.16 286
(5.32) (5.31) (5.79) (4.93) (4.53) (4.54) (4.47) (3.23) (3.21) (3.14) (3.28)
GDP
POP
18,880 19,215 19,569 19,830 20,396 20,919 21,661 22,403 22,350 21,083 21,357 286
(13,621)(13,745)(13,967)(13,965)(14,271)(14,612)(14,948)(15,429)(15,142)(14,194)(14,376)
Note: All means are expressed in % , except GDP
POP







Table 3.2: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES
V RR VAT Revenue Ratio = VAT Revenue(Final consumption−VAT Revenue)∗SV AT , where VAT Revenue is the actual
VAT revenue, and Final consumption is item P3 of the national accounts consisting of 1)
private final consumption expenditure of households and non-profit organisations serving
households and 2) individual and collective consumption expenditure of general government.
V RRM = VAT Revenue(Final consumption−VAT Revenue)∗SV AT is used in estimation, since SV AT is used as
a control variable. Source: OECD, Eurostat.
Ceff C-efficiency = Vat RevenueFinal consumption*SVAT . CeffM =
Vat Revenue
Final consumption is used in estimation, since
SV AT is used as a control variable. Source: OECD, Eurostat.




Value of transactions for all cards issued in the reporting country, except e-money function




Value of cash withdrawals for all cards issued in the reporting country via customer terminals
scaled by the Gross Domestic Product. Source: Payments and Settlement System Statistics,
ECB Data Warehouse; Eurostat.
CIT Statutory corporate tax rate. Source: Eurostat.
GovExp Total general government expenditure as a % of GDP. Source: Eurostat.
Deficit General government deficit (-) surplus (+) as a % of GDP. Source: Eurostat.
ATM
POPM
Number of ATMs per million inhabitants. Source: Payments and Settlement Systems
Statistics, ECB Data Warehouse.
POS
POPM
Number of Point of Sale Terminals per million inhabitants. Source: Payments and Settlement
Systems Statistics, ECB Data Warehouse.
Open Imports + Exports as a percent of GDP. Source: World Development Indicators, World
Bank.
Urban Urban population as a percent of total population. Source: World Development Indicators,
World Bank.
Unempl Rate of unemployment. Source: Eurostat.
Corrupt Corruption Perception Index ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). Source:
Transparency International.
ThreshGDP A minimum turnover threshold, below which small traders are exempt from registering for
VAT. % of GDP
POP
. Source: European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union, OECD
(Various Years), Ernst & Young Worldwide VAT, GST and Sales Tax Guides for 2003 and
2010, Various tax administration websites.
SV AT Standard VAT rate. A single standard VAT rate is used even in countries with several
standard rates applied in specific regions, as is the case in Austria, Greece, France, Portugal
and Spain. For example, standard rates are different on mainland Greece and Lesbos, Chios,
Samos, and the other Greek islands. The same holds for mainland Portugal and the Azores
and Madeira. Source: OECD (Various Years), Eurostat.
Range The difference between the standard VAT rate, SV AT and the reduced rate. In countries
with more than one reduced rate, the average is taken. If there is no reduced rate, Range is
set to zero. Source: Eurostat.
Prefill A dummy variable equal to 1 if a country uses fully/ partially pre-populated personal income
tax returns. Source: OECD (2008).
GDP
POP
Real gross domestic product per capita in Euro. Source: Eurostat.
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0.30pp, suggesting that compliance issues may be at play.
To distinguish between methods of payment, the main explanatory variables used are the
value of card transactions by all cards issued in the reporting country and the value of ATM cash
withdrawals (again pertaining to cards issued in the reporting country), both sourced from the
ECB’s Data Warehouse. ATM cash withdrawals are an imperfect measure of cash transactions,
but they are by no means an insignificant one. ATM cash ranges from 30% of GDP in Estonia
in 2001 and similar high values in other Baltic countries to less than 2% in Denmark. In fact,
ATM cash withdrawals nearly perfectly coincide with Denmark’s currency in circulation, once I
exclude the value of the largest banknote – 1000 DKK, which is rarely used for retail payments.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the growth rates of CashGDP and
Cards
GDP separately for CEE and the
so-called ‘old’ Member States (EU-15) covering Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, Finland, the UK, France, Italy, Sweden, Malta, the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain. After 2004, a convergence in the growth rates of cash and cards occurred for the two
regions of Europe, with card transactions growing by more than 30% per annum in CEE before
2005 and less than 10% after 2006. Cash growth was negligible and negative for the EU-15,
and turned negative in CEE only in 2010. Cash withdrawals, however, remain a very stable
share of GDP in most EU economies as is clear from Table 3.1. Additionally, the mean value
of the number of ATMs ( ATMPOPM ) has increased steadily, while point of sale terminals (
POS
POPM )
per million inhabitants have more than doubled from 2000 to 2010. The majority of the POS
terminals are EFTPOS (electronic fund transfer at point of sale) terminals for debit and credit
cards.
In principle, it would have been optimal to additionally include over-the-counter (OTC)
cash withdrawals in the measure of cash, but this variable is available for a very limited set of
countries (the Czech Republic, Greece,Germany, Spain, Finland, the UK, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,
the Netherlands, Romania, and Slovakia) and only for some years between 2000 and 2010. OTC
transactions and ATMs are the two major sources of cash to the public, and hence the main
indicators of retail payments done in cash. OTC withdrawals in Greece are several times higher
than GDP, suggesting that they include additional payments which are not mentioned in the
description of the variable. For this reason, Greek data is not considered in Figure 3.4. Such
high values apply to the CEE region in general, with OTC withdrawals being 52% of GDP on
average compared to only 12% in the EU-15 countries for which information is available. Even
though the data should be viewed with caution, it is useful to see how OTC withdrawals change,
especially in light of the fact that both ATM cash withdrawals and card payments grow as a
percent of GDP, at least in CEE.
Figure 3.4, which depicts the growth rate of OTC cash withdrawals as a % of GDP, demon-
strates that the biggest decline in the use of cash stems from vastly diminishing over-the-counter
withdrawals, with Finland and the Netherlands having the largest negative rates. Apart from a
single substantial positive spike in 2003 driven by Hungarian and Latvian data, the growth rates
are negative for both the EU-15 and CEE. If looking only at ATM cash withdrawals in CEE, one
can misleadingly conclude that cash usage is growing, while in fact OTC cash is substituted with
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ATM withdrawals, with overall cash usage likely not trending upward, and strongly declining
in the EU-15. Takala and Viren (2012), who construct a measure of cash usage in the Euro
area based on both ATM and imputed OTC cash, note that bank branches’ withdrawals usually
involve higher denomination banknotes and large single amounts, which can be used not only
as payments, but also as a store-of-value.3
Simple scatter plots of V RR versus CashGDP and
Cards
GDP depicted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 respec-
tively, suggest that the marginal relationships between the dependent and the main explanatory
variables of interest may not be linear. In fact, a quadratic prediction plot fits the non-parametric
lowess smoothing well. Nevertheless, other predictors are ignored in these plots, and since typi-
cally control variables are correlated, there can be a substantial difference between the marginal
and partial effects, which I will explore below.
3.3.1 Empirical specification and results
To find out if the method of payment has any effect on VAT’s collection performance, I start
out with the following basic specification:
















+ β5Range+ εit, (3.3.1)
where lnV RRMit = VAT Revenueit(Final consumptionit−VAT Revenueit) in country i at time t. As pointed out
by Ebrill et al. (2001), since SV AT is explicitly controlled for on the right-hand side of the
regression, the specification effectively models V RR. lnGDPPOP is the log of GDP per capita,
and Range is the difference between the standard VAT rate, SV AT , and the reduced rate(s),
if any. For countries without a reduced rate, Range is set to zero. For this reason, it is
not log transformed. 1pp increase in Range will lead to a β4 ∗ 100% change in V RRM . αi
are country fixed effects, with no assumption being made about cov(αi, xit) for now, while γt
are year dummies. If the expectation that an audit would uncover any undeclared electronic
sales drives firms to report these sales in full, then the effect of card transactions on V RRM
should be positive (α1 > 0). Conversely, if cash transactions are associated with greater evasion
opportunities, then α2 < 0.
Estimates based on the baseline specification are presented in Table 3.3. When the rela-
tionship between V RRM , cash, and cards is assumed to be linear, as is the case in Column
(1), neither the coefficient on lnCardsGDP , nor that on ln
Cash
GDP are statistically significant, implying
virtually no impact of the method of payment on VAT’s collection efficiency.
Given the non-linearity suggested by the simple scatterplots in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, I check if
3Takala and Viren (2012) impute OTC withdrawals by using the value of new and fit banknotes withdrawn
by third parties at NCB counters (a), and assuming the value of two recycling rates: cash-in-transit (b) and credit
institutions’ (c) recycling rates in the following formula: a(1 + b)(1 + c). Since a is sourced from the Currency
Information System 2, I do not have access to this variable at this point.
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the relationship between V RRM and CashGDP /
Cards
GDP is linear once the variables are log transformed,
and additional covariates are added to the estimation. To do so, eq. (4.3.1) is estimated with
all shown controls, except lnCashGDP . The difference between the actual and predicted values of
lnV RRM , which constitutes the unexplained variation in the dependent variable, is then plotted
against lnCashGDP in Figure 4.6. The same procedure is followed to obtain the plot in Figure 4.7, but
this time lnCardsGDP is excluded from the regression. The figures present a second-order polynomial
fit as well as a non-parametric locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess) with a bandwidth
set to .4.
Both graphs indicate distinct non-linearity between the main explanatory variables and
lnV RRM , with the quadratic approximation almost matching the non-parametric plot for cash,
and fairly closely following the lowess smooth for cards. VAT’s collection efficiency decreases
with increases in cash use, but for high values of cash withdrawals the curve bends upwards,
showing a convex relationship. Cards, conversely, exhibit a concave relation with lnV RRM ,
improving collection up to a point, after which their effect turns negative.
When the quadratic terms are added in Column (2) of Table 3.3, their coefficients are both
significant at 5%. I assume that cov(αi, xit) 6= 0, so that the presented estimates are obtained
through a fixed effects regression, which centres the variables around their means within each
cross-section. lnCardsGDP remains insignificant, but cash has a strong negative effect on VAT’s
collection. 1% rise in GDP per capita is associated with .35% higher V RRM . Even though at
conventional statistical levels the effect of cards on the dependent variable is nil, the number of
point of sale terminals do have a positive impact on VAT’s performance, a result which remains
consistent across various specifications. Jumps in the VAT rate lead to a less than proportionate
increase in the VAT revenue-to-consumption ratio. According to Ebrill et al. (2001), who obtain
similar estimates for a cross-section of approximately 90 countries, the less than 1 elasticity can
be explained with narrower tax bases, although reduced compliance is likely to be a contributing
factor as well. Neither the number of ATMs per million inhabitants, nor Range are precisely
estimated.
Note that in Column (2) the non-linear relationship is not identified by pure within variation.
In fact, as argued by McIntosh and Schlenker (2006), if y is a globally quadratic function of x,
deviations from group means cannot be used to identify the data generating process, since the
marginal effects must depend on the un-centred values of x. Identification, therefore, stems from
elements of between variation, as x is first squared, and then demeaned. In this way, the group
means are re-introduced into the regression (McIntosh and Schlenker, 2006).4,5
4In the fixed effects regression, x2it is transformed into x2it−x2i , which can be rewritten as (xit−xi)
2 +2(xit−
xi)x̄i + (xi)
2 − x2i .
5I additionally performed Random-effects (RE) GLS estimation, which uses both the cross-sectional and time-
series variation in the data, and imposes the restriction that cov(αi, xit) = 0. Compared to Column (2), there are
two main differences: the coefficient on lnCards
GDP
doubles and becomes statistically significant at 10% (.041 with
s.e. .023), while the effect of GDP per capita is close to zero. A simple Hausman test for fixed effects would be
inappropriate in this context, since it can only be performed with unclustered standard errors and assumes that
αi and εit are i.i.d., which is unlikely to hold. Indeed, standard errors are substantially underestimated when
observations are not clustered by country as a consequence of considering each observation to be an independent
piece of new information (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). I use, instead the Schaffer and Stillman (2010) xtoverid
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Note: The Y-axis variable is logV RRM net of the estimated effect of lnCardsGDP , ln
GDP
POP ,
ln ATMPOPM , ln
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was estimated with clustered standard errors, year and country dummies.
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The C-efficiency ratio and VAT revenue to GDP, or the Efficiency ratio, replace VRRM as
dependent variables in Columns (3) and (4), respectively. There is virtually no change in the
estimated coefficients and their significance when lnCeffM is used instead of lnV RRM . The
Efficiency ratio regression, however, yields substantially lower estimates. Nevertheless, both the
main and quadratic terms of cash remain significant at 10%, whereas GDP per capita is found
to have no influence on the ratio.
Even though the impact of major macroeconomic shocks should be captured by the year
dummies, which are present in all regressions, Column (5) removes 2008-2010 data from the
estimation in order to check the extent to which the financial crisis affects the results. Apart
from the finding that before the onset of the crisis a 1% increase in the VAT rate is associated
with a stronger positive response of the VAT revenue to net consumption ratio, excluding the
last three years of the data does not alter the estimates qualitatively or quantitatively.
The next two columns of Table 3.3 split the sample geographically into two groups: 1) the
CEE region, herein the Baltic states, and 2) the EU-15. Besides geographical, the split is also
along income lines, with CEE having an average of e8,140 GDP per capita, and the EU-15 –
e29,898. Similarly to previous estimations, cards enter with a positive sign for the linear and
negative sign for the quadratic term, both imprecisely estimated for the two subsets of countries.
The coefficient of lnCashGDP is negative and significant at 10%, but only the quadratic term for CEE
is statistically significant, suggesting that the positive effect of cash on VAT’s performance is
prevalent in countries where cash continues to be a preferred method of payment. On average,
ATM cash withdrawals are 6pp higher and card payments 7pp lower in CEE than in the EU-15.
Another interesting outcome of the sample split is that Range is negative and highly significant
for CEE: 1pp widening of the range between SV AT and the lowest reduced rate would lead to
a 1% fall in V RRM .
The arguments against reduced VAT rates are many and succinctly summarised by Tait
(1988). Perhaps the most compelling justification against rate differentiation is the inevitable
increase in traders’ compliance costs. There are also considerable administrative costs associated
with the management of a complex VAT system, which functions with multiple rates, exemptions,
and zero rating. It is further doubtful whether reduced rates achieve what they are aimed at,
namely mitigating the impact of VAT’s regressivity on low income households. In a cross-
sectional analysis, Bogetić and Hassan (1993) estimate a negative relationship between Range
and the Efficiency ratio. Likewise, Agha and Haughton (1996) demonstrate that the higher
the number of VAT rates, the lower the VAT compliance. Even though Range is found to be
statistically significant only for the CEE countries, once exposure to foreign trade is taken into
account, the variable becomes significant for the whole sample, as shown in Table 3.4.
Finally, Column (8) presents results from a cross-sectional regression, where the data has been
collapsed to country means. With only 26 data points, standard errors increase substantially
with most of the coefficients becoming statistically insignificant. In particular, a measure of
test, which treats RE’s orthogonality condition E(xit ∗ αi) = 0 as an over-identifying restriction and allows for
clustered errors. The very large Sargan-Hansen statistic of 257.6 with p-value of zero strongly rejects the null
hypothesis that RE is consistent. Thus, all subsequent regressions employ the within estimator.
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cash calculated as an average over the 2000-2010 period is generally not significant in explaining
VAT’s performance, even though the estimates are virtually unchanged from the fixed effects
coefficients. Interestingly, however, the linear term of cards is barely significant at 10%, a result
which is in line with the outcome of the Random-effects regression (see footnote 4) that utilises
both the time-series and cross-sectional variation in the data.
Next, Table 3.4 checks if the coefficients on cash and cards and their significance are sensitive
to the incorporation of additional explanatory variables. The first departure from the benchmark
specification is the inclusion of openness (Open), measured as exports and imports divided by
GDP. Invariably, studies modelling VAT revenue as a function of trade openness find a positive
association (Ebrill et al., 2001; Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2008). The intuition is that, all in
all, more trade enhances VAT collection on imports, despite the existence of various fraudulent
mechanisms exploiting the zero rating of exports at the border. In Table 3.4 Open enters with a
positive sign and is always significant at 5%. The estimated elasticity of V RRM to the level of
trade is .24 in most regressions. Both the linear and quadratic terms of cash remain statistically
significant and similar in magnitude to the estimates in Table 3.3. The quadratic term of cards
is barely significant at 10%. As mentioned above, due to smaller estimated standard error, there
is some indication that Range is negatively correlated with V RRM .
Column (2) adds the rate of unemployment as an explanatory variable that not only denotes
the general state of the economy, but also directly affects private consumption. Not surpris-
ingly, the coefficient of lnUnempl shows that VAT’s performance deteriorates as the number
of unemployed rises. As long as unemployment is explicitly controlled for, GDP per capita is
insignificant. Perceptions of corruption, which can influence the willingness to pay tax, also
enter with a negative sign in Column (3), albeit imprecisely estimated. Previous research has
shown a positive connection between the level of urbanisation and VAT revenue, but Column
(3) does not corroborate this finding (Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2008; de Mello, 2008).
By exempting the smallest traders from VAT registration, the VAT turnover threshold could
potentially reduce revenue, even though, given the high number of small traders, savings in
administrative costs could outweigh foregone revenue. Including the threshold as a percent of
GDP per capita in Column (4) shows at a 5% level of significance that if TreshGDP grows by
1pp, V RRM falls by 0.9%. Neither of the additional explanatory variables in Columns (2)-(4)
alters the effect of cash on VRRM. Cards also remain insignificant.
One possible explanation for cards’ lack of influence on V RRM is that unlike Turkey, and
more recently the US, where a clear signal is sent to firms that electronic sales are monitored,
in Europe card transactions may not serve as a sufficiently powerful deterrent to evasion. In
particular, it is unclear to what degree EU tax administrations match firms’ card transactions to
reported sales as a preventive mechanism before suspicions of non-compliance arise (before the
fact) as opposed to a pursuant mechanism, once suspicion is already established and an audit is
instigated as a consequence (after the fact).
Even if a specific tax policy utilising firms’ card transactions for enforcement purposes is not
in place, I test whether in general tax administrations that make extensive use of third-party
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reporting are more effective in VAT revenue collection. To do so, I introduce a dummy variable
Prefill, which equals one for countries that use pre-populated personal income tax returns;
this dummy is also interacted with CardsGDP . A high level of pre-filled returns indicates that most
salaries are paid electronically, which is also conducive to a greater use of cashless transactions,
provided that an adequate payment infrastructure exists. In Column (5), the coefficient of
Prefill is identified from countries (Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, and
Slovenia) that
switched fully or partially between taxpayer submitted returns to pre-populated returns in the
period 2000-2010. Use of third-party reporting for personal income taxation was pioneered by
Denmark in 1988, followed by Sweden and Finland in 1995 (OECD, 2008). In view of the results
in Column (5), however, I cannot find evidence that third-party reporting for individuals, or
card transactions given third-party reporting, have any effect on VAT revenue proportionate to
consumption.
Lastly, Column (6) explores the possibility of the endogeneity of the VAT rate. On the one
hand, higher SV AT can translate into higher collected revenues. On the other hand, if revenue
realisations do not meet a government target, SV AT can be adjusted accordingly.6
Among various sets of instruments, the following three variables met the relevance and
validity criteria best: the natural logs of corporate income tax rate and government expenditure,
and, due to numerous negative values, the non-transformed government deficit. At least before
the financial crisis, hikes in the VAT rate were generally compensated with cuts in the CIT
rate and/or PIT deductions. Since raising SV AT is a quick way to generate more revenue, I
expect that fluctuations in the government’s deficit and expenditure would closely correspond
to the dynamics of the VAT rate. The results of a fixed-effects instrumental variable regression
with clustered errors are reported in Column (6). The first-stage F-statistic testing for the joint
significance of the excluded instruments is 6.10 with a P-value of 0.0031, indicating that the
instruments are relevant. Further, given a Hansen-J statistic of 1.417 (χ2(2) P-value=0.4923), I
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the full set of orthogonality conditions are valid.
Overall, instrumenting for the VAT rate produces higher coefficients in absolute value, es-
pecially when it comes to SV AT , which increases four times. Both GDP per capita and the
unemployment rate are significant in Column (6) as opposed to previous regressions, in which
only unemployment mattered. The linear and quadratic terms of cash almost double and remain
significant at 5%. A similar increase is observed for cards, but the linear effect does not change
its statistical significance.7
6To detect the presence of reverse causality – revenue driving the rate rather than vice versa, one can replace
the dependent variable with the VAT rate, keeping VAT revenue on the right-hand side. In such a regression, it
turns out that V RRM does have a statistically significant effect on SV AT , which poses the question of whether
the results for cash and cards will change if SV AT is instrumented for.
7Another robustness check was performed with a different measure for cash, namely net currency in circu-
lation, taken from ECB’s data warehouse and defined as the number of banknotes/coins in circulation, where
for banknotes, circulation equals created notes minus destroyed notes less stock of the National Central Bank
(NCB). This measure is readily available for the EU members, which are not part of the monetary union, and
is not reported by the ECB for the Euro area countries. Currency in circulation for the Euro zone states was
obtained from the individual countries’ NCB websites, and in the case of Germany, Spain and Portugal, it was
estimated. The derivation is performed by assuming that the notes put in circulation are proportional to the
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Table 3.4: DETERMINANTS OF VAT COLLECTION EFFICIENCY: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS






.012 .019 .007 .017 .022 .046
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.070** .077** .076** .065** .072** .077*
(.029) (.029) (.032) (.029) (.029) (.044)
lnSV AT .594*** .619*** .526*** .540*** .621*** 2.63***
(.167) (.138) (.131) (.102) (.137) (.513)
Range -.006* -.006* -.006* -.009** -.006* -.024***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.006)
lnOpen .242** .237** .242** .226** .244** .336*
(.097) (.096) (.098) (.100) (.097) (.174)
lnUnempl -.094** -.082* -.095** -.092** -.121*




















Observations 267 266 264 233 266 265
Note: The sample in each regression pertains to 2000-2010. The dependent variable is the log of
V RRM= VAT RevenueFinal Consumption-VAT Revenue . All specifications include country and year fixed effects. In Column (6)
lnSV AT is instrumented with Deficit, lnCIT and lnGovExp; estimation is performed with xtivreg2 (Schaffer,
2010). In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks denote significance at
the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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3.4 Conclusion
The exceptional amount of firm-related information tax administrations could or already have
access to leads to the gradual implementation of policies whose aim is to prevent rather than
pursue tax evasion. If these policies require traders to transition from cash to electronic payment
systems, compliance costs are unavoidable. It is therefore important to study such practices and
their expected effect on enforcement.
In itself card payments’ traceability could improve compliance by increasing the perceived
probability of detection, even if no explicit policy using electronic transactions data as a pre-
ventive mechanism is in force. It is this particular aspect of cards that this chapter focused on.
Given the data, the visibility of electronic payments does not appear to influence VAT’s collec-
tion efficacy in a significant manner. It is possible that a more proactive tax policy following the
example of the US and Turkey can induce a considerable impact on compliance. Alternatively,
it is equally possible that the outcome could be limited if those firms that are bent on evading,
are inventive enough to find the means to do so. The picture is more clear-cut with respect
to cash, whose negative effect on VAT’s performance is unambiguous, at least in the countries
where card payments are well-established.
countries’ subscription key to the ECB’s share capital minus the 8% ECB’s share of total euro banknotes issued.
An analogous analysis to the one performed in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 showed that a quadratic term for net currency
in circulation is not justified and that the relationship between lnV RRM and currency in circulation is negative.
Replacing ATM cash withdrawals with net currency in circulation in eq. (4.3.1.) yields a negative estimated
coefficient of -.045, which, however, is not statistically significant (standard error is .034).
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Appendix 3.1
Table 3.5: CHANGES AFFECTING THE VAT TAX BASE
2000 2009
AT No zero rate; Lower rate 10%. Standard rate
20%. General registration threshold (GRT)
e22,000. Aggregate administrative costs for tax
functions as % of GDP (AAC): 0.22%. Number
of VAT registered traders, millions (NVT): 0.69.
Lower rate [added]: water supply; refuse (waste)
collection; sewage; dwelling; passenger transport;
hotel accommodation; restaurant services (except
drinks); medicine. GRT: e30,000. AAC: 0.19%.
NVT: 0.82 No change in rates and exemptions.
BE Zero rate; Lower rates 6%, 12%. Standard rate
21%. GRT: e5,580. AAC: -. NVT: -.
Lower rate [added]: some labour intensive
services (small repair services) [2003];
construction work leading to the construction of
new private housing and the sale of new private
housing (subject to conditions, limitations and of
temporary character)[2009 to 2010]. GRT:
e5,580. AAC: 0.35%. NVT: 0.7. No change in
rates and exemptions.
CZ No zero rate; Lower rate 5%. Standard rate 22%.
GRT: e85,567. AAC: -. NVT: -.
Zero rate on international passenger transport;
Lower rate 9%. Standard rate 19%. Scope of
lower rate reduced from covering most services in
2000 to: supply of water; disposal or waste water;
accommodation; construction of private dwellings
and social houses; healthcare and domestic care
services; cleaning in households; funeral; sport
activities. Exemptions [removed]: supplies of
enterprises. GRT: e39,904. AAC: 0.20%. NVT:
0.53.
DE No zero rate; Lower rate 7%. Standard rate 16%.
GRT: e16,620. AAC: -. NVT: 4.87.
Standard rate 19%. Lower rate [added]: plants;
flowers; devices for the disabled; museums; zoos;
circuses; authors’ rights [2003]. GRT: e17,500.
AAC: 0.29%. NVT: 5.70.
DK Zero rate; No lower rate. Standard rate 25%.
GRT: e2,680. AAC: -. NVT: 0.39
First time sale of artistic work valued over
DKK300,000 taxed at 5%. Exemptions [added]:
sale of products of artistic work valued under
DKK300,000; [removed]: supply of all land and
buildings. GRT: e6,711. AAC: 0.3%. NVT: 0.43.
EL No zero rate; Lower rate 8%. Standard rate 18%.
GRT: e6,070. NVT: 1.45.
Lower rate 9%. Standard rate 19%. Exemptions
[added]: legal and artists’ services; authors’
rights; public radio and TV; supply of water by
public bodies [2003]; supply of new buildings
[2005]; welfare and social security works; supply
of goods used exclusively in an exempt activity,
services included in the taxable value of imported
goods; postage and other similar stamps [2009].
[removed] supply of new buildings [2007]. Lower
rate [added]: books [2003]; cultural and sporting
events; collection and treatment of waste; some
labour intensive services [2005]; gas; live animals;
seeds; fertilisers; pharmaceutical products;
charitable work; plants and flowers [2009]. GRT:
e10,000. NVT: 1.10.
ES No zero rate; Lower rate 7%. Standard rate 16%.
GRT: None. AAC: -. NVT: 3.3.
No change in rates, exemptions, and lower rate
coverage. GRT: None. AAC: 0.13%. NVT: 2.8.
FI Zero rate; Lower rates 8%, 17%. Standard rate
22%. GRT: e8,500. AAC: 0.21%. NVT: 0.5.
Zero rate [removed]: international transport
[2003]. Lower rate [added]: works of art supplied
by their creators or imported [2003]. Exemptions
[removed]: products of visual art sold by the
artist [2003]. No change in rates. GRT: e8,500.
AAC: 0.22%. NVT: 0.58.
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CHANGES AFFECTING THE TAX BASE Contd.
2000 2009
FR No zero rate; Lower rates 5.5% Standard rate
19.6%. GRT: e76,300. AAC: 0.39%. NVT: -.
Lower rate [added]: most foods and drinks [2007];
gas; electricity; pharmaceutical products; farm
products, gardens, plants and flowers; refuse
collection; sewage [2009]; [removed]: museums.
Exemptions [added]: construction, work on
monuments; cemeteries and graves of war
victims; commodity futures transactions, services
rendered by resource consortia to their members
that are VAT exempt [2003]. No change in rates.
GRT: e80,000. AAC: 0.23%. NVT: 4.20.
HU Zero rate; Lower rate 12%. Standard rate 25%.
GRT: $7,544. AAC: 0.57%. NVT: 0.55.
No zero rate; Lower rates 5%, 18%. Lower rate
[removed]: food, electricity, live animals, water,
pharmaceutical products, transportation,
veterinary, movie, art, library and bath services,
etc. [added] musical notes. Exemptions
[removed]: mass sports events; services rendered
by intermediaries; lending of buildings for
education, sport, or cultural purposes; transfer of
creditors and ownership rights, compulsory social
security insurance, public administration. GRT:
e17,921. AAC: 0.39%. NVT: 0.52.
IE Zero rate; Lower rate 12.5%. Standard rate 21%.
GRT: e51,000/$26,050. AAC: 0.26%. NVT: 0.22.
Lower rate 13.5%. Zero rate [added]: certain
aircraft and sea-going vessels [2005]; Lower rate
[added]: gas; recreational and sports services;
certain nursery and garden centre stock [2009].
Exemptions: [added] child care [2003] and
[removed] [2005]. GRT: e75,000. AAC: 0.28%.
NVT: 0.28.
IT Zero rate (scrap iron); Lower rate 10%. Standard
rate 20%. GRT: e2,400. AAC: - . NVT: -.
No zero rate; Lower rate [added]: accommodation
let by building enterprises [2003]; Exemptions
[added] taxi; [removed] municipal passenger
transport [2009]. GRT: e30,000. AAC: 0.20%.
NVT: 5.26.
LU No zero rate; Lower rates 5%, 12%. Standard
rate 15%. GRT: e10,000. AAC: -. NVT: 0.076.
Lower rate [added]: accommodation; cultural,
sporting events; certain labour intensive services;
children’s’ clothing; electricity; construction of
dwellings; gas, passenger transport,
pharmaceutical products etc. Rates and
exemptions unchanged. GRT: e10,000. AAC:
0.24%. NVT: 0.06.
NL No zero rate; Lower rates 6%. Standard rate
17.5%. GRT: e1,345. AAC: 0.69%. NVT: 1.
Standard rate 19%. Lower rate [added]: cut
flowers and plants; hotel and holiday
accommodation; lending of books [2005]; cleaning
of dwellings and hairdressing [2009]; [removed]
lending of books [2009]. Exemptions unchanged.
GRT: e1,345. AAC: 0.36%. NVT: 1.45.
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CHANGES AFFECTING THE TAX BASE Contd.
2000 2009
PL Zero rate; Lower rate 7%. Standard rate 22%.
Exemptions: agriculture, taxi, R&D, cremation
and cemetery, and attorney services; funeral.
GRT: e20,833. AAC: 0.18%. NVT: 1.3.
Zero rate [removed]: new dwelling immovable
property; agricultural means of production.
Lower rate [added]: basic agricultural means of
production; restaurant, cemetery, certain
construction, and reception of broadcasting
services; certain foodstuffs and beverages;
passenger transport, etc. All goods/services
subject to lower rate in 2000 removed.
Exemptions: students’ accommodation; public
radio and TV. GRT: e24.390. AAC: 0.36%.
NVT: 2.14.
PT Zero rate; Lower rates 5%, 12%. Standard rate
17%. GRT: e10,000. AAC: 0.36%. NVT: -.
Standard rate 20%. Lower rate [added]: devices
for the disabled, medical services, natural gas,
hotels, social housing; some goods used in
agriculture; restaurant services; tools, machines
or other equipment used for collecting and using
alternative energy sources, etc. GRT: e12,000.
AAC: 0.23%. NVT: 1.50.
SE Zero rate; Lower rates 6%, 12%. Standard rate
25%. GRT: None. AAC: 0.27%. NVT: 0.84.
Standard rate 15%. Lower rate [added]: books;
newspapers; magazines; zoos [2003]. Exemptions
[added]: creative artists; investment gold [2007];
[removed]: certain memberships, publications
[2003], authors’ rights [2005], investment gold
[2009]. Rates unchanged. GRT: None. AAC:
0.18%. NVT: 1.
UK Zero rate; Lower rate 5%. Standard rate 17.5%.
GRT: e82,258. AAC: 0.33%. NVT: 1.73.
Standard rate 15%. Lower rate [added]: certain
grant-funded installations of heating equipment;
children car seats; certain pharmaceutical
products. Exemptions [added]: works of art.
GRT: e80,000. AAC: 0.28%. NVT: 1.9.
Sources: OECD (Various Years), OECD (2004, 2009), Eurostat. Used abbreviations: AAC Aggregate
administrative costs for tax functions as % of GDP; GRT General registration threshold; NVT Number of
VAT registered traders (millions). In the 2000 column, the value of NVT is for 2003, as this data is not available
for previous years. 2000 is the benchmark year. For coverage of lower rates and exemptions in 2000, refer to the
2001 edition of OECD (Various Years). The 2009 column lists only the low rate goods and services/ exemptions,
which have been added/removed as compared to 2000.
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Chapter 4
Real-time Collection of the Value-added Tax:
Some Business and Legal Implications
(with Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Boston University – School of Law)
Recent estimates of the level of VAT fraud in the EU are commensurate with the EU budget. With
the Green paper on the future of VAT, the European Commission stressed the urgency and necessity of
comprehensive VAT reforms. This chapter analyses the business and legal implications of the recently
proposed split-payment mechanism, which, if implemented, would move VAT’s method of collection to
real-time. The discussion is positioned in the context of two increasingly visible trends in the EU –
the general shift towards greater reliance on indirect taxation and the growing popularity of electronic
payment instruments. The potential implementation of VAT withholding would be a radical reform,
given its shift of the taxation system from voluntary to forced compliance. We argue that, on the one
hand, real-time VAT collection would constitute a potent preventive measure against VAT fraud, which
could generate synergetic effects within SEPA, and further deepen integration through the harmonisation
of VAT policies. On the other hand, real-time audit/refund would require tax authorities’ access to
confidential business information that may be incompatible with EU privacy rules. The trade-off between
efficient tax collection and privacy concerns mirrors the general debate on data protection in a cashless
economy.
Keywords: Value added tax, Fraud, Real-time collection, Tax design, European Union
JEL Classification: H25; H26; K34; K42
4.1 Introduction
The consequences of value-added tax (VAT) fraud within the European Union (EU) have as-
sumed gargantuan proportions, not only in terms of syphoned off liability, but also with the
crippling compliance burden imposed on honest businesses. The general sense of practitioners is
that “...tax authorities in the European Union are increasingly losing control of the VAT system
and that honest businesses pay the price for it...” (Zubeldia, 2011). An economic evaluation
We wish to thank Sijbren Cnossen and Fabrizio Borselli for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any
remaining errors are ours.
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ordered by the European Commission (EC) estimates that compliance costs for businesses range
between 2% and 8% of collected VAT (European Commission, 2011a).
Unlike personal income tax (PIT) and corporate income tax (CIT) evasion, whose effects, if
socially unacceptable are normally limited to the fraudster and his relationship with the fiscal
authorities, VAT fraud is very different. VAT fraud rolls through the supply chain increas-
ing compliance cost and exposing innocent businesses to crippling penalties. With estimates
varying from 1% in Luxembourg to 30% in Greece, the VAT gap is only one measure of VAT
fraud. Another, and equally important measure, is the uncertainty it injects into the business
environment. For example, a 2006 decision by the European Court of Justice in relation to
missing-trader fraud (MT) states that if the tax administration can prove that traders “knew or
should have known” that they engage in purchase transactions connected with VAT evasion, the
traders do not have the right to deduct the tax on these purchases (Terra and Kajus, 2011).1
While it is important that courts unequivocally signal that neither fraud, nor inaction given
awareness of fraud will be tolerated, the possibility that an honest business may become liable
for VAT stolen by others in the VAT chain is not a normal business risk (Amand and Boucquez,
2011). In effect, the theft of VAT by fraudulent firm A transforms into a tax on production for
bona fide firm B. Thus, in addition to distorting competition, VAT fraud leads to heavy com-
pliance costs for honest traders, who, inter alia, are compelled to research their suppliers, cover
possible litigation costs, and even face bankruptcy as a result of fraudulent actions committed
by others.
Final consumers, who effectively bear the incidence of VAT, are not insulated from the effects
of fraud either. VAT scams exacerbate already strained public finances and may lead to jumps
in VAT rates to compensate for lost revenue, which the Reckon Report estimated at e106.7
billion in 2006 (Reckon LLP, 2009). To put this number into perspective, the EU budget in 2006
was e106.6 billion.
The fact that VAT is collected by firms, and thus inevitably passes through private bank
accounts, makes the tax especially susceptible to fraud. Various proposals for reform targeting
the source of the fraud incentive were put forth as early as 2000. Bulgaria, for example, exper-
imented with VAT accounts in 2003, effectively eliminating traders’ access to the tax (Pashev,
2007). The viability of real-time VAT collection was also discussed in the UK, where the problem
of carousel fraud is severe (House of Lords, 2007).
The debate intensified recently with PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ (PWC) report on the useful-
ness of technology and financial intermediaries regarding VAT’s method of collection. In 2010,
the EC launched a public debate on the problematic aspects of VAT’s current design via the
Green paper on the future of VAT, with VAT collection being one of the most contentious points
(European Commission, 2010). In particular, PWC examined a split-payment mechanism, which
would break up the value of each transaction into a taxable amount and a VAT amount in real-
1The specific ECJ decision concerns the joined cases C-354/03 (Optigen), C-355/03 (Fulcrum) and C-484/03
(Bond House), as well as joined cases C-439/04 (Axel Kittel), and C-440/04 (Recolta Recycling). According to
the Court of Justice decision, the EU law cannot be relied upon for fraudulent ends, which also includes the case
where a trader is aware of VAT fraud, but stands aloof without gaining any advantage (Terra and Kajus, 2011).
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time, transferring the tax to a blocked VAT account. The idea of a blocked VAT account was
first developed by the Ifo Institute in 2003, and was called a “VAT trust account”(Sinn et al.,
2004).
According to the EC’s follow-up on the public debate, the reaction of businesses and tax
specialists to VAT withholding was predominantly negative, with concerns about its effects on
cash flow and compliance costs. Nevertheless, the Commission’s intention is to “...further analyse
the feasibility of the split payment and its design in order to allay the concerns expressed.”
(European Commission, 2011a).
This chapter analyses the split payment mechanism in the context of two specific proposals
for VAT reform: PWC’s proposition for the introduction of blocked VAT accounts and Chris
William’s real-time VAT (RTvat). In particular, we examine compliance and cash flow effects
of VAT withholding as well as the implications of the likely expansion of firm data reporting
under real-time audit. The discussion is further positioned at the background of two increasingly
visible trends, namely the greater reliance on indirect taxation in the EU, which makes VAT
reform all the more pressing, and the gradual movement to payment digitisation, given the rising
popularity of cashless transactions and targeted initiatives such as the Single European Payment
Area (SEPA).
The RTvat proposal claims that technology used in the credit card industry and inter-bank
payment systems makes VAT withholding a feasible alternative to the current method of col-
lection. While undisputedly such a step would serve as a powerful preventive measure against
VAT scams, it raises numerous points of concern. First and foremost, it would eliminate vol-
untary compliance for the firms it would affect. Second, if VAT is to be refunded in real-time
as well, which would necessitate real-time audits, what is the scope of the business information
that would have to be shared in real time with the tax authorities to enable an efficient audit
function built-in within the split-payment system?
On the one hand, given VAT’s increasing importance as a source of revenue and the steadfast
move of the economy towards digitisation, a major VAT re-design seems inevitable. On the other
hand, a technical solution to VAT fraud would likely entail a greater intrusion into (confidential)
business data, as well as the imposition of costly compliance procedures on mostly compliant
traders, although one may argue that the current enforcement measures are equally costly. In
a sense, the trade-off between maximising tax revenue through efficient use of technology and
privacy concerns mirrors the broader debate on data protection in an economy with quickly
growing electronic payments.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly documents the marked shift towards
indirect taxation and away from direct taxation, especially during the financial crisis of 2008-
2010. Pros and cons of blocked accounts and RTvat, and the required steps toward an efficient
split-payment system are studied in Section 3, while Section 4 concludes.
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4.2 The Shift from Direct to Indirect Taxation
There is a gradual shift from direct to indirect taxation in the European Union economies, which
became particularly evident in the nature of the fiscal packages implemented during the 2008-
2010 economic downturn. It is worth noting that a major decline in the corporate tax rates
is observed long before the start of the recession. In the Green paper on the future of VAT,
European Commission (2010) observes that consumption is “... a broader and more stable [tax]
base than income and profits,” and that “the financing of the welfare state may have to rely
less on labour taxes and tax revenues from capital income (savings), thereby further arguing
in favour of a shift to indirect taxation.” Similarly, a meeting of the OECD Ministers in 2009
singled out the shift of revenue from corporate and personal income taxation, or social security
contributions onto consumption and property taxes as an important growth-oriented tax reform
(OECD, 2009).
In general, receipts from VAT can be used to reduce other more distortionary taxes, such
as PIT, and especially CIT. Given that, besides other distortions, CIT favours debt over equity
financing, consumption over saving, labour over capital, while PIT may discourage saving and
work effort, lower reliance on direct taxation would be economically advantageous (Department
of the Treasury, 1984).2 It is precisely this type of policy that was pursued by the majority of
EU countries during the financial crisis.
Table 4.1 shows the tax rates and VAT revenue as a percent of GDP and total taxation in
2000 and 2009. The Member States exhibit a varying degree of reliance on VAT. In 2009, for
example, proceeds ranged from 4.1% of GDP in Spain to more than 10% in Denmark. VAT
revenue accounted for 13.2% of total taxation in Italy and reached 31.2% in Bulgaria.
From 2000 to 2008 inclusive, seven countries raised the standard VAT rate. Cuts occurred in
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, although usually accompanied by increases in the
reduced rates. Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria, which initially had a single VAT rate, introduced
reduced ones. Overall, this period was not characterised by a clear-cut VAT dynamics, apart
from sporadic country-specific reforms.
After 2008, however, VAT has consistently been utilised as a flexible fiscal policy tool, pri-
marily with the goal of financing cuts in direct taxes and ensuring the stability of public finances
during the crisis. In particular, the standard rate was raised by 2.12pp on average in fourteen
Member States in the space of four years, whereas the average growth in reduced rates was
2.2pp in seven countries.3 At the same time, a large number of base narrowing measures were
introduced, mostly for equity reasons, but the positive budgetary impact of the rate increases
far outweighed the effects of the base narrowing (Ferrario, 2011). Compared to their 2009 level,
2Some proposals even suggest replacing the income tax altogether. In the late 1990s, Professor Michael J.
Graetz suggested a progressive broad-based VAT for all US households. People earning more than a stipulated
threshold would be subject to an income tax on the income exceeding the threshold in addition to paying VAT
(Schenk and Oldman, 2007).
3The upward trend in VAT was not uninterrupted for all countries. For example, the UK lowered its standard
rate to 15% in 2009, and increased it to 20% in 2011. A reduction (0.5pp) followed by an increase (2pp) happened
also in Ireland.
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standard rates in the UK, Romania, and Greece are 5pp higher in 2012, which is not a painless
jump in consumer prices. Hungary has the highest VAT in the EU as of 2012, 27%, which is
2pp greater than the rates in traditionally high-tax Denmark and Sweden. The policy of rising
VAT rates in conjunction with base narrowing contradicts OECD’s general recommendation on
enhancing the efficiency of VAT through base expansion at a single rate, and minimal exemp-
tions and reduced rates as prerequisites for economic growth and revenue maximisation (OECD,
2010).
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Note: Potential revenue equals (Final consumption - VAT revenue)*Standard VAT rate.
Figure 4.1 compares actual VAT receipts to revenue from a potential tax base with full com-
pliance, a single VAT rate, no exemptions, and no zero rating. The country, whose actual tax
base is closest to its potential one is Luxembourg. The jumps in the standard VAT rates after
2007 are clearly reflected in the upward trend of potential revenue collections for almost all coun-
tries. In Greece, Spain, Ireland, Latvia and Portugal rising potential receipts are accompanied
by collapsing actual revenues.
In contrast to VAT, the importance of the corporate income tax decreased markedly judging
by its share in GDP in 2009 (Table 4.2). With the exception of Malta and Hungary, CIT rates
Table 4.1: VAT: TRENDS IN RATES AND REVENUE
Value added tax rates % GDP % Total taxation
2000 2009 2012 2000 2009 2000 2009
Sweden Standard 25 25 25 8.6 9.7 16.7 20.7
Reduced 6/12 6/12 6/12
Denmark Standard 25 25 25 9.6 10.1 19.4 21
Reduced
Finland Standard 22 22 23 8.2 8.8 17.4 20.3
Reduced 8/17 8/17 9/13
United Kingdom Standard 17.5 15 20 6.6 5.8 17.9 16.6
Reduced 5 5 5
Netherlands Standard 17.5 19 19 6.9 7 17.3 18.4
Reduced 6 6 6
Luxembourg Standard 15 15 15 5.6 6.2 14.3 16.7
Reduced 6/12 6/12 6/12
Estonia Standard 18 20 20 8.4 9.1 27.2 25.2
Reduced 5 9 9
France Standard 19.6 19.6 19.6 7.3 6.8 16.6 16.3
Reduced 5.5 5.5 5.5/7
Portugal Standard 17 20 23 7.7 7.1 24.6 23
Reduced 5/12 5/12 6/13
Belgium Standard 21 21 21 7.2 7 15.9 16
Reduced 6/12 6/12 6/12
Ireland Standard 21 21.5 23 7.3 6.4 23.1 22.7
Reduced 12.5 13.5 9/13.5
Slovenia Standard 19 20 20 8.7 8.4 23.1 22.4
Reduced 8 8.5 8.5
Austria Standard 20 20 20 8.1 8.1 18.8 18.9
Reduced 10 10 10
Spain Standard 16 16 18 6.1 4.1 18 13.5
Reduced 7 7 8
Latvia Standard 18 21 22 7 6 23.9 22.5
Reduced 10 12
Cyprus Standard 10 15 15 5.8 9.1 19.3 26
Reduced 5 5/8 5/8
Germany Standard 16 19 19 6.8 7.4 16.2 18.7
Reduced 7 7 7
Malta Standard 15 18 18 6 7.8 21.4 22.9
Reduced 5 5 5/7
Lithuania Standard 18 19 21 7.6 7.4 25.2 25.2
Reduced 5 5/9 5/9
Italy Standard 20 20 21 6.5 5.7 15.6 13.2
Reduced 10 10 10
Slovakia Standard 23 19 20 7 6.7 20.4 23.3
Reduced 10 10 10
Poland Standard 22 22 23 6.9 7.4 21.3 23.4
Reduced 7 7 5/8
Hungary Standard 25 25 27 8.7 8.4 22.3 21.3
Reduced 12 5/18 5/18
Czech Republic Standard 22 19 20 6.5 7.1 19.1 20.7
Reduced 5 9 14
Greece Standard 18 19 23 7.2 6.4 20.8 21.1
Reduced 8 9 6.5/13
Romania Standard 19 19 24 6.5 6.7 21.4 24.8
Reduced 5/9 5/9
Bulgaria Standard 20 20 20 8.3 9 26.4 31.2
Reduced 7 9
Source: European Commission (2011c); Taxation and Customs Union (2012). Super-reduced rates, i.e. rates
below 5%, are not reported.
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Table 4.2: PIT & CIT: TRENDS IN RATES AND REVENUE
Top personal tax rates Revenue %GDP Corporate tax rates Revenue %GDP
2000 2009 2011 2000 2009 2000 2009 2011 2000 2009
Sweden 51.5 56.4 56.4 18.1 16.4 28 26.3 26.3 3.8 3
Denmark 59.7 59 51.5 25.6 26.5 32 25 25 3.3 2.5
Finland 54 49.1 49.2 14.5 13.4 29 26 26 5.9 2
United Kingdom 40 40 50 10.8 10.4 30 28 27 3.5 2.8
Netherlands 60 52 52 6 8.6 35 25.5 25 4.3 2.1
Luxembourg 47.2 39 42.1 7.2 7.7 37.5 28.6 28.8 7 5.5
Estonia 26 21 21 6.8 5.7 26 21 21 0.9 1.8
France 59 45.8 46.7 8.4 7.5 37.8 34.4 34.4 2.8 1.3
Portugal 40 42 46.5 5.3 5.7 35.2 26.5 29 3.7 2.9
Belgium 60.6 53.7 53.7 13.3 12.2 40.2 34 34 3.2 2.5
Ireland 44 41 41 9.2 7.9 24 12.5 12.5 3.8 2.5
Slovenia 50 41 41 5.6 5.9 25 21 20 1.2 1.8
Austria 50 50 50 10.1 10 34 25 25 2.2 1.9
Spain 48 43 45 6.6 7 35 30 30 3.1 2.3
Latvia 25 23 25 5.6 5.4 25 15 15 1.6 1.6
Cyprus 40 30 30 3.6 3.9 29 10 10 6.2 6.5
Germany 53.8 47.5 47.5 10.2 9.7 51.6 29.8 29.8 1.7 0.7
Malta 35 35 35 5.6 6.3 35 35 35 2.9 6.7
Lithuania 33 15 15 7.7 4.1 24 20 15 0.7 1.8
Italy 45.9 44.9 45.6 11.5 11.7 41.3 31.4 31.4 2.4 2.4
Slovakia 42 19 19 3.4 2.4 29 19 19 2.6 2.5
Poland 40 32 32 4.4 4.6 30 19 19 2.4 2.3
Hungary 44 40 23 7.2 7.3 19.6 21.3 20.6 2.2 2.1
Czech Republic 32 15 15 4.6 3.6 31 20 19 3.5 3.6
Greece 45 40 45 5 5.1 40 25 20 4.1 2.4
Romania 40 16 16 3.5 3.5 25 16 16 3 2.6
Bulgaria 40 10 10 4 2.9 32.5 10 10 2.7 2.5
Source: European Commission (2011c). Currently Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia have a flat tax PIT.
have fallen substantially in the remaining EU countries, and so has revenue in the older Member
States. The countries, which joined the EU in and after 2004, however, display a distinctly
different pattern of CIT revenue, namely falling rates yield either stable, or rising CIT proceeds.
With the exception of Portugal and Luxembourg, some Member States continued lowering the
CIT throughout the 2009-2011 period. Narrowing changes in the tax base and new deductions
were also implemented (Ferrario, 2011). Already six Member States collect CIT revenue below
2% of GDP, and in Germany, proceeds were 0.7% in 2009. These figures raise questions about
the future of corporate taxation in the EU.
PIT reforms included mainly revisions in the tax scale, widening of the tax brackets, and an
increase in new and current allowances, especially for lower-income households, who were most
vulnerable to the effects of the crisis. Top rate hikes occurred in several countries with the aim
of increasing the progressivity of the tax as shown in Table 4.2. The table also demonstrates
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that PIT remained a stable source of revenue until 2009, with some sharp declines mainly in
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that implemented a flat PIT and enacted major
PIT rate cuts. Currently eight CEE and Baltic countries use a flat tax system, five of which
have set the flat PIT rate equal to the CIT rate. The effect of the PIT reforms on revenue after
2009 remains to be seen.
Overall, increased VAT revenue during the crisis enhanced governments’ fiscal manoeuvra-
bility with respect to direct taxes. Reforms in direct taxation were in turn used to stimulate
labour and business. Rises in VAT rates, however, which continue in 2012, may contribute to a
further spread of fraudulent schemes, if more effective measures are not taken to combat VAT
fraud that already is a major drain on the public purse. The trend of increasing rates makes
the tax more conspicuous, and therefore evasion more valuable to traders and the public alike
(Tait, 1988). VAT is likely to remain one of the most important sources of revenue in future,
both in a stable and a turbulent economy. It is, therefore, imperative to limit VAT’s exposure
to organised fraud and fraud/evasion on a small scale, whose cumulative effect on receipts can
be substantial.
4.3 Changing the Way VAT is Collected: Real-time Solutions
Several features of VAT’s design, labelled the ABCs of VAT fraud by Richard Baldwin, make
the tax susceptible to abuse by fraudsters, namely: a) Companies collect VAT on behalf of
tax authorities, hence VAT passes through private hands; b) VAT is remitted through periodic
returns, which means that there is a delay between the collection and the payment of the tax
to the government; c) due to the destination principle, importers collect the full-value added of
the imported goods.4
VAT fraud is predominantly technology-intensive, especially with regard to digital prod-
ucts such as CO2 permits, VoIP services and all of the rapid funds transfers among fraudsters
(Ainsworth, 2011a). Fraud in fictitious goods are a perfect fit with laptop technology. Com-
pared to technology’s speed of development and its use in the commitment of fraud, the EU VAT
system has been slow to react and resistant to change, a fact acknowledged by the European
Commission (2010) and especially emphasised by Williams (2009). There is a growing awareness
that in order to fight VAT fraud effectively, technologically, tax administrations should be on a
par with fraudsters. Given the technological means of perpetrating fraud, it would be difficult
for initial policies addressing VAT’s weak links to ignore the utilisation of technology or lag be-
hind its advances. As an important side-effect, modernising VAT would reinforce its flexibility
to two increasingly visible trends: the general shift towards indirect taxation and the move away
from cash in favour of electronic payments.
Reforming VAT towards greater reliance on technology in general, and cashless payments in
particular, is also in line with the objectives of SEPA as outlined in the Fourth Progress Report.
Specifically, SEPA aims toward standardised common payment instruments, infrastructure, pro-
4Richard Baldwin, EU VAT fraud. Available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/256.
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cedures and standards, which do not distinguish between national and cross-border payments
within the Euro zone (European Central Bank, 2006). Such development would likely promote
substantial economies of scale and is a logical next step in strengthening the Single Market. The
introduction of the Euro in 2002 produced a single Euro payment area in cash. SEPA’s goal is
to extend this process to electronic payments.
Many of the schemes, systems, and products evolving under SEPA could facilitate, support
and assist the transition of the VAT system, resulting in enhanced fraud prevention in both B2B
and B2C transactions. Likewise, the timing of VAT reform within the roll out of SEPA is propi-
tious and synergetic, as it may encourage public administrations to migrate faster towards the
SEPA instruments. The ECB has repeatedly stressed the importance of public administrations’
involvement for the success of SEPA (European Central Bank, 2006, 2010).
Not surprisingly, a growing number of proposals for combatting VAT fraud are based mainly
on the role of financial intermediaries and technology, and generally target the very source of
the incentive for VAT fraud – the method of collection. The rest of the chapter focuses on
the PWC’s proposed blocked VAT accounts and RTvat.5 At the heart of these proposals lies
the principle of split-payment also known as VAT withholding, which splits each (electronic)
payment into a taxable amount that goes to the seller, and a VAT amount, transferred into
blocked VAT accounts (PWC) or directly to the Treasury (RTvat). Since blocked VAT accounts
can be seen as a subset of the RTvat proposal, they are analysed first.
4.3.1 Blocked VAT accounts
A blocked VAT account can be used for no other purpose but incoming and outgoing VAT
payments as well as settlement of net VAT liabilities at the end of the reporting period. If
the balance in the account is not enough to cover an outgoing payment, the payment should
be processed through the firm’s regular bank account. The mechanism is described in Figure
4.2. The blocked VAT account targets points a) and b) outlined above. First, VAT, at least on
electronic transactions, is no longer remitted by firms, i.e. the tax never ends up in private bank
accounts. Instead, the role of a VAT collector is delegated to the banking system/card companies,
with their services being purely intermediary. There will of course be a fee for these intermediary
services and it is not specified in any proposals which party will bear the cost of intermediation.
Second, the tax is collected in real-time, although a delay in refunds remains under the PWC’s
proposal. Note that split-payment preserves the system of fractionated payments, but shifts the
collection of the tax from the seller to the buyer, who effectively transfers the tax through a
financial institution.
Any B2B bank/card transaction is already highly visible and easily subjected to scrutiny by
the tax administration, which raises the question about the usefulness of VAT accounts. The
5Other technology-based proposals such as VAT locator number, digital VAT, and Mittler Model, reviewed
in Ainsworth, (2011a,b) are outside the scope of the chapter. In addition to VAT accounts at various bank or
automated clearing house levels, PWC envisage the creation of central VAT monitoring database, the certifica-
tion of service providers, software or taxable persons as well as provide a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed
alternatives.
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fact that VAT is in a private bank account facilitates the establishment of an audit trail if fraud
is suspected, but does not preclude missing trader and other types of frauds from happening. By
taking away firms’ access to VAT, a blocked account would prevent such fraud, simultaneously
reducing the number of audits. VAT accounts will only be effective if they bring into the system
companies that wish to remain outside the system. Thus, if VAT accounts are optional, they are
likely to be inconsequential.6 Yet, provided that blocked accounts have a mandatory character,
issues emerge on what firms should be covered: only exporters, firms in risky sectors, or all
VAT-registered traders.
An additional consequence of a blocked VAT account is that a record of each transaction
will be available by a third party, in this case a bank. The higher the number of transactions
executed through the financial intermediaries, the lower the reporting requirements of a firm,
who will basically receive a pre-filled VAT return, amend it if necessary, and return it to the tax
authorities.7,8
The importance of third-party reporting was studied by Kleven et al. (2011) for individual
taxation in Denmark, where the Danish tax authorities receive most information reports regard-
ing but not limited to personal income from third parties, and not from the taxpayer himself.
In fact, almost 100% of salary and wage payments are accomplished via credit transfers. The
taxpayer, however, has the option to adjust the pre-populated return. This type of return-free
tax system is called tax agency reconciliation system (Denmark, Sweden) as opposed to an exact
withholding system (the UK). The low levels of tax evasion in Denmark are explained accord-
ingly with the efficient checks of third-party reporting. In other words, even if taxpayers are
willing to cheat, they are unable to do so (Kleven et al., 2011). Besides the Scandinavian coun-
tries, currently Belgium, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia have partially
or fully adopted pre-filled PIT returns.
The involvement of financial intermediaries is an attempt to move VAT closer to a return-free
system through the increased use of electronic payment instruments and in fact, the elimination
of voluntary compliance by firms subject to VAT withholding. Borselli (2011) notes that the
Italian tax administration already has information transmitted by banks and financial interme-
diaries on a regular basis concerning the transactions of taxpayers who are under tax assessment.
Ainsworth (2011b) points to the Latin American countries as the pioneers in VAT withhold-
ing. Currently Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and Mexico have implemented
6VAT accounts will be most effective against MT fraud, but do not address evasion through under-reporting,
non-registration, fictitious invoices, etc. VAT accounts are also not the only way to induce, and even force,
traders to pass transactions through banks. Harrison and Krelove (2005) point out that many countries, including
France, Hungary, Turkey, and Denmark, require that transactions above a stipulated amount should go through
the banking system. In more extreme cases, Azerbaijan refuses VAT credit if purchases were done in cash.
7This is an oversimplification of the procedure, as the tax point, or equivalently the time of supply, can vary
between the date the invoice is issued, the day of payment, or the day of the physical supply of goods. Gradual
incorporation of B2C transactions into the split-payment system could make such pre-filled returns more likely.
8From January 2011, Section 6050W to Title 26 of the US Code requires that banks, third-party settlement
organisations, and other organisations with contractual obligations in the settlement of payment cards send annual
reports to the IRS regarding data on payments made to merchants via debit/credit cards and other electronic
means. IRS can match this information with the sales reported on merchants’ tax returns. A similar policy
was enacted in Turkey in 2008 – VAT registered traders can check their monthly credit card sales online when
preparing their VAT returns.
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Supplier (S) sells goods/services to Taxable person (TP). TP’s bank transfers the taxable amount 
A to S’s regular bank account. The VAT amount, tA, is paid from TP’s blocked VAT account into 
S’s blocked VAT account (Scenario i) if enough funds are available, or from TP’s regular bank 
account if there are insuffiicient funds in TP’s blocked VAT account (Scenario ii). TP sells goods/
services to Customer (C). C’s bank transfers the taxable amount B to TP’s regular bank account. 
The VAT amount, tB, is paid from C’s blocked VAT account into TP’s blocked VAT account 
(Scenario I) if enough funds are available, or from C’s regular bank account if there are insuffiicient 
funds in C’s blocked VAT account (Scenario II). t is the VAT rate. For simplicity, steps involving 
the automated clearinghouse are omitted. Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2010).
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VAT withholding regimes, under which, if the buyer (business or final customer) chooses to pay
via a bank or by card, the payment is automatically split into the taxable amount and the VAT
component. The rate of VAT withholding is not always 100% and in Ecuador it varies between
30% to 100%, mainly to tackle cash flow issues.
In Europe, Bulgaria introduced obligatory VAT accounts in 2003 for VAT-registered traders.
The motivation was the country’s high estimated VAT gap ranging from 22% according to the
World Bank (2003) to 45% of VAT revenue in a report of the 39th National Assembly referenced
in Pashev (2007). Any VAT amount greater than e500 had to be paid to a supplier’s VAT
account. Before the introduction of the accounts, VAT credit had to be carried forward for
the next three reporting periods and any refund was subject to an audit. Once the accounts
were launched, however, a firm that paid at least 80% of the VAT on its transactions through
the VAT accounts could obtain a refund within 45 days, irrespective of whether or not it was
undergoing an audit (Pashev, 2007). Bulgaria abandoned the scheme in 2007. Given the revival
of the discussion on VAT accounts in PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2010) and the EC’s intention
to further investigate the split-payment mechanism, it is important to understand why VAT
accounts can under-perform as an anti-fraud device. Several points are worth elaborating on:
• As long as there are cash buyers at the end of a VAT chain, a blocked VAT account
mitigates, but cannot eradicate the missing trader fraud.
• Businesses are unable to use the funds in the blocked accounts as working capital. Severe
cash flow problems can arise for firms with thin profit margins, in times of economic crisis,
etc.
• Compliance costs can be disproportionately greater for small and medium enterprises, and
especially for micro enterprises.
The analysis that follows is equally valid for any general split-payment mechanism.
4.3.2 The problem with cash
Figure 4.3 shows a simple example borrowed from Pashev (2007) on how the VAT account system
was manipulated in Bulgaria to syphon off VAT. Trader B will go missing, but before he does,
he needs to acquire credit into his VAT account. First, he purchases goods from a non-VAT
registered trader, in order to prevent outflow of VAT from his regular bank account. He adds
value, and resells the goods to Trader C who transfers VAT into B’s account. Using this credit,
B can now purchase goods from D, which B will then sell to cash buyers, and disappear with the
tax, having zero credit into his blocked VAT account. As Pashev (2007) points out, if Traders C
and D are compliant, the evasion will be limited to the value added of B. Nevertheless, different
variations are possible, with multiple colluding traders, which can result in significant losses to
the treasury.
It is apparent, therefore, that as long as cash markets are easily accessible, VAT fraud cannot
be precluded even if VAT accounts are introduced. According to Pashev (2007), numerous
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compliant taxpayers filed legal cases against the tax administration for refund denial despite
the taxpayers’ diligent use of the VAT accounts. The speeding up of refunds and the weakening
of the audit requirement, which were the intended benefits of VAT accounts to honest traders,
backfired by accelerating the gains from fraud. The Bulgarian experience shows that audit
and monitoring remain of prime importance even if firms’ access to VAT is removed. Thus,
unless a sophisticated fraud-analysing function is implemented, the efficacy of a split-payment
arrangement would be undermined. A concerted effort to discourage the use of cash in the
economy is also called for.
Figure 4.3: EXAMPLE OF CHEATING WITH BLOCKED VAT ACCOUNTS
D
1) Trader B purchases goods X 
worth €10,000 from non-registered 
trader A. Trader B adds value of 
€1,000.
2) Trader B sells goods X to VAT-
registered trader C for €11,000, 
charging additionally €2,200 in 
VAT, assuming a VAT rate of 20%. 
Trader C deposits €2,200 into 
trader B’s VAT account. Trader C 
can subsequently sell goods X, 
collecting €2,200 in VAT, which he 
keeps as he is entitled to an 
equivalent refund.
3) Trader B purchases goods Y 
worth €11,000 from trader C. 
Trader B deposits €2,200 of VAT 
into trader C’s VAT account.
4) Trader B sells goods Y for 
€12,000 to cash buyers, collects 













4.3.3 The problem with cash flow
In the current system VAT payment is based on invoices issued instead of actual cash received for
businesses reporting on an accrual basis. This means that if a customer does not pay a supplier
before the day the VAT return is due, the supplier is stranded with a VAT bill, although he
has not been paid yet (if at all) for the transaction in question. In other words, the business
is experiencing negative float. To alleviate this problem, the UK, for example, offers a Cash
Accounting Scheme, under which eligible companies pay VAT only on cash received and vice
versa – VAT can be claimed only if the firm has paid its suppliers. Despite the availability of
alternative payment methods, Blackburn et al. (2005) report that in the UK 82.9% of businesses
adhere to the conventional quarterly invoice-based VAT payment. This figure is sourced from a
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business survey of more than 750 enterprises performed by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) in
2005. The UK VAT rate in 2005 was 17.5% and for 17.8% of the surveyed companies the timing
of VAT payment presented a “critical” or “major” cash flow issue, primarily due to unpredicted
fluctuations in sales, late payment by customers, and the general performance of the business
(Blackburn et al., 2005).
The growing reliance on indirect taxation, which generally translates into higher VAT rates,
will likely exacerbate cash flow problems. A survey of 295 SMEs by the British bank Aldermore
found that the 2.5pp increase in the UK VAT rate in 2011 put a heavy strain on the cash flow
of 35% of the surveyed firms.9 When faced with cash flow difficulties, the majority of firms
(59.1%) resort to bank overdraft, while 39.2% can delay payment to suppliers as documented
by Blackburn et al. (2005). Bank funding during a recession, however, is hard to procure, and
a long hold up of payments can worsen an already unstable cash flow.
The mechanism of split-payment, with or without a VAT account, introduces an additional
problem to the ones described above. In particular, 100% VAT withholding will effectively freeze
VAT on sales in suppliers’ VAT accounts, which can be problematic for firms realising a cash
benefit. The credit can still be used for paying VAT on purchases, but cannot be used as a
working capital. Ainsworth (2011b), for instance, notes that VAT withholding generated critical
cash flow problems in Cameroon, which resulted in the abolishment of the regime in 2010.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2010) do point out that a company with long days’ sales outstanding
(DSO), who collect VAT on sales after they have passed it to the tax authorities, would be
indifferent between the current VAT system and VAT accounts. While this is true for industries
like construction, media and manufacturing, with an average DSO of about 70 days, for retail,
logistics, and real estate with a DSO of 15 days on average, the loss of working capital can
be palpable (Rebel and Kester, 2011). A non-trivial 38% of SMEs in the EU are concentrated
within the distributive trades, real estate and transportation and storage, employing about 30
million people (Eurostat, 2011).
4.3.4 Compliance costs
A VAT account, or any other split-payment mechanism, unavoidably yields additional transac-
tion costs in the form of payment orders, account-keeping fees, transaction fees, etc. Compliance
costs could be of small significance to big companies, who already conduct business through elec-
tronic banking and have sophisticated computerised accounting systems. Provided that refunds
are sped up through a VAT account, big companies are unlikely to oppose such an arrangement.
Administrative costs can be disproportionately burdensome for SMEs, however, imposing major
re-adjustments in their payment practices. Harrison and Krelove (2005) single out the cost on
SMEs as one of VAT accounts’ main disadvantages. The overwhelming majority of enterprises in
the EU are SMEs (99.8%) responsible for two out of every three jobs, and 58.6% of value-added
in the non-financial sector (Eurostat, 2011). A split-payment system therefore, runs the risk of
9Summary of the findings of the survey is available at http://www.aldermore.co.uk/about/
news-press-releases/2011/01/vat-rise/.
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collecting more revenue at the expense of small business.
If transactions generating VAT amounts below a stipulated threshold are excluded from the
VAT account scheme, an incentive arises to break up transactions into smaller ones in order
to avoid both administrative costs and the blocking of capital in the account. Conversely,
presuming that costs cannot easily be passed down to the consumer, they can be minimised by
the consolidation of transactions. Such consolidation could lead to distortions in competition
as big purchases would be more convenient from a single supplier, instead of several (Conrad,
2006).
4.3.5 Steps towards an optimal split-payment system
In the context of the obstacles to changing VAT’s collection method, several policy recommen-
dations emerge. First, for the viability of a split-payment system to be maintained, the general
trend towards cashless transactions should be promoted. By design, cash transactions remain
beyond the reach of any split-payment mechanism. Humphrey et. al. (2004) observe that with
legal demand for cash falling, government provision of cash will increasingly be utilised for the
payment of illegal activities such as tax evasion, money laundering, and drugs. Simultaneously,
the use of cashless payment systems is growing, clearly demonstrated by the quick pace with
which debit cards replace cash in the majority of Member States, and especially in the Scandi-
navian countries. Nevertheless, according to Amromin and Chakravorti (2007), the aggregate
demand for cash has not decreased substantially, in spite of the growing adoption of non-cash
payment instruments. In addition to being a store of value and medium of payment, cash has
one prominent advantage: it is anonymous.
Figure 4.4 depicts the growth rates of the value of transactions of all cards issued in the
EU countries, the value of ATM cash withdrawals as well as the Over-the-counter (OTC) with-
drawals, all scaled by GDP.10 Both cards and ATM cash grew significantly, albeit at a decreasing
rate. From 2005 onwards, the growth rate of cash was modest and turned negative in 2010. Even
though ATM distributions of cash were increasing, throughout the same period, OTC with-
drawals declined steadily, highlighting the fact that as debit/credit cards became widespread
payment instruments, bank branches were replaced by ATMs as the primary source of cash to
the public, with the overall demand for cash remaining stable.
In Figure 4.5, the EU countries are plotted in order of increasing estimated VAT gaps for
2009. The graph also shows the value of card transactions as a percent of GDP for the same
year. In general, the higher the penetration of electronic payments, the smaller the VAT gap.
A notable exception is the UK with a large estimated VAT gap regardless of substantial card
popularity. Yet, any conclusion about a correlation between the VAT gap and the prevalent types
of payment would be premature, as many country-specific factors should first be accounted for,
herein tax morale and the efficiency of the tax administration. Furthermore, the estimates of
the VAT gap, which is defined as the difference between theoretical and actual VAT receipts,
10Data for OTC withdrawals is available for limited set of EU countries, namely the Czech Republic, Germany,
Spain, Finland, the UK, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, and Slovakia, and for some of these
countries, only for a single year.
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divided by theoretical revenue, should be viewed with extreme caution, given Reckon LLP’s
methodology and the imposed assumptions.
Complementing the rise in electronic transactions is the launch of SEPA’s credit transfer and
direct debit in January 2008 and November 2009, respectively. Common European card schemes
compliant with SEPA are also underway, principally targeting retail payments. Development
of online or internet payment (e-payment) and mobile payment (m-payment) services are on
SEPA’s agenda as well (European Central Bank, 2010).
Mobile payment platforms such as Barclays’ Pingit and Singapore’s Swiff already offer pay-
ments between individuals, merchants and banks through mobile devices such as smart phones
and tablets. In fact, m-payments are one of the fastest growing markets. Juniper Research fore-
casts that m-payments for digital and physical goods, mobile money transfers and Near Field
Communication transactions will jump from $240 billion in 2011 to $670 billion in 2015, while
the number of mobile money users will double by 2013.11
Another major development is the adoption of ISO 20022 by a growing number of institutions.
ISO 20022 is a message standard, whose primary syntax is XML, used by the financial industry
in the exchange of data. According to SWIFT (2010), ISO 20022 serves as an “unification tool”
across the various standards currently used in the industry. Not only do part of the financial
community migrate to ISO 20022, but those for whom migration costs are prohibitive, can
have their message standard mapped into ISO 20022 by middleware. This enables the seamless
interoperability of various standards, which is essential for cross-border transactions, among
many others (SWIFT, 2010).
Second, a system whose goal is to collect VAT at real-time should strive to refund VAT in
real-time as well in order to avoid the cash flow issues mentioned above. With an automated VAT
collection, speedy refunds are likely, but hinge entirely on the efficiency of a central auditing
function that can flag suspicious transactions, trigger audits, and most importantly, prevent
fraudulent refunds. Such function is envisaged under RTvat and is discussed below. As an
intermediate step, it is worthwhile considering Pakistan’s categorisation of taxpayers as “gold”
for refund claimants with minimal revenue risk, “silver” for claimants with moderate risk, and
“others,” described and recommended as a sound practice by Harrison and Krelove (2005). Gold
claimants receive refunds within 3-5 days, silver–within 15 days, while regular claimants are
subject to the statutory deadlines. Since split-payment can impose a considerable burden on
compliant traders, expediting refunds, or equivalently minimising the interference of the VAT
system on cash flow, will make the mechanism more appealing.
Third, transaction costs on electronic payments constitute a significant concern for SMEs,
and especially micro-enterprises, and need to be addressed. With the launch of SEPA, domestic
payment infrastructures will eventually be replaced by a single pan-European system. It is
argued that the integration can culminate in significant economies of scale and scope, leading
to pronounced reductions in payment costs. Bolt and Chakravorti (2010) give TARGET-2 as
an example of an interbank single shared platform, which, by consolidating 15 national gross
11http://juniperresearch.com/viewpressrelease.php?pr=250
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Figure 4.4: GROWTH RATES OF VALUE OF CARD TRANSACTIONS, ATM AND OTC WITHDRAWALS
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real-time settlement systems, generated a considerable fall in the average fee per transaction.
Estimating scale economies for point of sale and bill payments in Norway, Belgium and the
Netherlands, Bolt and Humphrey (2007) find that the elasticity of operating costs with respect
to payment volume ranges between 0.25-0.30. This means that a 1% increase in volume increases
costs by 0.25-0.30%.
The authors observe that with time, expansions in debit card volume will naturally lower the
average cost of debit card use to that of cash. Alternatively and preferably, consolidation of card
processing centres in the EU can achieve even larger scale benefits of about 33% lower processing
costs based on the authors estimates of the cost elasticity (Bolt and Humphrey, 2007).
In the Green Paper on an integrated European market for card, internet and mobile pay-
ments, however, European Commission (2012) notes that despite the rising volume of card
payments and the generated large scale effects, no considerable fall in consumer costs, inter-
bank, or merchant fees has occurred over the last decade. The Commission criticises multilat-
eral inter-change fees for hampering competition, leading to market fragmentation, and lacking
transparency. The opaqueness of the cost of payment services results in consumer choices of
payment instruments based solely on consumer fees, which may or may not be the optimal
payment method for merchants, given the merchant service charges (MSC). Since merchants
typically pass their transaction costs on to consumers, the lack of information on MSC means
that consumers make suboptimal choices (European Commission, 2012).
Transaction fees play a central role in determining the pace with which cashless payments
are adopted. Given the compliance costs they would impose on business if VAT is collected
through split-payment, the amount of charges and their potential to decline with volume would
be crucial when assessing the pros and cons of VAT withholding.12
4.3.6 RTvat
The proposal for VAT reform most consistent with the objectives outlined above is real-time
VAT, or RTvat, put forward by Chris Williams, a chairman of the RTvat Executive Committee.
In the literature, RTvat has been discussed by (Ainsworth, 2011a,b). RTvat is envisioned as a
real-time system based on already existing card payment platforms. It will operate through a
network of interconnected server farms in all 27 Member States, whose role would be to pass
payments through an automated clearing house, charge an interchange fee, split the payment
into taxable amount and VAT due on the transaction, and subsequently distribute the funds
12Learning from countries with extensive experience in the use of debit cards can also be beneficial. Denmark’s
Dankort, introduced in 1983 in a joint venture by the Danish banks, is widely used in Denmark and is one of
the cheapest cards in the EU. Card holders pay no fees for face-to-face transactions, and neither did businesses
until 2005 (Konkurrencestyrelsen, 2010). After 2005, firms paid a subscription fee to the issuer, covering 25%
of the card maintenance costs. After 2009, the subscription fees, based on number of transactions, amounted
to 50% of the costs. Despite a 61% increase in businesses’ Dankort costs between 2009 and 2010, the card still
remains cheap relative to most debit cards in Europe. There are 4.2 million cards in Denmark for 3.9 million
Danes over the age of 18. 41% of all transactions in the bricks and mortar trade were done with Dankort
(Konkurrencestyrelsen, 2010). Dankort transactions amounted to 14.3% of GDP, or close to 30% of private
consumption in 2007. According to Amromin and Chakravorti (2007), the critical step leading to an explosive
growth in debit cards use is the adoption of card terminals by merchants. The Danish case shows that charging
no fees for merchants for years on end, embedded the card in the market.
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to the relevant financial institutions and tax authorities (Williams, 2009). Williams further
recommends the introduction of a B2B debit card connected to both the firm’s VAT identity
and business bank account.
Under RTvat, blocked VAT accounts are unnecessary as the VAT amount will be transferred
directly to the tax authorities. All the information required to make a real-time decision regard-
ing the validity of a refund claim should be available to the tax administrators, enabling quicker
refunds, and for traders with solid compliance history, refund automation.
RTvat would be fully operational under both the origin and destination principles for cross-
border transactions. Under the origin principle, a seller in country A applies country A’s VAT
rate for a sale to a customer in country B. Once the customer’s bank authorises the payment, the
RTvat servers split the payment into the value of the supply, sent to the seller’s bank account,
and the VAT amount, x, sent to country A’s tax authorities. Country A’s tax authorities are
then informed of a VAT return due in the amount of x, which is remitted to the server network.
At this point a fraud function becomes activated, and if no red flags are raised, x is returned
to the buyer’s bank account by Country B’s tax authorities (Ainsworth, 2011b). Under the
destination principle, the redundant step of moving the VAT amount across two countries is
removed. VAT is charged at country B’s rate and the refund process takes place only in country
B.
In a Communication addressing the outcome of the public debate on VAT, the EC stated
that “...the Commission has come to the conclusion that there are no longer any valid reasons
for this objective [the origin system], and will propose that it should be abandoned” (European
Commission, 2011a). This statement strongly suggests that intra-EU transactions will continue
to be conducted under the destination principle.
4.3.7 IT-audits and privacy implications
A central feature of RTvat is the Tax Authority Settlement System (TASS), that would settle
VAT liabilities, and would also provide state-of-the-art real-time fraud analysis. According to
Williams (2011), in a two-tier process, the fraud tool would compare the financial performance
of the parties involved in a transaction, as well as compare the companies to a similar pool of
firms based on size, type of business, location and other characteristics. TASS would be built
on technology used by credit card companies.13
13Fraud analysis systems are already being put in place in countries with serious VAT compliance issues. An
example is China, which launched a Golden Tax Project at the time it adopted the VAT system. The objective of
the Project is to “...construct a centralised invoice clearing system that will permit the ... tax authorities to detect
and reject fake invoices in real time, and to quickly and accurately identify the culprits issuing them” (Winn and
Zhang, 2010). The Chinese system is not based on real-time collection, but e-invoicing and massive cross-checking.
Whenever an electronic invoice is issued, a numerical cipher is generated, based on the information in the invoice,
issue date, etc. When traders submit their invoices for the periodic VAT return, the information in the cipher
is decrypted, and matched to the unencrypted data. To claim credit, general VAT traders must go through this
certification process for every VAT special invoice they have paid (Winn and Zhang, 2010). VAT special invoices
show the purchase price and the VAT amount separately, and can be used to claim VAT. In contrast, General
VAT invoices, listing the full amount, price plus VAT, cannot be used for refund purposes. Although the authors
describe the procedure as “draconian”, the number of phoney invoices has decreased. However, Harrison and
Krelove (2005) observe that neither the cost of administering this large-scale cross-checking of invoices, nor the
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TASS was criticised by Ainsworth (2011a) on the grounds of the security of the firm-level
confidential data it contains, specifically how this information would be protected against hacking
attacks, but also how its authenticity would be verified once it is submitted to the system. This
is valid criticism. In fact, if the EU decides to adopt a split-payment mechanism as a part of
a real-time VAT collection, such a move would require massive interdisciplinary collaborative
effort, shifting the debate towards the security and stability of the VAT server network, its
fault-tolerance and non-availability fall back.
There are also the questions of the acceptable degree of invasiveness of the tax administra-
tion’s access to business information, the optimal amount of interchange fees, and crucially, the
financing of the system. In particular, it is unclear what type of information would be required
for TASS to perform effectively. Likewise, under PWC’s blocked VAT accounts, “enriched” data
regarding the VAT treatment of the transaction is needed for payment requests. RTvat’s method
of accessing company information, which would be used for real-time auditing, is not specified.
On the whole, it would be difficult, if not impossible to separate audit-relevant data from
sensitive personal information like personnel data or private correspondence. In this respect,
TASS may be inconsistent with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as well
as Article 6 of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data. Such was the case, for example, with the Danish Ministry of Taxation’s
(DMT) proposal for the amendment of the Danish Tax Control Act in 2010 regarding the tax
administration’s access to firm data for purposes of tax control. A further discussion of the
Danish bill is worthwhile, given its parallels with TASS.
As part of a move towards the digitisation of communication between the public and the
private sector, DMT proposed that the Danish tax authorities should have the possibility to
undertake data mirroring of firms’ electronic devices in order to retrieve audit-relevant data
without a court order (Skatteministeriet J. 2010-711-0044, 2010).14 By electronic devices it is
understood not only hard disks, CD-ROM, and USB keys, but also electronic programs and
programme systems. According to the proposal, data mirroring can alleviate administrative
burdens in terms of printing costs of the required accounting documentation as well as limit the
duration of inspections on the premises of audited companies, and is therefore, a “logical” and
“natural” response of the tax authorities to the developments in companies’ use of information
technology. The trade-off between infringement of privacy and efficient tax collection is clearly
demonstrated in the DMT’s assessment that “...restricting the scope of Article 6 of the Data
Protection Directive would be necessary and proportionate relative to the potential loss of tax
revenue and the crucial significance of accounting data for an effective tax control (authors’
translation)” (Skatteministeriet J. 2010-711-0044, 2010).15 The extent to which tax administra-
tions have the discretionary power to determine whether a piece of information is audit-relevant
or not is also uncertain.
compliance burden on taxpayers is known.
14Data mirroring is the creation of identical electronic copies of digital content in real-time.
15“Det er dog Skatteministeriets vurdering, at en begrænsning af rækkevidden i persondatadirektivets artikel
6 vil være nødvendig og forholdsmæssig i betragtning af det potentielle tab af skatteindtægter og regnskabso-
plysningernes afgørende betydning for en effectiv skattekontrol.”
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The controversial issue of the acceptable degree of data provision aside, it is uncertain how
confidential firm information would be safeguarded, whether in storage or while being transmit-
ted across networks. Enterprises typically have a data security policy in place as well as data
loss prevention solutions for confidential information such as customers, transactions, partners,
etc. If such type of data is collected by the TASS, then the level of protection provided by
the tax authorities should be at least commensurate with that of the enterprise-specific security
policies, which can be a tough requirement to fulfil.
Another problem is how RTvat is going to handle electronic payments, which are not executed
through a card or a bank. According to a survey on the future of money conducted by Pew
Internet and Elon University, 65 out of the 100 technology experts participating in the survey
agreed with the statement that “By 2020, most people would have embraced and fully adopted
the use of smart-device swiping for purchases they make, nearly eliminating the need for cash
or credit cards” (Smith et al., 2012). Yet, according to European Commission (2012), mobile
phone manufacturers, payment service providers, and mobile network operators have still not
developed interoperable payment solutions. Will RTvat be able to cover the whole spectrum
of payment methods or be adaptable to emerging innovations? If not, VAT fraud can easily
migrate to systems, which do not split payments.
Generally, all challenges arising out of the economy’s progression towards cashless pay-
ment systems apply equally to RTvat, namely issues of data privacy and protection, as well
as anonymity. These are topics of very serious concern to the majority of EU citizens as demon-
strated by a large Eurobarometer survey in 2012 of the attitudes on data protection and electronic
identity (European Commission, 2011b). Table 4.3 presents a selection of the questions covered
by the survey. On average, 70% of the interviewees considered financial information such as
salary, bank details and credit record to be personal. 54% were concerned that their payment
card behaviour was recorded, while for mobile phones this percentage is slightly lower – 49%.
Every third respondent out of ten resorts to transactions in cash as a strategy not to disclose his
or her identity. 44% of all interviewed in Poland, 40% in Austria, and 39% in Hungary prefer the
anonymity of cash to reported transactions, whereas in the Netherlands, Finland, and Denmark
this method of identity protection is used only by 15%, 17% and 18%, respectively.
While cash would likely remain the preferred method of payment for illegal transactions,
the survey unambiguously shows that cash is also used by some consumers as an alternative to
a system they consider unsafe, either due to privacy concerns, or as a way to overcome risks
inherent in cashless payments such as susceptibility to fraud.
Even though the RTvat’s proposal for VAT is a logical outcome of the digitalisation of
payments as well as the level of VAT fraud in the EU, it is unlikely that it is going to be
compatible with EU privacy laws, especially in light of the 2012 proposal for reform of the
EU’s legal framework for the protection of personal data. Yet, the alternative is a patchwork of
enforcement measures, mainly on a national level, leading to divergence instead of harmonisation
of the VAT systems within the EU.
One of the risks of an uncoordinated anti-fraud strategy, especially in regard to external
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Sweden 82 37 28 21 42
Denmark 91 36 40 18 37
Finland 88 35 31 17 39
United Kingdom 87 54 48 29 49
Netherlands 90 43 44 15 26
Luxembourg 90 51 56 29 33
Estonia 79 35 36 29 45
France 81 64 55 18 47
Portugal 64 51 47 28 56
Belgium 81 56 51 23 28
Ireland 89 63 56 34 36
Slovenia 88 51 42 34 44
Austria 73 49 44 40 30
Spain 75 53 50 32 52
Latvia 79 49 41 38 48
Cyprus 70 45 49 35 38
Germany 87 62 55 37 41
Malta 83 35 39 27 33
Lithuania 70 34 37 33 45
Italy 70 58 53 26 26
Slovakia 82 54 46 34 29
Poland 44 42 45 44 53
Hungary 65 51 47 39 32
Czech Republic 82 64 63 34 40
Greece 64 67 65 34 42
Romania 46 30 31 28 25
Bulgaria 55 32 38 33 39
EU-27 75 54 49 30 41
Source: European Commission (2011b). The base of Eurobarometer 359 survey is 26,574 EU citizens.
a Which of the following types of information and data that are related to you do you consider as personal?
b Nowadays, cameras, cards, and websites record your behaviour, for a range of reasons. Are you very concerned,
fairly concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned about your behaviour being recorded? Via payment
cards (location and spending)
c Nowadays, cameras, cards, and websites record your behaviour, for a range of reasons. Are you very concerned,
fairly concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned about your behaviour being recorded? Via mobile
phone/ mobile Internet (call content, geo-location)
d In your daily life what do you do to protect your identity?
e I will read out a risk of potential risks. According to you, what are the most important risks connected with
disclosure?
f The base is 40% of the whole sample
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EU trade, is that dishonest importers will “shop” for the countries with least efficient tax ad-
ministrations and anti-fraud policies. A case in point is Italy, whose imports of clothes from
China decreased when the country’s Customs Agency was empowered to adjust suspiciously low
import value on the basis of market prices, transportation costs, and other general information
(Borselli, 2011). As a result, Borselli (2011) reports, the average import prices for goods from
China more than doubled from 2005 to 2010. In contrast, China’s clothing imports with the rest
of the EU doubled, while prices grew at a much slower pace than that in Italy. This example
illustrates that unless a common approach is adopted at EU level, there are means to circumvent
any anti-under-invoicing policy by simply redirecting trade, thus sabotaging genuine effort to
combat fraud.
4.4 Conclusion
Over the last decade, major developments in technology have enabled VAT fraud on an un-
precedented scale. Technology-oriented reforms of the VAT system are not only appealing due
to their efficiency and revenue-maximising potential, but also because of the natural progression
of the economy towards cashless transactions. Generally, there are two broad ways to approach
the reform: Keeping voluntary compliance as a corner stone of the tax system with stringent
and modern enforcement measures in place, or eliminating voluntary compliance in a return-free
system, in which traders do not have a choice but to comply. As discussed above, the latter
option would likely require a legally controversial disclosure of information and raises serious
privacy concerns.
While it is distinctly possible that removing traders access to VAT would prevent the large
majority of attempted frauds, VAT returns, and overall the main issues related to VAT, would be
a matter of unilateral decision-making and processing by a single authority: tax administrations.
This would render VAT less transparent for firms and would entail a great deal of trust in the
tax authorities. The extent to which VAT fraud can be contained without excessive enforcement
costs on compliant firms under the current method of VAT collection may be the deciding factor
for the direction and scope of VAT reform.
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Appendix 4.1: VAT features in brief
VAT, as currently levied in the EU, is a general indirect tax on consumption. It is a non-
cumulative multi-stage tax, with the value added calculated using the tax credit method. Under
this method, liability is obtained by subtracting VAT on a firm’s purchases from VAT due on
its sales.16
Since firms can deduct VAT on investments in capital assets, even though they are the final
consumers of the capital, the tax base of VAT is aggregate consumption (Department of the
Treasury, 1984). If capital goods’ VAT were not deductible (gross product VAT), or only the
depreciation on the capital goods were deductible (income type VAT), then the tax would dis-
criminate in favour of labour-intensive firms to the detriment of capital-intensive businesses. A
consumption-type VAT, however, is neutral with respect to the factors of production. Further-
more, unlike a cascading tax, defined as a tax imposed at every stage inclusive of previously
paid tax, VAT is neutral to management control. In other words, the incentive to reduce the
tax incidence through horizontal or vertical integration, which in effect shorten the tax chain, is
eliminated under VAT.17
Some of VAT’s most praised features are its “self-administering” and “self-policing” qualities
(Directorate General for Research, 1995). The statutory incidence of the tax lies with firms, as
they are the collectors and payers of VAT to the tax authorities. Moreover, at least in theory, the
tax credit method ensures that firms act as efficient collecting agents. This is so, because a firm
has an incentive to report its purchases in full, its purchases are other firms’ sales, and hence
the self-checking aspect of VAT.18 The economic incidence falls on final consumers, i.e. the tax
is shifted to consumers through higher prices. The fractionated system of payment secures a
portion of the tax due by the final consumer in stages.
VAT is an excellent source of revenue given its general character. Ideally, it would not
distinguish between goods and services when these are intended for personal consumption. This
is all the more necessary, since some services are close substitutes for goods. Taxation at one
uniform rate, therefore, would leave the relative prices of goods and services unchanged, thus
not distorting consumers’ choices.
16Tait (1988), Terra and Kajus (2011) (Chapters 7 and 8) and Department of the Treasury (1984) (Chapters
2 and 3) among others offer a comprehensive analysis of the legal and economic aspects of VAT.
17Possibly the strongest impetus behind the adoption of VAT in Europe was the impossibility to guarantee
the legal neutrality of a cascading tax. To ensure legal neutrality, the amount of tax payable under a turnover
tax should be certain (i.e. expressed as a percent of the retail price) and equal for identical products, a condition
which a cascading tax could not meet (Terra and Kajus, 2011).
18In practice, the self-checking mechanism is described as “illusory” ’ or plainly not working. See Keen and
Smith (2006) and Tait (1988), page 304.
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In reality, there are numerous reduced and super-reduced VAT rates in the EU, applying
especially to education, medical products, housing, certain services provided by public authori-
ties, social services, and others (Taxation and Customs Union, 2012).19 Compared to Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Korea and Singapore that have a low single standard VAT rate levied
on a broad base, the EU’s VAT base is narrow with numerous zero and reduced rates (Owens
et. al, 2011). Rate differentiation not only increases the administrative complexity of VAT and
the scope for fraud, but also generates non-neutrality in its design. Nevertheless, reduced rates
remain common in the EU, serving mainly as instruments of alleviating VAT’s regressivity, as
well as inducing certain consumption patterns.20
In the current VAT system, intra-EU and domestic transactions are not treated under the
same VAT rules. In particular, exports are zero-rated in the country of origin, with the exporter
receiving a refund of the VAT paid on his inputs. In this way the goods enter the country of
destination free of tax, subsequently being taxed at the local rates. This “de-tax-and-re-tax”
system is called a destination principle, and its purpose is to ensure that an imported good
bears the same tax burden when sold to consumers in a given country as any other domestically
produced good.
19According to the EU VAT Directive, Member States can have a standard rate not lower than 15%, and two
reduced rates of at least 5%. Denmark is the only EU country that currently does not have a reduced VAT rate.
20VAT is a regressive tax, because the higher the personal income becomes, the lower the proportion of
consumption. Reduced rates are aimed mainly at handling regressivity, although sometimes their purpose is to
produce a desired consumption effect or to correct externalities by taxing environmentally friendly goods at lower
rates. For example, smoking cessation products in the UK are subject to a reduced rate, and Portugal has a
parking rate for solar and alternative energy equipment.
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